




















Text © Michael Robinson 1986
Original edition published by Norvik Press 1986
This edition published by Ubiquity Press Ltd 2013
Cover illustration: Wonderland (1894) by August Strindberg, Nationalmuseum, 
Stockholm. Via Wikimedia Commons. Source: Google Art Project. Available at: http://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AAugust_Strindberg_-_Wonderland_-_Google_
Art_Project.jpg
Printed in the UK by Lightning Source
ISBN (paperback): 978-1-909188-01-3 
ISBN (EPUB): 978-1-909188-05-1 
ISBN (PDF): 978-1-909188-09-9
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/bab
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. 
To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ or send a 
letter to Creative Commons, 444 Castro Street, Suite 900, Mountain View, California, 
94041, USA. This licence allows for copying any part of the work for personal and 
commercial use, providing author attribution is clearly stated.
Suggested citation: 
Robinson, M 2013 Strindberg and Autobiography. Norvik Press/Ubiquity Press. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/bab
To read the online open access version of this  
book, either visit http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/bab 
or scan this QR code with your mobile device:
Contents
Preface i
Chapter One Writing a Life: An Approach to Strindberg’s Project 1
Chapter Two Writing Out and Repetition 21
Chapter Three Writing, not Speaking: Strindberg, Language,  
and the Self                     51
Chapter Four Plot and Counter Plot,  
or Reading and Composing the Text of the Self    93
Chapter Five Publishing the Private, or The Economics of Experience        123








This is a book about Strindberg and about autobiographical writing, about 
how a particular writer projects himself in language, the problems this 
entails, the subterfuges it engenders, about how he finds and loses himself 
there. It therefore attempts to place this central aspect of Strindberg’s project 
upon a more nuanced and substantial footing than the familiar tradition 
of biographical criticism in Strindberg studies normally permits, and does 
not restrict itself only to those works singled out by Strindberg as explicitly 
autobiographical. Nor, I should perhaps add, does it concern itself in any 
detailed way with the laborious examination of the relative accuracy of the 
life Strindberg attributed to himself – whether, for example, the description 
of his early years in The Son of a Servant as a time of fear and hunger is in fact 
belied by the evident plenitude in the way of food and drink as chronicled 
in his father’s household accounts. In any case, the myth a writer generates 
about his own experience is as significant a fact as any other, and a writer 
like Strindberg merely accentuates the way in which all of us live our lives 
as fictions in terms of the available narrative and plot structures, structures 
that incorporate those personal symbolic landscapes which (as Strindberg 
well knew) are in large part unconsciously fostered by the prevailing doxa 
or mythologies. I am aware, however, that the approach employed here 
remains partial. Notwithstanding his achievement in other fields, all of 
which, including his scientific preoccupations deserve to be taken seriously, 
Strindberg’s major achievement remains his drama. A consummate creator 
as well as player of roles, the mosaic work of character which he elaborated 
in his theatrical projections is an essential complement to the life traced in 
his prose works, and deserves to be studied as such. Moreover, like Janine 
Chasseguet- Smirgel, in her analysis of Strindberg in Pour une psychanalyse 
de l’art et de la créativité (Paris, 1971), “Je n’ai pas manqué toutefois d’être 
frappée par la pauvreté relative des thèmes des oeuvres biographiques si on 
les compare à la richesse des élaborations dont ces mêmes thèmes sont l’objet 
dans l’oeuvre dramatique.” Maybe the occasion to explore this elaborated 
wealth of drama will one day present itself. 
As it is, in the protracted passage of this study from its inception into 
typescript and on to print, there have been numerous developments in 
Strindberg studies. Not least has been the inauguration of the new National 
Edition of Strindberg’s Collected Works, the necessary replacement for John 
Landquist’s long-serving Samlade skrifter. But so far only a small proportion 
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of the anticipated seventy-seven volumes has appeared, none of them central 
works in Strindberg’s autobiographical sequence, and I have therefore 
continued to use Landquist’s edition. Hopefully, however, this will be one of 
the last books on Strindberg to do so. 
Over the same period, there has also been a welcome increase of interest 
in Strindberg, both in the United States and in Britain. Beginning with 
Evert Sprinchorn’s important Strindberg as Dramatist (New Haven, 1979) 
and reinforced by Harry Carlson’s Strindberg and the Poetry of Myth, Walter 
Johnson’s edition of the plays, new, accessible translations of Inferno and 
By the Open Sea, and the publication in Britain of biographies by Olof 
Lagercrantz and Michael Meyer, it is at last becoming possible to envisage a 
time when English readers will be able to make a more accurate assessment 
of Strindberg’s achievement in all its facets, though much still remains to be 
done, particularly in the way of translation. And perhaps, too, this will be 
accompanied by a more adventurous approach to Strindberg in the theatre, 
both as regards the selection of plays for production and the manner of their 
staging. The British theatre has accommodated Ibsen with relative comfort 
for many years, but it remains largely uncomprehending, even hostile, to the 
type of stage interpretation which Strindberg’s plays require. 
My debts in writing this study are several, and of different kinds, all 
invaluable. Part of Chapter One has appeared in a slightly different form in 
Scandinavica 23:2 (1984); I am grateful to the editor for permission to reprint 
it here. Some formulations from Chapter Three, again somewhat altered, 
were deployed in a paper on “Autobiography and Biography”, given at the 
British Scandinavian Conference at the University of Wales in 1985, and 
published in the Proceedings of the conference. 
While working on the original version of this study, I benefited from 
two generous grants from the Brita Mortensen fund at the University of 
Cambridge, and one from Clare College. These were of great assistance to 
me in enabling me to undertake research in Sweden which was decisive for 
the direction of my work. For three months in 1979 I was also the fortunate 
recipient of Strindbergssällskapet’s Strindberg Fellowship in Blå tornet; I am 
truly grateful to them for providing me with the opportunity to immerse 
myself in the minutiae of Strindberg’s life and manuscripts, a task made 
easier by the helpful staff of the manuscript department of the Royal Library 
in Stockholm. 
On a more personal level, I owe an enormous amount to Göran Printz-
Påhlson for his advice, sympathy and intellectual example in working out my 
ideas on Strindberg and autobiography, as well as to Ulla Printz-Påhlson for 
her frequent and generous hospitality. I am also grateful to Elinor Shaffer for 
her lively interest in this project, and to James McFarlane, both at an early 
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stage in my work and latterly for the care and patience he has bestowed in 
helping a computer illiterate to transform his typescript into print by way of 
modern technology. Needless to say, any errors that remain are indubitably 
my own. 
Finally, my debt to Siv for her support and encouragement in an enterprise 
whose outcome was sometimes in doubt is incalculable.

Chapter One
Writing a Life:  
An Approach to Strindberg’s Project 
He has dived under, in the Autobiographical Chaos, and swims we see not where.  
– Carlyle: Sartor Resartus 
In the bravura discourse on writing which forms the improbable introduction 
to a correspondence in which he will inscribe himself on the heart of his 
first wife, Siri von Essen, Strindberg declares: ‘A writer is only a reporter of 
what he has lived’ (I:190)1. The emphasis already placed on this sentence in 
the original has helped to foster the notion that, when writing, Strindberg 
merely transcribed remembered experience from the text recorded in 
his mind directly to the page in front of him. It is as if the rudimentary 
phonograph which furnishes his late experimental novella, The Roofing 
Feast, with an underlying structural image for its stream of consciousness 
technique, provides the critic with an apt metaphor for this recording and 
writing process. Just as the machine reproduces the music that is already 
traced on a cylinder so, each time the novel’s protagonist awakens, ‘the 
cylinder in the phonograph of his mind began to move again, emitting all 
his latest memories and impressions, but strictly in order exactly as they had 
been “recorded”’ (44:61). If for Rousseau memories are ineffaceably ‘gravé 
dans mon âme’,2 for Strindberg they are ineradicably printed upon the mind, 
and sustained by what he had come to regard as the authority of Swedenborg, 
his later work assumes ‘that every least thing that a man has thought, willed, 
spoken, done or even heard and seen is inscribed on his eternal or spiritual 
memory; and that the things there are never erased.’3 However difficult 
it may be to decipher, the past always takes the form of writing, at times 
uncomfortably lucid and conveniently linear, as in the instance from The 
Roofing Feast, at others burdened with resistance and only
A line with many coils upon it  
like the image of a script  
on blotting paper – back to front – 
forwards and backwards, up and down  
but in a mirror you can read the script (51:80). 
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In every case, however, this trace is the precious and indelible sign of an 
individual life and presence. As the Teacher in the dramatic fragment, The Isle 
of the Dead, points out, memory is ‘our capital’, the reading required of us if 
‘we are going to make use of our true dreams or our experiences!’ It is the place 
where each man’s story is written even as he lives it, an account which is at 
once a personal narrative and a moral ledger, a codex of his life and the index 
of his vice or virtue. Without the written text there would be no man: ‘If in one 
moment you could lose all remembrance, you would be like a book with white 
pages, less than a new-born child, and have to begin all over again!’ 4
Indeed, it is all too easy to capitulate to such images and accept at face value 
a conception of writing as the mere and immediate transcription of the lived 
into the written, especially when they are reinforced by the arguments with 
which Strindberg fervently advanced the utilitarian aesthetic he adopted during 
the 1880s. Even when composing historical fiction he insisted that ‘the warp is 
always taken from my own life’ (VII:154), and since he invariably maintained 
that writing predicates the experience of the writer as its foundation (‘to be 
able to portray every facet and hazard of life one must have lived it’ (46:72), he 
states, in A Blue Book), he frequently contends that an author’s only proper and 
possible subject is himself. Like Rousseau, who argued that ‘Nul ne peut écrire 
la vie d’un homme que lui -même. Sa manière d’être intérieure, sa véritable 
vie n’est connue que de lui’,5 he claims the autobiographical prerogative and 
extends it to other genres. Apparently disdaining the lure of invention, he 
asserts the precedence of the experimental autobiographical narrative, The Son 
of a Servant, over the fictional The People of Hemsö: ‘Not a novel, for the genre 
is false, we only really know fragments of other people’s lives, and can only 
write one novel, the one about our own life’ (VI:335). And what he particularly 
values is the author’s presence in the text. After reading Edvard Brandes’s play 
Superior Force (Overmagt), he tells him: ‘Of all the things you’ve written, this 
seems to me the most full of life, because you have given something of yourself. 
And what else should one give, when one knows so little about others!’ (VII:33), 
and more than twenty years later he criticises Birger Mörner for having failed 
to achieve the drastic display of his ‘entrails’ [inälvor] that alternately disgusted 
and compelled him in his own writing: ‘I’ve now read your book! All right! But 
you must write about yourself, about the important, remarkable things you 
have yourself experienced…. But you don’t want to, because opening your belly 
is painful (=Harakiri).’6 In fact Strindberg repeatedly stresses the continuity 
between living and writing, and even their identity. In a disarmingly simple 
observation from the Inferno period, he informs Torsten Hedlund that he is 
‘returning to [his] book! Although it is not a book; it is a life!’ (XI:100), while 
he explains to his sister, Elisabeth, that the art of the writer depends not upon 
invention but on the uninhibited exploitation of personal experience. To write 
Writing a Life 3
does not mean ‘making up things that have never happened; to write means 
relating what one has lived’, and what endangers such an undertaking is not 
a lack of ability, since’ anyone with education can write, that is to say, put his 
thoughts on paper’, but reticence, a reluctance to give oneself ‘to the paper’ and 
so achieve ‘the greatest form of pleasure and comfort’ (III:41–2) as one’s reward 
for releasing what is within.7
For his insistent misgivings about the moral propriety of imaginative writing 
are accompanied by a personal drive towards exposure and introspection 
which links the early assertion that ‘what we have been seeking to compile 
for thousands of years is the natural history of the human heart, and everyone 
can and must make their contribution’ (I:198), with the later declaration 
‘imaginative writing will gradually cease to exist. The future should see the 
setting up of offices at which at a certain age everyone anonymously handed 
in a truthful biography [sic]; it could become the data for a real science of 
man if such a thing were needed.’8 In any case, Strindberg was well-equipped 
to engage in continuous and rigorous introspection, and he often claimed to 
have mastered the complex art of regarding himself and his life objectively. 
Indeed, what distinguished him from critics of his subjectivity was, according 
to a letter of 1895, precisely his ability ‘to objectify [him]self ’ (X:351), a faculty 
he bestowed in turn upon The Unknown in To Damascus (29:175) and The 
Stranger in the chamber play The Burned House, who describes how he ‘now 
regarded [him]self as another, and observed and studied this other and his fate, 
which made me insensible to my own suffering’ (45:106), and in later years 
Strindberg frequently envisaged the past he had lived through as if it were the 
plot of a superior dramatist in which he was both actor and spectator, or the 
text and its reader. An expert in what Nietzsche termed ‘the art of staging and 
watching ourselves,’9 he thus caused Falkenström, one of the figures in whom 
he contrived this objectification, to remark in the novel Black Banners: ‘It has 
in fact seemed to me from an early age that my life was staged before me so that 
I would be able to observe all its facets. This reconciled me to my misfortunes, 
and taught me to perceive myself as an object’ (41: 196). 
Several factors, to which Strindberg himself sometimes draws attention, 
nurtured this tendency. There was what he once called ‘that damnable old faith 
of duty and asceticism’, his early pietism, which his Norwegian colleagues, 
Bjørnson and Jonas Lie, both regarded as the fundamental stratum of his 
character. To Lie the engaged polemicist he knew in the early 1880s, who 
advanced the claims of a socially conscious, scientific literature at the expense 
of the imagination, was a concealed but fanatical Pietist, passionately attracted 
to martyrdom, while Bjørnson perceived that regardless of his later experience, 
Strindberg remained, morally at least, faithful to the Pietism of his youth.10 
And when, in The Son of a Servant, Strindberg came to analyse the religious 
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perspective which in spite of everything continues to animate the text in 
which the judgement is made, he refers himself, if somewhat disparagingly, to 
‘Christianity’s individualism, with its eternal burrowing into the self and its 
imperfections’ (18:239), and indicates how ‘Christianity’s egotistical criticism 
of the self had accustomed him to occupy himself with his self, fondle it, cosset 
it, like another beloved person’ (18:271). ‘This habit of self -examination, which 
he derived from Christian soul-searching’ (18:213) acted as a stimulus, both to 
the continual inspection of himself in the mirror of his words, and in a lifelong 
inclination to identify with a series of Romantic protagonists (Karl Moor, 
Manfred, Cain) who have in common a disposition ‘to appear interesting in 
their own eyes’ (19:99), and in whom he also saw himself reflected. As Nils 
Norman has observed, in his astute study of Strindberg’s early religious ideas 
and experience:
That the psychological training involved in evangelical Christianity was 
of enormous significance for Strindberg as a writer, is obvious. When 
Strindberg became a Naturalist in the eighties, this also meant a return 
to behavioural patterns which had been implanted in him during his 
evangelical years. The confessional vein, which is already apparent in his 
early writing, but which first comes to the fore as a dominating feature 
in The Son of a Servant, has his youthful religious self-scrutiny as its self-
evident precondition.11 
In Strindberg’s case, therefore, the autobiographical enterprise is clearly 
related to the introspective religious tradition which Georges Gusdorf calls 
‘pietist’, a non literary tradition initially, consisting of works written with no 
explicit artistic intent or thought of publication, in which various individuals 
recorded their spiritual life in writing. However, the scrupulous observation 
of his thoughts and motives, which the believer was encouraged to perform, 
prepared a context in which later writers (Gusdorf points to Rousseau, Herder, 
Goethe, and Kierkegaard) thought and wrote. Thus spiritual autobiography 
moved from the private domain of correspondence and diary (at the most, 
confidential texts open only to a select group of readers such as Strindberg 
wrote for his youthful mentor, Edla Heijkorn), via exemplary and cautionary 
personal histories, to the commercial world of published literature, a trend 
which, in the 1880s, and culminating with The Son of a Servant, Strindberg 
sometimes suggests he is anxious to reverse. As Gusdorf writes: 
Le rôle du piétisme, dans l’histoire de l’autobiographie, aura été de susciter 
une conversion de l’attention vers l’espace du dedans… Lorsque diminuera 
la part de l’exigence religieuse, celle de la psychologie augmentera 
d’autant. Et l’autobiographie littéraire modern naîtra de la désacrilisation 
de l’espace du dedans. Ceux qui ne s’examinent plus devant Dieu et en 
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fonction de Dieu verront s’ouvrir à leur curiosité, à leur inquiétude, une 
région autonome de l’être humain.12 
But if the habit of constant self-scrutiny originally encouraged the combination 
of self-assertion and public confession that characterizes so much of Strindberg’s 
autobiographical writing (the one resisting and the other conceding the guilt 
he had become accustomed to seek and find), the desire to bear witness, 
which leads him to the extraordinary claim that he not only tells the truth 
but is the truth (‘But in me there is a brutal animal instinct for truth… which 
compels me to be truth’ (IV:168)), finds additional encouragement in both 
Kierkegaard, whose ‘subjective demand for truth liberated and encouraged the 
Strindbergian subjectivity’,13 and the theories of Naturalism. 
The discovery of Kierkegaard, whose impact on the young Strindberg is 
documented in volume two of The Son of a Servant, acted as a further spur to 
self -analysis and moral self-scrutiny, provided an example of how to distribute 
and objectify the different sides and drives of the self among invented and 
pseudonymous characters, and introduced him to the idea of experimenting 
with standpoints and to seeing his life as a series of stages, as well as to the 
art of ‘living immured within one’s own personality to be one’s own witness, 
one’s own judge, one’s own prosecutor, to be in oneself the one and only!’14 In 
Kierkegaard’s description in his Essay in Experimental Psychology, Repetition, 
of the young man who was captivated by the theatre ‘and desired to be himself 
carried away into the midst of that fictitious reality in order to see and hear 
himself as an alter ego, to disperse himself among the innumerable possibilities 
which diverge from himself, and yet in such a way that every diversity is in turn 
a single self ’,15 there is, too, an anticipation not only of Strindberg’s method 
of characterization but also of the species of shadow play into which he enters 
in To Damascus, in order to project himself and the events of his life in the 
mirror image of the stage. Moreover, Kierkegaard offered Strindberg grounds 
for regarding his passion for writing as a calling (kallelse), a sacrifice (offer), and 
a duty (pligt), so partly allaying that ‘distaste for art’ (IV:144) which always 
haunted him as ‘Ghosts from my youth, when I was a pietist’ (II:362). By 
placing his production in the category of the ethical rather than the aesthetic, 
he was able to accept the ‘indescribable’ pleasure writing gave him, as well as 
‘this wonderful turning inside out of the soul… which is the precondition of 
art’ (I:325). 
By purporting to represent the real and not the beautified, Naturalism 
also assuaged, if only temporarily, the same misgivings. With its scientific 
pretensions, what he termed ‘this microscopic view which wants to penetrate 
to the core of the matter’ (II:357), afforded a theoretical framework for his 
native disposition, and Nietzsche’s malicious description of the current literary 
trend as one in which ‘the showy words are: … being “scientific” (the document 
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humain: in other words, the novel of colportage and addition in place of 
composition)’16 provides an apt summary of Strindberg’s many comments 
on the need to abandon a literature derived from the imagination during 
the 1880s. Not that he was the first to argue the scientific and documentary 
value of autobiographical writing at the expense of fantasy and invention: 
in Monsieur Nicolas, Restif de la Bretonne had claimed ‘Ce n’est pas pour 
m’historier que j’écris, mais pour démontrer les causes et les effets des actions 
humaines. Voilà ce qui nécessite une foule de détails. C’est un livre utile qu’on 
lit ici, et s’il est amusant, ce n’est que son second mérite.’17 But with The Son of a 
Servant, Strindberg certainly embarks upon the single most extended attempt 
at the scientific literature which possessed the imagination of his French 
contemporaries. Flaubert’s remark, ‘Quand on aura, pendant quelque temps, 
traité l’âme humaine avec l’impartialité que l’on met dans les sciences physiques 
à étudier la matière, on aura fait un pas immense’,18 and Zola’s demand for ‘une 
littérature expérimentale’ in which ‘l’écrivain est un chirurgien qui, pour aller 
jusqu’au cœur, coupe dans la chair d’une main paisible et ferme, sans fièvre 
aucune’,19 preface Strindberg’s argument that literature ‘ought to emancipate 
itself totally from art and become science’ (V:339); and the four volumes, in 
which he dissects himself in accordance with the prevailing view of the writer 
as a counterpart to the surgeon or physiologist, are in fact continuous with the 
scientific investigations to which he afterwards devotes himself. They represent 
an attempt to proceed beyond the constructions he accused Zola of having 
placed on observed or invented lives (and the criticism of Zola for pretending 
to know ‘what goes on in other people’s heads’ (18:456) in the Foreword 
signals the autobiographical nature of The Son of a Servant in a discussion 
which otherwise deflects precise generic identification), while as ‘an attempt at 
the literature of the future’ (18:455), they approach the ‘livre de pure analyse’ 
which Edmond de Goncourt believed might represent ‘la dernière évolution 
du roman’.20 
Conceiving his life as a scientific project, each of Strindberg’s principal 
autobiographical ventures is therefore not only a Kierkegaardian experiment 
with standpoints but a text in which he is ‘Laborator und Experiment-
objekt auf demselben Mal’ (XIII:262). The Son of a Servant is considered ‘a 
development of the naturalist novel, incorporating history, psychology, social 
milieu, together with the writer’s opinions on the matter’ (V:295), ‘an attempt 
to emancipate literature from art’ in which the author ‘has merely taken the 
corpse of the person I have known best and learned anatomy, physiology, 
psychology, history from the carcass’ (V:344). The next stage, A Madman’s 
Defence, is the outcome of ‘an experimental psychological analysis’ (VI:242) 
in which Strindberg transforms himself and his environment into a field of 
research, cultivates the virus of jealousy, explores the hinterland of insanity, 
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and turns his private life with Siri von Essen into a public laboratory in which 
he tests his views on marriage, so accomplishing an extreme instance of that 
type of dédoublement often encountered in Naturalism where, as Maupassant 
observes of the writer, ‘Il semble avoir deux âmes, l’une qui note, explique, 
commente chaque sensation de sa voisine de l’âme naturelle, commune a tous 
les homes’.21 In Inferno, meanwhile, he embarks upon ‘the study of man’ (XI: 
104) to which he redirected his attention after the spectacular investigation of 
the natural world and man’s place in nature which he conducted in the early 
1890s, and writes up the experimental data gathered in the letters to Torsten 
Hedlund and his Occult Diary, while Alone, written in 1903, incorporates a 
theoretical blueprint by means of which he seeks to explore and disarm his 
future as well as placate and preserve the past.22 
In any case, of course, Strindberg palpably fails to achieve that impartial 
and impassive detachment from his material which a number of contemporary 
writers considered appropriate to the objectivity that was an essential component 
of the experimental method as understood by contemporary science.23 Indeed, 
the impersonality of the experimental method, which ‘aura pour résultat de 
faire disparaître de la science toutes les vues individuelles pour les remplacer 
par des théories impersonnelles et générales’,24 posed a direct threat to the self 
which Strindberg guarded so jealously and whose preservation and distinction 
is one of the underlying purposes of his autobiographical project. As Claude 
Bernard stressed in his Introduction à l’ étude la médecine expérimentale, the 
treatise on scientific method which exerted so potent an influence on Zola’s 
Le roman experimental: ‘L’expérimentateur doit alors disparaître ou plutôt 
se transformer instantanément en observateur.’25 But to disappear was an 
option Strindberg rigorously declined, and like the grounds upon which 
Naturalism eventually proved inadequate to the questions he asked of it, in 
part precisely because of the dilemmas inherent in a literature which affects 
‘la nudité d’une leçon d’anatomie’,26 these tensions in his approach to writing 
will shortly require elucidation, for it is often in relation to the easily accepted 
metaphors and images through which Strindberg describes his project that, 
on investigation, it becomes most discrepant and opaque. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that in the conception of literature to which he so often gestures, that 
is, a combination of the kind of autobiographical and confessional material 
which both Herder, in ‘Von Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen 
Seele’, and Goethe, in his desire for a history of the personality, wanted to see 
collated and published, and the document humain advocated by the Goncourts 
and Taine, the role of the imagination in writing is normally treated as 
secondary to the facts of the author’s life:27 ‘Of course, you have the freedom 
to use your imagination,’ he remarks, in a significantly concessionary addition 
to his letter on writing to Siri von Essen (I:198). It serves to augment what 
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life offers and provides ‘the protective disguise’ (VII:138) when the material 
to hand is too intimate for immediate publication, as is strikingly the case 
with his almost contemporaneous account of events at Skovlyst in 1888 in 
the novella Tschandala, where he literally dresses up his revelations about his 
landlady, her bailiff lover, and his own entanglement with the latter’s sister, 
in seventeenth-century costume.28 Otherwise, however, at least until after he 
develops a modernist aesthetic during the Inferno period, Strindberg continues 
to maintain that ‘the imagination, which has been regarded as creative, that is 
to say, able to make something out of nothing, is only the gift of organization, 
which arranges the memory’s greater or lesser wealth of impressions and puts 
each of them in its place.’ (17:193) 
Prefaced by such statements, it is perhaps not so extraordinary to recall 
that, until recently, it was an accepted practice in Sweden for the actor who 
played The Unknown in To Damascus to wear a mask representing Strindberg’s 
features. In its immediate erasure of all difference between the writer and his 
text, this custom affords an eloquent image of the long tradition of biographical 
criticism in Strindberg studies, where the writing is generally mapped neatly 
back on to what is known of the life it ostensibly transcribes. That what is 
known is often only recoverable through Strindberg’s highly personal account 
is, however, a nicety which leaves such criticism largely unruffled. In its 
concern to identify the text with its author and to reconstruct from it only 
the image of its progenitor, it attributes any noticeable discrepancies in the 
transcription of known facts to the realm of authorial inadvertency, and 
habitually glides from the names of the characters to those of Strindberg and 
his contemporaries. Thus Strindberg’s first biographer, Erik Hedén, illustrates 
his discussion of The People of Hemsö with a recent photograph of ‘Gusten 
in The People of Hemsö as an old man’, and even Torsten Eklund grows so 
frustrated with the discrepancies between A Madman’s Defence and the facts of 
Strindberg’s life that consideration of the work’s veracity provokes the resigned 
comment: ‘Moreover, the material is clearly designed with an artistic aim.’29 
In this critical tradition, life and work are understood to reflect one another 
without significant distortion, and a text like The Roofing Feast can therefore 
easily be reduced to the status of a transparent report from Strindberg’s third 
marriage.30
Since the interval between the events of Strindberg’s life and the material 
of his writing is certainly traversed more rapidly than with most authors, 
criticism is not unjustified in observing this proximity; but in its tendency 
to annul all difference and engage with novels and plays only as forms of 
more or less impeded autobiography, this approach denies many texts their 
potential polyvalency of meaning as literature. Indeed, it even negates the 
possibility of an imagined literature since, as Kierkegaard points out, ‘all 
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poetic production would eo ipso be rendered impossible and unendurable, 
if the lines must be the very words of the producer, literally understood.’31 
Unfortunately, however, where Strindberg is concerned, impurities abound 
and fact and fiction are frequently only imperfectly distinguished, either 
through the impassioned carelessness of an author personally engaged in the 
recorded events, as in A Madman’s Defence, when the equivocal figure of 
‘fröken Z’ is inadvertently unfrocked towards the end of the text as her real 
life original ‘Miss David’ (ED:247), or with intent, as when, in retrospect, 
he deliberately aligns his later destiny as it is recounted in Inferno with the 
fate of the central character of his first major work, the historical drama 
Master Olof  32. Thus an alternative critical method, which regards even A 
Madman’s Defence and Inferno as fictional entities independent of the life 
of their creator, also affords too partial an approach. Eric Johannesson’s 
penetrating study, The Novels of August Strindberg,33 for example, provides an 
antidote to the excesses of the biographical tradition which is of great service 
in demonstrating the artistry with which Strindberg composes his narratives, 
but it cannot account for the duplicity with which he moves back and forth, 
from one domain to another, either in the relationships a text proposes 
between the lives of actual persons in a real environment and its own internal 
narrative logic, or the uses to which it was put by its producer. Generally, 
disguises are transparent or bestowed on a system of minimal displacement 
(in the Inferno material, for instance, Poles become Russians, and Norwegian 
painters, Danes); footnotes and textual allusions sometimes direct the reader 
to other fictional or non-fictional segments of the developing corpus of texts 
to which Strindberg signs his name; and even in achieved works of fiction 
(for example, in the statement ‘They lived in Norrtullsgatan, to the left of 
Observatory Square’ (14:40), in the short story, ‘The Rewards of Virtue’, or 
the Student’s remark, ‘I’m said to have come into the world in the middle of 
bankruptcy proceedings’ (45:153), in The Ghost Sonata, both of which evoke 
information about Strindberg’s early life that is explicitly developed in The 
Son of a Servant), there are rents in the text through which his life flows. They 
are solicitations in which he draws attention to himself, apertures where he 
allows himself to become visible to the eyes of his contemporaries and to 
the critical gaze he intends should one day trace his whole career. For he 
frequently maintains that he is only to be apprehended in the entirety of his 
writing (‘My writings are me!’ (XV:223)), and that the truth about him is to 
be found not in the world, but in ‘the thousands of printed pages’ (19:278) 
wherein their author is dispersed, to be constituted subsequently from 
what Michel Foucault terms ‘[the] relationships of homogeneity, filiation, 
reciprocal explanation, authentification or… common utilization’34 which 
exist between the various texts.
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Hence his concern that nothing he wrote be lost or overlooked, as in one 
of his several premature testimentary letters (on this occasion to his short-
term collaborator on the ironic comedy, Comrades, Axel Lundegård) in which 
he urges him to see that ‘my collected works, everything I have written, every 
word from newspapers, almanacs, at home and abroad, including my letters, 
are published when the time is ripe, in Flensburg, Leipzig, Copenhagen or 
Chicago’ (VI:297). Every word must be available for the reader to be in 
a position ‘to see as deeply into a soul as can be seen’ (VI:298), for like 
Kierkegaard he conceived of the work as a whole, shaped and orchestrated 
and yielding itself only to the informed reader. It is a play of signifiers in 
which he has ‘multiplied himself (polymeriserat sig – 18:459), and where his 
self is distributed throughout the totality of texts from which ‘the enlightened 
reader’ (18:459) may reconstruct the author and his life amid the cluster of 
Johans, Axels, Falk(-enström)s, and their companion Teklas, Marias, Gustavs, 
and Borgs, characters in whom Kierkegaardian pseudonymity is sometimes 
coupled with Balzacian recurrence in novels, plays and autobiographies: ‘And 
if his collected works are ever published,’ Strindberg writes, of one of these 
multiplications, ‘not a word should be changed, but all the contradictions 
resolved in the common Kierkegaardian title: Stages on Life’s Way’ (40:46).35 
This is Strindberg’s larger project, which establishes a context in which all 
his writing demands recognition as in some degree autobiographical. And, of 
course, most writing accommodates such a reading. Thus Nietzsche considered 
every great philosophy ‘a confession on the part of its author and a kind of 
involuntary and unconscious memoir;’36 Derrida’s continuing deconstruction 
of Freud has uncovered the autobiography in Beyond the Pleasure Principle as 
well as in The Interpretation of Dreams;37 and works of fiction offer innumerable 
opportunities for the pursuit (if not the capture) of the author since, as André 
Maurois observes, ‘la création artistique n’est pas une création ex nihilo. C’est 
un regroupement des éléments de la réalité. On pourrait montrer facilement que 
les récits les plus étranges, ceux qui nous paraissent le plus loin de l’observation 
réelle, comme les Voyages de Gulliver, les Contes d’Edgar Poe, la Divine 
Comédie de Dante ou l’Ubu Roi de Jarry, sont faite de souvenirs.’38 Indeed, an 
invitation to trace latent or overt transpositions and transformations of lived 
experience into writing that does not necessarily advertise its autobiographical 
substance is implicit in most post-Classical literature where the reader is 
encouraged to discern not only what Edward Said has called the ‘idiolect’ that 
signifies the ‘irreducible individuality’ of the author,39 but also the more or 
less submerged fragments of the great confession which, since Romanticism, 
it has been the custom to seek and find in literature: as Strindberg retorts, 
to criticism of To Damascus: ‘Why does Norddeutsche Allg. Z. go on about 
autobiography? Doesn’t Goethe state in Aus meinem Leben that all his work 
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was a Confession? Isn’t Faust a diary?’ (XIV:223). But this pursuit entails a 
vastly more sophisticated process than the tradition of biographical criticism 
normally allows for. If the author’s life lurks at the base of a literary work, 
where it provides the deep structure of experience retailed in the text, then no 
more than literature as a whole is a simple reflection of the society of which 
it is part, does this underlying sequence of events appear in the text without 
refraction, distortion, addition, and inevitably subtraction. Besides retaining 
a sense of the text’s diversity, therefore, following the autobiographical trace 
involves a recognition that the obvious signposts of intent in a text may 
prove misleading, and that the transfer of a life into the text of its written 
inscription inserts it into a circuit of communication where it is traversed by 
other forces, the demands and constraints of language and genre, and what 
Roland Barthes calls ‘the image -repertoire, which oversees, controls, purifies, 
banalizes, codifies, corrects [and] imposes the focus (and the vision) of a social 
communication,’40 as well as by those forces which the narrator does not know, 
or knows only obscurely, his unconscious and the prevailing ideology, which 
constantly undercut any desire he may have to fit the word neatly to the world. 
As Strindberg knows from his own self-study, characters are ‘conglomerations 
of past and present cultures, scraps from books and newspapers, fragments of 
people, torn scraps of fine clothing that has become rags, in just the same way 
that the soul is patched together’ (23:104), and he proceeds with what Paul de 
Man has termed the blindness which yields insight,41 whether he is writing 
autobiography or fiction. 
To comprehend Strindberg’s enterprise, therefore, requires neither the simple 
matching of fact to fiction, nor the removal of his work to an independent 
realm for contemplation as a series of self-contained realities, but an eye for the 
unarticulated forms which mediate its production, for the non-transparencies 
in the text, and for those symptoms of an unseen meaning which may reside 
even in the most prominent and constant of his images, in for example his 
claim to be the lucid purveyor of truth or the bearer of a spectacular destiny. 
In the interplay between the lived and the written, moreover, it is the work that 
illuminates the life, not the reverse, and for the reader both constitute texts to 
be interpreted. As Fredric Jameson notes: 
It should be observed that, where the older biographical criticism 
understood the author’s life as a context, or as a cause, as that which 
could explain the text, the newer kind understands that ‘life’ or rather its 
reconstruction, precisely as one further text in its turn, a text on the level 
with the other literary texts of the writer in question and susceptible of 
forming a larger corpus of study with them.42 
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But it requires, too, an awareness of the context in which writers were prepared 
to render up their lives to a literature in which the reader expected to discover the 
figure of its author in the text. For although an extreme instance, Strindberg’s 
flagrant exposure of himself to the public gaze, in which he attempts to convey 
‘my story stark naked’ (VIII:188), was only conceivable because it encompassed 
a potential inherent in the literary institution of a period for which writing was 
published and read as essentially self-revelatory. In a market where the novel 
was the dominant article of self-display, Maupassant, in remarking that ‘nous 
ne diversifions donc nos personnages qu’en changeant l’âge, le sexe, la situation 
sociale et toutes les circonstances de la vie de notre moi,’ 43 might still imply that 
diversity and even invention remained an option, but a comment by Edmond 
de Goncourt in his Journal (the publication of which was itself a symptom of 
the time), betrays the growing impatience with invention, at least on the part 
of a sophisticated reader: after criticizing Zola for the kind of ‘fabulation’ with 
which Strindberg also took issue, he observes that ‘Je ne suis intéressé que par 
un roman où je sens dans l’imprimé, pour ainsi dire, la transcription d’êtres en 
chair et en os, où je lis un peu ou beaucoup des mémoires d’une vie vécue.’44 In 
an earlier period, Shaftesbury had already lamented that ‘The whole Writing 
of this Age is become indeed a sort of Memoir-Writing’;45 but Strindberg now 
frequently took up this development in defence of his own practice, as when, in 
a letter urging the publication of Miss Julie and Creditors upon a publisher who 
recoiled at what he took to be their character of improper private revelation, he 
pointed out that ‘in our days everything is intimate and Confessions are the 
height of fashion’ (VII: 144), and went on to remind him of recent examples, 
among them Zola’s L’Oeuvre, (with its ‘pretty intimate scenes in bed with his 
wife’), Goncourt’s Les frères Zemganno, Jonas Lie’s Ett Samliv, and Victoria 
Benedictsson’s Pengar, in which he detected a transparent account of the writer’s 
marriage, down to ‘her husband’s hairy chest’. This claim is repeated some five 
years later, again with reference to Pengar, in order to defend the exposure of 
his own marriage in A Madman’s Defence’ (IX:224), and a similar argument 
is used to exonerate writing à clef in the essay ‘On the General Discontent’ 
(‘Om det allmänna missnöjet’), where he includes both Dante and Dickens 
among the ‘out and out scandal-mongers’ (16:46). Apart from indicating that 
Strindberg’s manner of reading resembled Goncourt’s, however, and that his 
approach to a text was often vehemently partial, the evidence he marshals does 
suggest that contemporary writers at least sometimes invited such attention. 
In short, Strindberg’s writing is part of a movement in which the textual 
encounter between writer and reader seems more immediate than hitherto. At 
times, in Inferno or Maupassant’s ‘La Horla’, Hamsun’s Hunger or Huysman’s 
En Route, where the writer assumes the burden of the experience recounted 
in his text with minimal pretence, this writing resembles a document humain, 
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and it is therefore not surprising that, in what Conrad describes as a ‘task 
which mainly consists in laying one’s soul more or less bare to the world’ where 
‘everyone who puts pen to paper for the reading of strangers… can speak of 
nothing else’ than himself,’46 this trend should coincide with the development 
of the kind of purposeful occultation practiced by Henry James and Mallarmé, 
who wished to preserve both literature and themselves from too direct and 
impertinent a gaze. 
This approach applies particularly to the more modest of Strindberg’s 
projects, that selection of his works which in later years he suggested should 
be published under the collective title ‘The Son of a Servant’ as a continuous 
account of his ‘life’s saga’ (XIII:28). The 1909 preface to the second edition 
of the original Son of a Servant is evidently written as a foreword to the whole 
sequence, as it is enumerated in an unwieldy conception he sent to his German 
translator, Emit Schering, in 1904: 
One thing, while I remember it. If I die soon, will you collect and 
publish, in one volume, under the title ‘The Son of a Servant’ these works:  
 
1. The Son of a Servant  
2. Time of Ferment  
3. In the Red Room  
4. (Fourth part of this work, manuscript at Bonniers)  
5. Die Beichte eines Thoren  
6. The Quarantine Officer’s Second Story (from Fagervik and Skamsund)  
7.  Inferno  
8.  Legends  
9.  Alone  
10.  The Occult Diary since 1896  
11.  Correspondence, letters.  
 
This is the only monument I desire: a black wooden cross and my story! 
(XV: 38) 
That the project represents more than a passing whim is confirmed by similar 
lists to his publisher, Bonnier, and the writer Gustaf af Geijerstam (XV:42, 
XIII:28), and among his surviving papers a further reformulation of the table of 
contents is written on a concept entitled ‘The Son of a Servant (to be published 
after my death with this title in one volume).’47 
Given the ambiguity which surrounds the nature and genre of every one of 
these texts (the refusal in the 1886 Foreword to identify The Son of a Servant as 
‘novel, biography, memoir… apology… confession’ (18:452), for example; the 
narrative frame of A Madman’s Defence, with its duplication of writers between 
the preface and the text; the claim of Inferno to be only a transcription of 
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the Narrator’s diary; the extraction of the pseudo-fictional ‘The Quarantine 
Master’s Second Story’ from the autobiographical novel, The Cloister, which 
was not published until after Strindberg’s death; and the way in which the 
first person narration, absence of names, and fictional inclusions places Alone 
in the no-man’s land described by Philippe Lejeune in his recent influential 
attempt to establish the generic boundaries of autobiography on the basis of 
the writer’s contract with his readers as ‘Pacte = 0: non seulement le personnage 
n’a pas de nom, mais l’auteur ne conclut aucun pacte, – ni autobiographique, 
ni romanesque’),48 it is evident that Strindberg nevertheless experiences a need 
to distinguish these writings from the remainder of his production in what 
represents a kind of autobiographical pact with those who study his work. 
Although he may sometimes yield to the temptation to relocate a work in 
the domain of fiction, it exhibits, for all the flux of categories that now exists 
in the relationship between autobiography, Bildungsroman, roman intime, 
confessional novel, case history, self-analysis, diary, and letter, a desire to achieve 
a coherent, consequent, and continuous account of his life. And it is precisely 
in relation to these works which most obviously seek to take possession of 
their author’s past self and the life he has lived, that the image offered by The 
Unknown’s Strindberg mask reveals a fine irony. For however closely writing 
retraces the events it records, and whatever the degree of veracity it achieves, 
it simultaneously covers over and masks the life it is employed to recover. 
Language displaces the past: the past is replaced by language and the genres 
into which it settles, and which in turn impose a shape not only on the past 
but on a reader’s response to its reproduction. Thus language interposes itself 
as a screen between the reader or spectator and the events projected in it, and it 
is by no means a gratuitous play on words to see, in any subsequent account of 
the lived experience, both a further recovery and a fresh re-covering. For, more 
evidently than most discourses, the autobiographical demonstrates that writing 
is secondary. Even in cases of almost immediate transcription (for example, in 
those parts of Anais Nin’s Journals in which she attempts the instantaneous 
capture of experience ‘before it is altered, changed by distance or time’),49 
whatever incites the writer to write is separate usually in place and always in 
time from the act of recording. What is narrated or described is developed, 
enriched, and impoverished as it is transposed into the domain of the written; 
moreover, autobiography is not a one-way mirror but a composition, and the 
image of the self that is captured there is not a reflection but something created 
by the act of writing, an act which is itself an event in the life, an action which 
produces rather than reproduces the life. 
Although part of the writer’s life, therefore, and capable once written, 
of playing a role in the inauguration of other texts, autobiography remains 
a supplement. That is, it follows after the life it narrates until it reaches a 
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point where, by a neat reversal, it becomes the life narrated. For the obsessive 
autobiographer such as Rousseau or Strindberg, writing is partly a means of 
organizing identity, of recuperating the dispersed fragments of personality, 
and, through the mediation of language, of creating his own image in the 
cohering structure of literature, and almost any event may stimulate a revision 
or a fresh attempt. A single page of Strindberg’s favourite Lessebo writing 
paper survives as witness to one such aborted attempt. It merely lists a handful 
of dates, 1849, 1857, 1867, 1877, 1893, 1901, 1904, in a column down the 
page, all of which (except tantalizingly and provocatively the second) are 
easily associated with significant events in the succession of birth, university, 
marriage, and divorce, which form the most obvious chronology of his life.50 
Meanwhile, in another inventory, headed ‘Excremental hells’ (Träckhelveten), 
the reading of Swedenborg’s Arcana Coelestia, where those who once delighted 
in sensual pleasures are described as finding their post mortem delight in sewers, 
urine and dung, has provoked a further recapitulation in search of continuity 
and order that is governed by the idea of an excremental hell. Before issuing in 
the Swiftian disgust which sometimes characterizes his later writing (‘Children 
enter the world in excrement, live their first years in excrement’), and in an 
urgent addition in crayon in which he once again demands to know ‘Who am 
I?’, the list succeeds in incorporating a large reach of the past among places 
which he has repeatedly described in the autobiographical sequence and To 
Damascus:
The dustbin in the yard at Clara, where I played as a child by the toilets. 
Loviseberg, cowshed, cesspits, tobacco plantation, putrid ponds with 
leeches and dead cats:  
Norrtullsgatan 12. In the flat. Grev Magnigatan.  
Lästmakargatan – the dining room window was directly opposite the 
toilet. Norrmalmsgatan in an old whore house with the toilets beneath 
an open sewer.  
The situation when Baroness W. declared her love for me and the old 
codgers W. went through the room with the out-house lantern  
Skovlyst: Excremental hell and Swine hell.  
Dornach: Excremental hell.  
In Gravesend: the closets.  
Rue de la Grande Chaumière opposite the toilet. 
Orfila opposite one; above one; and a view over 150 toilets  
The yard at Madame Charlotte’s where we ate between the dustbins and 
the toilet.  
The Rose Room at Klam was directly opposite the toilet.51
But as even this minor example suggests, the image of the self and its past 
established in language gradually replaces its source, and the natural 
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sequence of events in the life becomes an interpreted series, a retrospective 
reconstruction which confers on the discrete particulars of existence the 
coherence, order, and elaboration of a destiny. What is unwritten, meanwhile, 
becomes the unlived, and each recorded moment or fact is a component of 
the image comprehended by the text. Thus one of the main drives articulated 
in Strindberg’s writing, the instinct for truth which provokes ‘a hazy desire 
to rip off one’s clothes and go naked’ (16:110), which is often advanced in 
evidence of his autobiographical probity, is itself an element of the personal 
myth embodied in the writing. Whether, as in the 1880s, he appears in the 
guise of the iconoclastic rebel, Loke, or, after his Inferno experiences, as the 
reluctant prophet, Jonah, Strindberg, the truth-sayer, who unmasks the web 
of deceit and lies with ‘the simple, raw language of truth’ (54:227), is only one 
aspect of the almost archetypal self-projection which his writing has imposed 
upon his: readers. And hence what matters is not to ascertain whether what 
Strindberg writes is true or false in any pedantic, literal sense; what matters is 
only what he wrote of himself either wittingly or not, of what may be deduced 
from both the sequence of autobiographical works and the totality of his 
writings since they hold not merely other versions of himself but belong to the 
single endeavour to apprehend his experience of the world. Eventually rejecting 
Naturalism, he would maintain that the natural world had not developed like 
a Darwinian chain but formed a complex lattice-work of relationships: ‘The 
plants are not developed like a chain but… the whole is a net’ (27:679). His 
life, too, as he lived and wrote about it, came to resemble not a continuous 
linear progression of events but a network of discontinuities, repetitions, and 
contradictions for which he sought a more sensitive means of self-representation 
than the developmental Naturalist account, with its stress on physiological and 
psychological cause and effect, one that was alert to the often unconscious, 
seemingly trivial, and apparently random fragments of being as well as to its 
steady, onward flow. 
Moreover, if it is the continuous desire to represent himself in language which 
eventually convinces Strindberg of the need to go beyond Naturalism, it also 
accounts for his refusal to confine himself to the customary autobiographical 
model, that is, the single retrospective text involving a return to childhood 
and the retracing of the writer’s origins and development, which distinguishes 
autobiography as a genre from related forms such as the historical memoir (in 
which the emphasis, as Strindberg himself observed in commenting on the 
exclusion of events surrounding his trial for blasphemy in 1884 (19:227), is 
placed on an account of external matters rather than on an examination of the 
personal life), the short episode or souvenir (which covers only a period in the 
subject’s life), the intimate journal, auto-portrait, essay or diary (all of which 
are discontinuous or do not take the form of a retrospective prose narrative). 
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According to Philippe Lejeune, it is this singleness ‘qui rend particulièrement 
solennel et émouvant l’acte autobiographique.’52 A man can produce only one 
such autobiography, Lejeune argues, for in writing of himself he will become, 
if he has not already done so, once and for all, who he is. Having reconstructed 
the unity of his life in time, the prospect of change appears at an end, if only in 
the closure achieved in the consummation of the autobiographical act in which 
he has given his one life its definitive form.53 This is the singular task which 
Strindberg performs in The Son of a Servant, which he often regards as a book 
composed in the face of death, the vivisection of a corpse in which he achieves 
the posthumous perspective of the comprehensive autobiographer who falls 
back upon his origins in the face of a foreclosed future and dissects his naked 
body: as he wrote, to Edvard Brandes: 
If you only knew how pleased I am that my book has made an impression 
on you. For all my demagogism, I think I am too genteel to write for 
the mob. I have cut a caper before, I have no doubt been an unwitting 
clown, who ‘put it on’, who dressed up, made faces, anything to attract 
people’s attention. But this time I regarded myself as dead, paid no heed 
to the inquisitive snout of the common herd, forgot myself more than it 
seems… and tried to be the most difficult thing of all: honest. (V:350)
In his study of Stendhal, Lejeune notes how ‘sans doute l’idée de la mort (mort 
affective… et après 1830, mort sociale) était-elle nécessaire pour briser un 
instant le dynamique systèm de relais vers l’avenir, et induire un retour aux 
origines,’54 and his analysis is suggestive of the context in which Strindberg 
sought a way out of the ‘mort sociale’ of the trial arising from Getting Married 
by writing his autobiography. ‘I regard myself and my talent as dead and am 
now writing the saga of my life in a peculiar form of novel’, he tells Brandes, ‘I 
believe that in that way I will be able to analyse myself and discover what makes 
me tick’ (V:306). Indeed, each autobiographical volume is written ‘confronted 
by death’ (18:458) or ‘devant la mort’ (IX:339), but this is underlined in the 
case of The Son of a Servant by the fiction of seeing his life as past, a fiction 
partly sustained by his use of the third person to objectify himself as ‘Jo/han’55 
and regard himself, at least in theory, from the standpoint of a research scientist 
writing a report on an unusually interesting case. 
However, in later years Strindberg adds further instalments in other 
narrative modes and from greatly altered perspectives. When, therefore, 
Lejeune asserts, of the traditional autobiographical model, that ‘ce récit une 
fois écrit il sera difficile de la recomposer autrement. Aucune approache fraîche 
et directe du passé ne sera plus possible, on ne pourra plus le voir qu’à travers 
le récit qui en aura été fait’,56 he is in fact describing precisely the situation of 
intertextuality which Strindberg contrives. His past is written and rewritten, 
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lived and relived, across a succession of texts that comment upon each other as 
well as upon the life they record. The method is dynamic in order to encompass 
change. Continuity and discontinuity, which Francis Hart sees as the essence 
of autobiography since, as he argues, ‘effective access to a recollected self or 
its ‘version’ begins in a discontinuity of identity or being which permits past 
selves to be seen as distinct realities, yet only a continuity of identity or being 
makes the autobiographical act or purpose meaningful’,57 are dialectically 
related, so that the narrator is constantly confronting himself as he was, as he 
knows himself no longer to be, but as (once written) he cannot easily escape 
or disavow. ‘My disharmonies’, he tells Schering, ‘reside in the impossibility of 
stitching my previous points of view together with my present ones’ (XV:146), 
a difficulty that is compounded by the republication, either in new editions or 
in translation, of works embodying opinions he now abjured. But subscribing 
as he does to the post-Romantic ideology of unfettered, organic personal 
development, and contemporary as he is to the debate on evolution, it is not 
surprising that Strindberg should expect and value growth and change, both 
in society and the individual. To bind himself to a single standpoint or a fixed 
programme would undermine his often-vaunted ‘freedom to “grow” freely’ 
(VII:39), and in a letter of 1894 to his old friend, Littmansson, he defends the 
mutability for which his contemporaries frequently criticised him by arguing 
what is perhaps the central tenet of his undertaking: 
You bore the seeds of growth within you, but you didn’t cultivate your self 
with brutal egoism. You couldn’t create several persons out of yourself; 
you couldn’t like Münchhausen and I, pull yourself up by your hair and 
lift yourself out of your scepticism; you couldn’t search out yourself and 
use it to correct the other conventional selves which others had poked 
down into your soul; you couldn’t rise above your self. (X:150–1) 
When, therefore, Robert Saytre writes of Henry Adams (who likewise procured 
a posthumous perspective for himself by adopting the third person form in his 
autobiography) that ‘the Education is not a response to some other experience, 
not a way of memorializing some other insight or achievement that has given 
life significance; it is a response to that moment in life at which an examination 
of life became essential’,58 he could be describing The Son of a Servant, which 
represents the necessary ‘balancing of accounts with the past’ (19:250) to 
which Strindberg was compelled by the encounter with Darwin, Socialism 
and Atheism that he describes in the final volume. But also implicit in the 
final pages is an awareness that Johan will not remain as he is at the point at 
which the book concludes. Consistent with the view that growth is continual, 
Strindberg continually outgrows himself. What begins as a summing up, 
therefore, becomes in the course of its writing, the grounds of ‘a later enterprise, 
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whatever that may turn out to be’ (19:250), and when he completes the text he 
is on the point of taking leave of Johan: when next encountered, in A Madman’s 
Defence, he has become Axel. 
Moreover, once the initial autobiography catches up with the life at the 
moment of writing, the texts produced thereafter (A Madman’s Defence, 
Inferno, Alone) foreshadow modernism. They become the substance of the life 
itself. The life is lived with the writing in mind, and the latter becomes not an 
addendum to experience but part of the event, no longer the documentation of 
the career in recollection but something calling attention to itself, to its career 
as text, to its own life as part of the autobiography of its writer, a central event 
more important now than the events recorded in it, or rather, constituting a 
version of events to which his future life must consequently conform. In the 
narration of Inferno, one observes the situation described by Robert Adams 
with reference to Ulysses, of ‘the presence of the artist within the work of art, 
not simply as an overt and dramatic character (Stephen Dedalus), but as the 
terminus ad quem, the retrospective arranger, the manipulator of the characters, 
and perhaps even the secretive and willful manipulator of the manipulator’,59 
and since he is living through the writing of the text, what appear to be possible 
transformations and deformations of the past become Strindberg’s present 
experience. Thus this all-pervasive intertextuality affects the relationship of all 
his other texts to those of his autobiographical sequence and to the life they 
variously apprehend. When reproduced in literature the events of this life have 
already been worked over and winnowed, in memory. They undergo further 
changes, elisions, compression, displacement, and extension in the process 
of transformation, and depending upon the genre chosen, similar material 
assumes a different form in separate works. 
Furthermore, the exploration of analogous material in different literary 
texts has placed a figured screen between the writer and his past, and the 
wife Strindberg depicts as his own in A Madman’s Defence, for example, is not 
only regarded in the light of the theories advanced contemporaneously in the 
essay volume, Vivisections, but refracted by the images of Bertha in Comrades 
and Laura in The Father. As Maurice Gravier rightly points out, therefore, A 
Madman’s Defence should not be considered as merely the key to the dramas of 
the same period; this narrative is also constituted by the texts which surround 
it and which (in Miss Julie, Creditors, and Playing With Fire) it colours in turn, 
and it is therefore equally appropriate to enquire not in what way the novel 
provides a biographical explication of the plays but 
… dans quelle mesure le travail que Strindberg a fait pour dessiner 
les personnages de Camarades ou de Père ne l’a-t-il influencé, lorsqu’il 
évoquait dans la Plaidoyer d’un fou les rapports et les faits et gestes de la 
baronne, d’Axel et du Capitaine.60
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The Father, for example, certainly implants the idea of a wife who tries to destroy 
her husband by driving him insane into the evolving narrative of Strindberg’s 
own marriage, where it feeds upon misgivings he had long entertained 
regarding his mental stability. The drama thus transfers from the stage to his 
private life, as one of the letters to his friend Pehr Staaff, in which he explores 
the literary possibilities of this material, makes clear: ‘It will be interesting 
to see the outcome of the drama’ (VI:266), he declares, with his customary 
appetite for experience he can turn to literary account. And if, therefore, some 
five years later he complains ‘I have been married for 13 years – and don’t know 
who I’ve been married to’ (VIII: 177), it is not unreasonable to attribute his 
doubts to the practice of literature, with which his life is so easily confused. As 
he remarked, on one much-quoted occasion: ‘I don’t know if The Father is a 
work of the imagination, or if my life has been’ (VI:298). 
The question raised by Strindberg’s writing is thus not how faithfully it 
reproduces its anterior experience or the accuracy with which it reflects the 
real but rather, how well does he in fact know himself when, in the otherness 
of the written text, the writer is also written, the subject is also an object, and 
the discourse of the self is not single and irreducible but dialogic and even 
polyphonic? The mask he adopts with his use of language may be precisely 
that, and what therefore now demands investigation are the ends to which he 
employs his writing and how he can adequately represent himself in a medium, 
language, which he in fact considers inherently mendacious.
 Chapter Two 
 Writing Out and Repetition 
The psychical process which originally took place must be repeated as vividly as possible; it 
must be brought back to its status nascendi and then given verbal utterance.  
– Studies on Hysteria 
One other thing! Because both my stories concern people in quarantine, you must not think 
that this is my own story or stories -that is more deeply buried!  
– The Quarantine Officer’s Stories
I
In his study of Romantic literary theory, The Mirror and the Lamp, M. H. 
Abrams examines a tradition in which the nature of art is predicated in 
terms that ‘turn on a metaphor which, like “overflow” signifies the internal 
made external’, and he remarks in particular upon the way in which, with 
Romanticism, the Aristotelian notion of the relief which art affords the spectator 
becomes ‘silently shifted to denote the healing expenditure of feeling in the 
poet himself.’1 He quotes Byron’s blunt comment, ‘If I don’t write to empty 
my mind, I go mad’, and draws attention to John Keble’s Oxford Lectures in 
which the thrust of much earlier thinking is impressively reformulated. Keble, 
who follows Hazlitt and anticipates Freud in observing a relationship between 
poetry and the fulfilment of ungratified personal desire, distinguishes primary 
poets as those ‘who, spontaneously moved by impulse, resort to composition 
for relief and solace of a burdened and over-wrought mind’, and discerns in 
poetic creation ‘a safety-valve preserving men from actual madness.’2 
With his desire ‘to write a book about the lot of us in order to liberate 
myself ’ (XI:300), Strindberg’s writing has been widely regarded as an 
unusually transparent instance of such a venture, whereby he effects an often 
immediate and sometimes tempestuous emotional discharge of the excitations 
accumulated in everyday experience. Sustained by the daily therapeutic practice 
of literature, it is argued,3 he converts his life into language and so removes 
affects that would otherwise remain strangulated and occasion pathogenic 
results. Indeed, Strindberg stresses the cathartic nature of writing on his own 
account, and readily identifies with the tradition discussed by Abrams. In Alone, 
for example, he quotes Goethe on the relief to be gained from ‘transforming 
whatever delighted or distressed me into a poem or image… in order to bring 
peace and order to my inner life’ (38:198). Like Keble he regards poetry as a 
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safety-valve (‘My habit of converting experiences into poetry opens the safety-
valve (säkerhetsventilen) for an excess of impressions, and replaces the need to 
speak’ (38:192)); and in the account of Johan’s discovery of his… vocation 
as a writer, in Time of Ferment, he provides a paradigmatic description of the 
cathartic action of creation upon the creator. Although Johan has already 
attempted to satisfy his need for self-expression in a number of ways, he finds 
them all (declamation, painting, acting) at least partly inadequate. For while 
it will often be painting that eventually helps him to ‘show himself to himself ’ 
when ‘the small, cramped letters on the page lay there dead’ (19:18) and he 
could not write, it did not as yet enable him ‘to express what he wanted to 
say’. Equally, while he may occasionally stumble upon a role in another man’s 
text that corresponds with the words he would himself like to utter (in both 
Schiller’s Karl Moor and Wijkander’s Lucidor ‘he had discovered his inner 
feelings expressed in print, and therefore he wanted to speak with their tongues’ 
(18:313)), he discovers that as an actor he is normally called upon ‘to shout out 
empty meaningless words’ (18:332), since what a character says does not carry 
the burden of his own unexpressed ideas and feelings. 
Disappointed in the theatre, therefore, and denied advancement there, he 
seeks to save face and re-establish his ‘battered, wounded, torn’ self by escaping 
into the imaginary world of The Army Surgeon’s Tales (Fältskärns berättelser), a 
popular collection of stories by the Finnish writer, Zachris Topelius. But whether 
by accident or subsequent design (and it certainly fits the crucial retrospective 
episode of The Son of a Servant precisely), the story he reads reminds him of 
his own familial situation at a moment in his life when he is at odds with 
his father and his stepmother, yet longing ‘for reconciliation and peace’. To 
achieve a vicarious satisfaction, therefore, and to amend reality, he ‘spins’ a 
daydream in which his stepmother reconciles him with his father, a scenario 
which is accomplished ‘by organizing memories from the past, removing some 
things and adding others’ (18:340), or as Freud was to define the process, in 
‘Creative Writers and Day -Dreaming’, ‘the wish makes use of an occasion in 
the present to construct, on the pattern of the past, a picture of the future.’4 
Once this is accomplished (and the Narrator doubts if something so effortless 
and irresistible ‘could be called work, for it went of its own accord, and was 
none of his willing or doing’ (18:341)), it only remains to write it down. The 
relief is then immediate and comprehensive. It felt (and the image is typical of 
the bodily metaphors, either surgical or purgative, to which Strindberg often 
resorts in order to describe his compulsion to write) ‘as if years of pain were 
over, as if an abscess had been lanced’ (18:341).5 
However, the role and function of Strindberg’s conception of writing as 
catharsis has never been thought through in relation to his accomplished work, 
which raises a number of insistent questions especially as regards the margin of 
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overlap implicit in the frequently drawn comparison between his attempt ‘to 
see as deeply into a soul as can be seen’ (VI:298) and the theory and practice 
of psychoanalysis, which Freud, in one of his first attempts at an adequate 
metaphor for the abreaction of repressed material, compared to ‘the opening 
up of a cavity filled with pus, the scraping out of a carious region.’6 What 
in fact does the often aggressive desire to speak out (‘att tala ut’) represent? 
Does it remove the effects, as Strindberg often suggests, or is the material with 
which he works only fastened the more securely as he returns each day to 
his life in writing? Is his attempt to reveal himself in words a symptom or its 
cure, or is the language in which he formulates his life only a means of solace, 
like the chemical formulae with which he manipulates the natural world in 
his scientific essays, where exactitude is often sacrificed to the consonance of 
mathematical harmony? Moreover, given Strindberg’s ability as a consummate 
player as well as creator of roles, how far may the autobiographical writing, 
which prompted the psychologist Gösta Harding, to maintain that ‘apart 
from his genius as a dramatist, the most remarkable thing about Strindberg 
seems to me to be his capacity for self-treatment–auto-psychotherapy’,7 be 
regarded as consonant with the talking cure developed by Freud from Breuer’s 
fortuitous discoveries in the case of Anna O, and what, if anything, is to be 
made of the striking synchronicity wherein (as Gunnar Brandell points out) 
‘Strindberg during his Inferno crisis to some extent carried out a self-analysis, 
albeit presented in religious and moral terms, at virtually the same moment 
as Freud was embarking upon the self-analysis which forms the basis of The 
Interpretation of Dreams’ ?8 
The problem is therefore twofold: the questionable nature and efficacy of 
Strindberg’s attempt to meet his claim that suffering may be expunged merely 
by writing it down (e.g. XIV:217) raises what Guy Vogelweith calls ‘le problème 
si délicat des rapports entre psychanalyse et littérature,’9 and at precisely the 
moment when the former discourse was taking shape, a point which lends 
further encouragement to the tempting notion that the endeavours of Freud 
and Strindberg run parallel to one another. For there is, certainly, a remarkable 
degree of shared ground. As heirs to an impulse in European thought that 
Henri Ellenberger terms ‘the unmasking trend… the systematic search for 
deception and the uncovering of underlying truth,’10 they both detect in man 
not merely a deliberate intention to lie, to himself as well as to others, but a 
powerful inner resistance to truth, which is sustained by the fiction of a world 
that corresponds to our desires. Strindberg’s insight into the mechanisms of 
repression and self-deception, for example, often suggests Freud’s shrewd and 
intricate explorations. He knows we punish ourselves for hidden wishes, what 
he calls our ‘önskesynd’ (46:193), as well as for the crimes and peccadilloes we 
actually commit, and he recognizes that man has ‘an ability to keep obnoxious 
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impressions from him, which borders upon the miraculous’ (48:854), while in 
his later works he frequently dramatizes the dilemma to which Gerda confesses 
in The Pelican, when she responds to her brother’s ruthless unmasking of family 
secrets by crying, ‘I knew it all along, and yet I didn’t know it… It didn’t reach 
my consciousness, because it was too awful’ (45:253). 
More immediately, however, the kinship between Strindberg and Freud is 
largely a matter of the precursors and contemporaries they have in common. 
For both in detail and in its general tenor their work inhabits an intellectual 
milieu which is populated by Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Ibsen, Nietzsche, 
and Taine,11 and in the 1880s Strindberg, like Freud, became conversant with 
contemporary psychology. By his own account he consumed ‘a whole literature 
of insanity’ (VI:78), and the writings of Ribot, Maudsley, Galton, Bernheim, 
and Binet figure in his letters, his libraries, and his works, as he sought to 
implement the current demand, articulated here by Maudsley, in The Pathology 
of Mind, for ‘a scientific demonstration of the strict order and necessity of the 
chain of events of the person’s life history by a patient unfolding of his action 
on circumstances and of their action on him’. ‘Sane or insane,’ Maudsley 
continued, ‘a man’s history is his character, and the full and exact explanation of 
his position in life, whether eminence or madness, would be the full and exact 
disclosure of his character,’12 and by combining autobiographical and religious 
traditions of introspection with contemporary psychological theory, Strindberg 
attempted such a disclosure in The Son of a Servant, just as other developments 
in the field, for example Bernheim’s work on hypnosis and suggestion in De 
la suggestion et de ses applications à la thérapeutique and Charcot’s research 
into hysteria at La Salpetrière, are as significant for what Strindberg called 
his ‘artistic psychological writing’ (VI:335) in Short Cuts (Genvägar), ‘The 
Romantic Organist on Rånö’, Vivisections, and By the Open Sea, as they are 
for the contribution of Charcot’s student and Bernheim’s German translator, 
Freud, to Studies on Hysteria. Conversely, Freud, as Brandell suggests, may 
well have read Strindberg’s study of the hysteric, Tekla, when Short Cuts was 
published in the Neue Freie Presse in 1887,13 and the influence he subsequently 
exerted upon literature is in any case only a reversal of the situation in the early 
days of psychoanalysis when Freud was caught up in the literary as well as the 
scientific developments of the period. As Brandell points out, in his stimulating 
study, Freud – A Man of His Century, the Paris to which he came in 1885 to 
study with Charcot, at a time when Strindberg had just embarked upon The 
Son of a Servant, was the centre of ‘a general ideo-historical and literary context, 
which may be called that of psychological naturalism’, and ‘Freud’s new system 
of psychological understanding and his self-analysis during the 1890s are, from 
one point of view, the culmination of a long-lasting collaboration between 
humanistic men of letters on the one hand, and doctors and researchers on 
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the other.’14 Indeed, the resemblance between the two domains was at times 
so close that in both Studies on Hysteria and the Case History devoted to 
‘Dora’, Freud found it necessary to distinguish his compelling and ingenious 
narratives from the psycho-pathological studies in which contemporary fiction 
abounded,15 an endeavour of some urgency when literature aspired to the 
status of ‘scientific analysis’ and employed ‘all the tools of the new science of 
psychology’ (MD:17). The Son of a Servant, Strindberg maintained, was not ‘an 
Ehrenrettung or book of exculpation, it is a soul’s analysis, anatomic psychology’ 
(V:356), and he told Ola Hansson that Naturalism had brought literature to 
the point where invention had been superseded by psychology: ‘Don’t you see 
yourself that you are moving from synthetic literature into the psychological 
thesis!’ (VII:248). Thus when he attributes his own technique to Axel Borg in 
By the Open Sea, the account reads (apart from the final modest disclaimer) as 
a striking anticipation of the course Freud would take when he added his self-
analysis to the library of Naturalist case histories and thereby transformed the 
genre: ‘And in order to verify the correctness of his observation he used himself 
as a psychological preparation, cut himself up living, experimented on himself, 
constructed fistula and fontanelles, subjected himself to an unnatural, often 
repulsive spiritual diet, but then – paying careful attention to the bias exerted 
by the presence of the experimenter in the experiment – avoided using himself 
and his life to establish a norm for others’ (24:65). 
This analytic standpoint was in fact endemic in Naturalism, which affords 
many instances of a dédoublement similar to the investigations undertaken in 
A Madman’s Defence and Inferno. Stressing the split into experiencing self and 
observing consciousness, the Naturalist writer often presents himself as a spy 
upon his own mind, someone who watches himself live and then composes 
a report on what he has seen. Thus Alfred Binet records Alphonse Daudet’s 
response to an investigation into the nature of thinking, where Daudet describes 
the ‘horrible analytic and critical faculty’ underlying his writing and argues that 
it is ‘like an internal watcher, impassive and unmoved, a double, inert and cold, 
which in the most violent broadsides of Le Petit Chose was observing all, taking 
notes and saying the next day: A nous deux!’16 Directed outwards, moreover, in 
the Vivisector’s role which Strindberg cultivated in the late 1880s, this faculty 
not only permitted the writer to use his inner life as ‘a carcass for dissection’ 
(V:364), but also foreshadowed the analytic situation. Thus, in his one-acter, 
The Stronger, Y’s silence enables X to talk herself into understanding the past, 
and in Creditors, as Strindberg pointed out to his French translator, Georges 
Loiseau, ‘Tekla, qui mène une existence inconsciente comme les femmes… est 
emmené par Gustave de réfléchir sur elle-même, devient devoilée devant soi-
même, est rendu consciente.’ (X:76) 
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But of course the similarity here is superficial. Gustav, ‘l’assassin psychologue’ 
(X:77) reveals what is concealed in Tekla’s discourse to its speaker only because 
he is personally involved in the drama. His mastery of the situation depends 
upon deception. Spurred on by his own hidden wound and motivated by a 
desire for revenge, the past he reconstructs by encouraging others to talk of it, 
is as much a part of his experience as it is of theirs. For as his author repeatedly 
discovers, ‘one is not alone in the possession of one’s experiences’ (V:356): the 
past, that is, is not singular but shared with those among whom one lives, and 
out of the web of conflicting interpretations the Vivisector therefore seeks to 
establish the primacy of his own account: as Strindberg informs his publisher, 
concerning the third volume of The Son of a Servant, ‘I analyse an event from a 
psychological point of view, and I relate it in my way, after others have related 
it in theirs’ (VI:86). 
Nevertheless, his desire to ‘peer down into the hidden’ (24:35) and bring 
‘life in the hidden’ (37:68) to light is an undertaking he takes seriously, and the 
technique of allowing ‘his memories to run through the history of his personal 
development, as far back as he could trace it, in order as it were to seek his way 
up to his self and be able to read in the past stages his probable fate’ (24:44), to 
which Strindberg often refers, is again one that seems to derive from Freud rather 
than precede him. Each such ‘refresher course’ (24:65) represents an attempt on 
Strindberg’s part to review his past, bring it back into the present, and transpose 
it into language, and as in Freud’s advocacy of a similar procedure, his method 
bears traces of another literary movement, Romanticism. Both writers inherit 
what Philip Rieff calls ‘the Romantic insight that equated artistic creativeness 
with the process of unconscious truth- telling in general,’17 and Freud’s idea of 
the discourse in which the patient might circumvent repression and reclaim his 
past is, like Strindberg’s conception of writing as the immediate transcription 
of experience, authenticated by the notion of inspiration which frequently 
accompanies a view of poetry as the cathartic expression of overpowering 
emotion. Indeed, in many respects inspiration emerges as another royal road 
to the self, and both Freud and Strindberg take encouragement from the same 
predecessors, notably Schiller, who is quoted at length in later editions of The 
Interpretation of Dreams and serves to authorize inspired discourse in The Son 
of a Servant,18 and Ludwig Börne, whose sketch’ Die Kunst in drei Tagen ein 
Original-Schriftsteller zu werden’ caused Freud to write the clarificatory ‘A 
Note on the Pre-History of the Technique of Analysis’ (1920), and supported 
Strindberg’s case in the theory of writing he sent Siri von Essen: ‘Reproduce 
what you have experienced, I wrote to her, for you have lived a life with 
harrowing changes; get hold of a pad of paper, a pen; be frank and you will 
become an author, I quoted, following Börne’s recommendation.’ (MD:50) For 
although Strindberg initially enlisted Börne to combat a conception of genius 
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which granted the elevating visitation of inspiration to an exceptional few (this, 
he argued, was ‘an out-of-date falsehood’ (I:187) since the spread of literacy 
made literature accessible to anyone who wished to write, much as Freud’s 
account of the artistry displayed in dreaming was also sometimes taken to 
suggest that art itself was thus open to all), he in fact suppressed his mistrust of 
inspiration’s improper ease and believed ‘that in his fever the writer is led in the 
right direction’ (VI:103). ‘The artist’, he stated, ‘works unconsciously, creating 
like nature by chance with an incredible wastefulness, but in the moment 
when he, post festum, tries to think his work over, to analyse it, he wakes from 
his half slumber, and falls to the ground like a sleepwalker’ (27:630), and by 
employing images of somnambulism and hallucination, he depicted the writer 
as a medium awaiting a visitation (‘But it doesn’t come to order, nor when I 
please. It comes when It pleases’ (54:472)), just as Freud sought to establish the 
most favourable conditions for the unconscious to reveal itself in the patient’s 
discourse. Abandoning in turn both hypnosis and suggestion, he arrived at 
Free Association where, he concluded, It spoke most clearly. 
And it was when Strindberg made a virtue out of the fact that he wrote best 
when he hallucinated (IV:80), and deliberately submitted himself to the drive 
of his fantasies (as he wrote to his friend, the botanist Bengt Lidforss: ‘I often 
put myself into a state of unconsciousness, not with drink or the like, for that 
awakens a host of memories and new ideas, but by distractions, games, play, 
sleep, novels, and then I let my brain work freely, without bothering about the 
outcome or consequences, and something then emerges which I believe in, just 
because it has grown inevitably’ (VIII:239–40)) that he arrived not merely at 
the most remarkable prefigurations of Freud in his writing, but also at a method 
which resembles Freud’s technique and anticipates the shift from a linear to an 
associative autobiographical mode that is implicit in Freud’s theories, and in 
the example of The Interpretation of Dreams. Firstly when painting according 
to the technique of skogssnufvism, which he introduced in 1892 (IX:40 – the 
name, literally ‘wood-spiritism’, is derived from a folk tale concerning a boy 
who mistakes a tree trunk for the wood sprite, so displaying the kind of double 
vision demanded by his own works, with their dual exoteric and esoteric 
meaning), and then in the seminal essay of 1894, ‘Des arts nouveaux!’ où Le 
Hasard dans la production artistique’, in which he develops a theory that is 
implemented in literary texts such as ‘Deranged Impressions’ and the letters 
he wrote to Torsten Hedlund during 1896, he deliberately lays himself open 
to chance (‘that propitious chance, which has made so many discoveries’ (27: 
130)) and adopts a random manner of creation, a ‘free-hand drawing’ (X:206) 
or associational method (X:64), which he believes nature also employs, in 
order to penetrate what he terms ‘le rideau du conscient’ (VR:66) and read the 
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normally invisible deeper syntax that underlies the calligraphy of the surface. 
As he describes the process in ‘Des arts nouveaux!’: 
Dégagé de la peine de controuver les couleurs l’âme du peintre dispose 
de la pleinitude des forces à chercher des contoures, et comme la main 
manie la spatule à l’aventure, toutefois retenant le modèle de la nature 
sans vouloir la copier, l’ensemble se révèle comme ce charmant pêle mêle 
d’inconscient et de conscient. C’est l’art naturel, où l’artiste travail comme 
la nature capricieuse et sans but déterminé. (VR:58) 
Thus he evolved a type of ‘naturalistic clairvoyance’ (28:59) which encourages 
what he later termed ‘the appearance of the unconscious’ (46:190). By 
improvisatory techniques either adopted or invented, he essayed a type of ‘art 
fortuite’ (X:177) in which customary mechanisms of repression were suspended 
and his unconscious life was free to reveal itself. Perhaps taking his cue from 
Leonardo, to whom he refers in A Blue Book (46:190), and responding during 
the 1880s to Max Nordau, whose collection of essays, Paradoxes, includes the 
description of a child’s game in which a series of random dots are linked to form 
the image of a person or object, Strindberg describes how ‘a painter (can) see 
figures in the sawdust which is strewn on the shop floor by arbitrarily linking 
one point with another, seeing figures in other words where there are none’ as 
early as Flower Paintings and Animal Pieces (22:269). Not surprisingly, too, he 
showed an interest in automatic writing, in the Rorschach blot, and in Kerner’s 
‘kleksography’ which revealed ‘the operator’s very innermost unconscious 
thoughts, even such as he didn’t wish to recognize as his own, but nevertheless 
must’ (46:191). Moreover, attributing substance to his fantasies and to his dreams 
(‘Nothing comes from nothing, and fantasies, like dreams, possess full higher 
reality’ (XI:236)), and fashioning an instrument of exceptional sensitivity in 
what he termed his ‘inner eye’ (XI:268), he was able, although still confined 
to the discourse of romantic fiction, an occult world of doubles, ghosts, and 
mesmeric suggestion, to discover a fresh autobiographical dimension in the 
‘strange occurrences’ that composed themselves into the significant pattern 
of life with the aid of free association and skilful interpretation. It is as if he 
employs the method outlined in his proposal to illustrate the book of Job ‘in 
an occult manner’ (XI:288) and lays a fine paper over events to catch their 
imprint, extracting from the trivia of his daily life, its chance encounters, the 
detritus of the streets, his haphazard reading, and obsessive images, a gigantic 
frottage wherein he can trace his life’s design. ‘I believe that if one only refrains 
from hardening one’s heart a great deal is revealed’ (XI:157), he confided to 
Hedlund; esoteric meaning was to be found even in the gutter of everyday 
Parisian life; and as Marcel Réja remarks, in his informed preface to the first 
French edition of Inferno, on which he worked with Strindberg, by observing 
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la législation du hasard… tous les petits détails, les incidents fortuits que 
nous ne jugeons pas dignes d’un seul moment d’attention, il les dépiste 
avec un soin jaloux, les confronte et les fait hurler de force à nos oreilles, 
qui veulent être sourdes, et les fait briller violemment à nos yeux qui 
veulent être aveugles.
Il combine en système inquiétant ce que nous éliminons 
systématiquement du domaine de notre attention. Tandis que nous les 
mettons sans plus d’enquête sur le compte du hasard, il adopte ces enfants 
abandonnés, et cherche à leur constituer une famille, une significtion, un 
but.19
Or as The Unknown explains, in To Damascus: ‘Life, which was earlier a great 
nonsense, has gained a meaning, and I perceive a purpose, where before I only 
saw chance’ (29:10). 
Thus, as Göran Printz-Påhlson points out, Freud and Strindberg are also 
united ‘by their experience that in the inner life nothing is wasted, everything 
comes back in one form or other.’20 ‘To throw light on things by tracing what 
is manifest back to what is hidden,’21 delights them both; they share a passion 
for interpretation and discern in fortuitousness a key to a more deeply inscribed 
reality where the play of chance becomes a determined network repeatedly 
producing’ a coincidence which cannot be chance’ (X:153). At much the same 
moment they become alert to the intermittencies of conscious life through 
which another order of being may be glimpsed, to what could be gleaned 
from what Freud once termed ‘the rubbish heap… of our observation’,22 in the 
seemingly banal details and objets trouvés out of which Strindberg fashions his 
Occult Diary, Inferno and To Damascus, and which forms much of the material 
in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Freud’s second psychoanalytical book 
and the one in which, by a nice stroke, he quotes Strindberg for the only 
time.23 For what Strindberg unveils in the Inferno material is very much ‘our 
double existence, obsessions, our nocturnal existence, our bad conscience, our 
momentary baseless fears’ (XI:293) as they manifest themselves in the action of 
what the Surrealists would call L’hasard objectif. As in Breton’s post -Freudian 
narrative, Nadja, or Aragon’s novel, Le Paysan de Paris, a predominantly 
urban environment casts up images and objects that accord with the writer’s 
unconscious desires and fears, and if the language in which Strindberg 
conveys his findings is sometimes less precise than Freud’s measured tone, it 
is nevertheless continually reaching out to accommodate comparable insights: 
My inner being is mirrored in my dreams and so I can use them as I use 
my shaving mirror: to see what I am doing and avoid cutting myself. 
The same applies to certain ‘occurrences’ in waking life – but not all. For 
example, there are always bits of paper lying in the street yet not every 
bit of paper catches my attention. But if one of them does, then I pay 
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attention to it, and if there is something written or printed on it that has 
some connection with what is occupying my thoughts, then I regard it as 
an expression of my innermost unborn thoughts. And I am right to do so. 
For if this bridge of thought between my inner self and this outer thing 
did not exist, a transfer could never take place. (38:135)24
It is this tension between apparent randomness and a concealed personal order 
which dictates the emergence of a radically new form of autobiography in The 
Interpretation of Dreams, where a life is no longer written according to the 
causal, chronological sequence that the rational consciousness extracts from 
the remembered past, but is reclaimed from the data of dream by association 
and analogy, regardless of temporality and no longer impeded by a concern to 
distinguish between what is fantasy and what is real since, as Freud later makes 
plain, what we remember is all we possess and our ‘phantasies possess psychical 
as contrasted with material reality.’25 Even in the process of remembering, the 
past becomes dismembered, as Freud realizes in his account of the dissection 
dream (‘The task which was imposed on me in the dream of carrying out a 
dissection of my own body was thus my self-analysis’)26, and individual identity 
as the continuity of consciousness through time thus becomes no longer so 
certain or essential a principle of autobiography. Meaning is not enchained, 
as the nineteenth-century mode adopted in The Son of a Servant suggests, in 
successive events that are conveyed by a narrative where temporal sequence 
is elevated into a causal one, but embedded in the obsessions, repetitions, 
and intermittencies cast up in the course of narration, during which the self 
reconstitutes itself around patterns of memory, complexes of association, and 
correlations in literature and myth. For, as John Sturrock remarks, in an 
essay on the autobiographer whose practice has responded most thoroughly 
to Freud, Michel Leiris: ‘the power of association, of bringing into the light 
mnemonic instead of temporal contiguities, has infinitely more to tell us about 
our permanent psychic organization than the power of chronology.’27 
And this is a major aspect of the Inferno process. Having placed his 
experience under the control of contemporary psychological theory and taken 
introspection to its respectable limits in The Son of a Servant, Strindberg now 
submits himself to conditions in which he contrives, firstly to experience the 
derangement which others had only studied, and then to write his own case 
history.28 In his experimental records, the Hedlund letters, The Occult Diary, 
the first drafts of Inferno, and Inferno itself, he re-explores the data of his life 
according to his experimental associative technique until, in To Damascus, 
where ‘everything recurs’ in the form of ‘dead men and beggars and madmen 
and human destinies and childhood memories’ (29:45), he projects himself 
on to the mirror of The Unknown and is able to monitor his experience with 
a subtlety that sets ajar that door to the past to which he, like Freud, so often 
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refers,29 through which his guilt and neurosis emerge with unprecedented 
complexity, not as a single extended strand but in a web of metaphor and myth, 
a network of interrelationships wherein the past reveals its continued potency 
in the present and the present re-illumines the past. 
But if these manifold similarities encourage the notion that by transposing 
his life into language Strindberg achieves not only a temporary release of effects 
in words but mastery over their causes as well, it is more likely that he stops 
where Freud began, namely at the point in the ‘Preliminary Communication’ 
to Studies on Hysteria where Freud and Breuer describe how: 
The injured person’s reaction to the trauma only exercises a completely 
‘cathartic’ effect if it is an adequate reaction – as, for instance, revenge. 
But language serves as a substitute for action; by its help an effect can 
be ‘abreacted’ almost as effectively. In other cases speaking is itself the 
adequate reflex, when for instance it is a lamentation or giving utterance 
to a tormenting secret, e.g. a confession.30 
For while he may bring the buried past back into his texts, Strindberg does 
not perform the labour of interpretation which Freud came to regard as 
the necessary extension of the talking cure if the latter is to be effective, a 
development in his thinking which marks the methodological shift from 
catharsis to psychoanalysis, whose ‘aim was no longer to abreact an affect 
which had got on to the wrong lines but to uncover repressions and replace 
them by acts of judgement which might result either in the accepting or in 
the condemning of what had been formerly repudiated.’31 Indeed, Strindberg 
is not looking for a cure; he wants to go on writing since, as he remarks, ‘I 
found existence pure bliss so long as the writing continued, and do so still. 
It’s only then that I live’ (54:467). Moreover, it is not necessarily the deepest 
or the most remote layers of his personality that this unburdening process is 
directly engaged in tapping, but a recent, often minor, affront to his self-image 
(a day’s residue in fact) that demands prompt relief. And while Strindberg 
perceives the process by which an affect can be abreacted through language 
as clearly as Freud and Breuer (in both A Blue Book and Black Banners he 
relates an anecdote in which an acquaintance had, by speaking, ‘freed himself 
from a painful impression so completely that it was erased from his memory’ 
(41:128)), the solace which writing affords is shortlived and normally confined 
to the effacement of immediate discomfort. It offers a means of redress in times 
of adversity and its habitual practice renders the present endurable, but as a 
type of secondary revision of experience, it does not substantially modify the 
personality. Rather, the narrative or drama in which fragments of the past 
arise is a recreation which repeats and adapts the autobiographical material, 
and the text, like the last stage of the dream work, connects the disconnected, 
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systematizes and reshapes the mnemonic data which is already, as Freud notes 
in his essay on ‘Screen Memories’, formed ‘unconsciously – almost like works 
of fiction’,32 and establishes relationships between the manner and the matter 
of the utterance whereby it conforms to expectations of an intelligible whole 
that are often already fulfilled by the genre in which it is cast, and which, to 
the extent that it is conventional, depersonalizes what is entrusted to it. To 
employ a formula of Philippe Lejeune which is particularly apt when applied 
to Strindberg: ‘C’est une tentative d’alchimie poétique, plutôt que de chimie 
analytique.’33
This verbal alchemy already colours the most immediate of the ways in 
which Strindberg formulates an affect in words, his letter writing, where 
even more promptly than by writing for the press, he could perform what 
Torsten Eklund sees as one of the essential tasks of his project: ‘… to keep the 
public up to date with his more or less private misfortunes and sufferings.’34 At 
times, indeed, he keeps selected correspondents informed on chosen aspects 
of his life by almost daily reports, each letter taking up the tale even as it is 
unfolding, and in some cases, for example in the letters to Pehr Staaff in 1887 
on the disintegration of his first marriage, it is clear that he is discovering, or 
inventing, or recomposing this life in the very act of writing about it. It is as if 
he allows the words to have their say, following them where they care to take 
him, in what is effectively a trial run for the novel they conjure up, A Madman’s 
Defence. 
Given the importance he placed on letter writing as the model for writing 
in general, the letters are obviously of particular relevance to a project in which 
the boundaries between different written discourses tend to dissolve into a 
single life of scription. They represent perhaps the quintessential method of 
self-representation since they afford a true multiplicité du moi in the different 
projections each correspondent elicits, and he frequently uses an extended 
correspondence as a mirror in which to observe and analyse himself. But his 
practice resembles a soliloquy rather than the dialogue which an exchange of 
letters normally evokes. As he reminds one of the first in a series of reflectors 
with whom he enters into a sometimes entirely written relationship, ‘You are 
used to my speaking in the first person Singularis’ (I:27), and in telling both his 
youthful confidant, Eugène Fahlstedt, and Jonas Lie that they need not answer 
the letters he intends sending them (I:122, IV:180), he acknowledges that his 
correspondence is not intended for a full and reciprocal communication. 
At its most intense this practice produces a form of externalized inner 
monologue, a type of public self-address in which Strindberg analyses 
his situation and inspects himself. In a succession of correspondences, he 
deftly secures a balance between intimacy and distance that permits him to 
concentrate on himself, and especially in relation to Torsten Hedlund he is 
Writing Out and Repetition 33
able, in the crucial stages of the Inferno crisis, to use the other as a screen 
on to which he projects his inner turmoil in order to interpret it. He arrives, 
in short, at a remarkable complement to the analytic situation, or rather, at 
the almost contemporary situation contrived by Freud in relation to Wilhelm 
Fliess for the conduct of his self-analysis. ‘I need you as my audience,’ Freud 
wrote to Fliess,’35 much as Strindberg required Hedlund to be the distant 
intimate of his intellectual isolation, and Paul Roazen’s remark, ‘On the one 
hand, Freud needed his own isolation, even if he grumbled about it; yet he 
also sought an uncomprehending blank screen in Fliess,’36 could as easily be 
applied to Strindberg’s relationship with Hedlund, who was enlisted to receive 
what Strindberg extracted from himself by experimental techniques involving 
introspection and free association, and then transferred to paper: ‘Read what I 
write without criticism, without resistance, and don’t prevent me from running 
on,’ he instructs Hedlund, ‘for I am growing as I write this, and perhaps you will 
too’ (XI:240). And yet, quite clearly, Hedlund was forbidden to place his own 
constructions on the material Strindberg offered him. As always, the latter’s 
resistance to other interpretations of his experience remains firm: he refuses the 
transference which Freud came to see as part of the psychoanalytical situation, 
and when Hedlund comes too close, he breaks off with a letter that confirms 
the one-sided nature of their entire correspondence: ‘Your appearance in my 
life always seemed to me like a mission, and your person, which I don’t know 
and have never seen, remained an abstraction to me the whole time’ (XI:393). 
This abrupt end, and Strindberg’s subsequent return to literature in order to 
alleviate his conflicts in art, helps to distinguish the writer from the subject in 
analysis. It belongs to the nature of the pact under which an analysis is carried 
out that the subject lies on a couch and talks, suppressing nothing, however 
trivial or exceptional, that comes to mind. He is in the presence of a listener, 
the analyst, who receives this discourse, responds to it with questions, and 
prompts the subject towards an interpretation of his own words, returning 
them to him in order that he may amend and augment them. Moreover, this 
interruptable discourse is not only modified by the immediate response it 
elicits; it is also supported or betrayed by the other eloquent signs emitted by 
the subject. As Freud observed, as early as Studies on Hysteria, the gestures, 
intonations, facial expressions, and silences of the subject can be as revealing as 
his words. 37 Although it is tempting to compare the analyst to a blank page on 
which the analysand writes his story, the actual situation is thus one in which 
spoken discourse is clearly distinguished from the written, however direct or 
immediate. It is a question of unveiling the hidden and unknown discourse 
transmitted by the subject, a discourse conveyed and audible only in the words 
he nevertheless speaks with the conviction that they mean what he says, to a 
listener who helps him to bring it into the open, recognize himself in it, and 
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accept it as a more faithful account than the one he is accustomed to tell. The 
subject has need of the other so that the opaque material of his discourse may 
achieve clarity and coherence. He presents it to another in order that it be given 
back to him, that eventually in the exchange of words, he will possess his own 
discourse instead of being possessed by it, that he will, as Bernard Pingaud 
points out, in his essay ‘L’Ecriture et la cure’, ‘enfin parler sa propre parole au 
lieu d’être parlé par elle.’38 
Conversely, the writer’s language, which is normally produced at a desk 
and consigned in silence to the page, is addressed to an absent reader, whose 
response does not modify the text. Although the features of the reader whom the 
author would like to see elaborate its codes are often implicit in the text, there 
is no guarantee into whose hands, or when, it will fall, and whatever the writer 
imagines he has intended with his text, this intention is not only impossible 
to impose but actually not recoverable as such by the potential reader, who 
may well discover that the text embodies meanings at variance with what the 
writer believed himself to have written. The situation of the autobiographer 
in particular is irremediably narcissistic. Engaged in the creation of his own 
image he is, irrespective of any desire to surmount his resistance and unearth 
the aetiology of his character, left to his own linguistic devices, without the 
assistance of an interlocutor. Alert to the constraints of form and genre, and to 
the determinacies of other books and lives, he is occupied with composing a 
discourse that is shaped and closed, not untidy and open -ended, as in analysis. 
And where the endeavour of psychoanalysis is to penetrate the image which 
the subject has formed of himself, the autobiographer elaborates a specular 
image in a narrative given over to the establishment of order and coherence, 
consciously manipulated, highly crafted, and felicitously expressed. Moreover, 
the object of the cure sought in analysis is deliverance, which means that 
having said all that matters the subject may be silent and move on, whereas the 
writer continually returns to his writing and multiplies the texts. Hopefully, 
the patient finally becomes himself; the writer, however, achieves the status 
of a subject only vicariously by projecting his personal myth in a work that is 
then detached from him in order to embark upon its own career. As Pingaud 
observes: ‘La personnalité conquise de l’ecrivain, c’est l’oeuvre elle-même.’39 But 
once conquered this personality is immediately lost again, as a product now 
external to the self which produced it. Once written, the text and its author 
part company, so compounding the sense of lack and misprision with which 
his committal to a written existence may in any case impart to the writer. To 
recapture himself he must begin again and then again, only to lose himself 
in each set of words he leaves behind. For if the cure is singular, the work is 
plural and may therefore be, as Pingaud suggests, ‘le modèle de toute fixation’, 
since even when he seeks to deliver himself from obsessive themes and images, 
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the writer only succeeds in fixing them outside himself, in the now foreign 
monument of the text, where it is the words and not their substantial producer 
that are ‘l’objet même du discours’. 40
II
Certainly, Strindberg’s attempt to write out the past assumes, for its author as 
well as for the reader or spectator, every sign of a fixation. From the Inferno period 
onwards, the phrase ‘Allt går igen’ (Everything repeats itself) constantly recurs 
to point the structure of plays where repetition is a major organizing principle for 
transforming an otherwise unbridled reality into significant pattern, and pure 
continguity into interpreted, meaningful sequence. Sometimes proffered as the 
wisdom of experience (‘Anyone aged forty, knows everything: life functions so 
simply; everything is repeated, everything comes again’),41 repetition reveals 
how the unexpected consistency of events prompts what Freud describes as the 
uncanny ‘idea of something fateful and unescapable where otherwise we should 
have spoken of chance.’42 ‘Then no matter how life shaped itself, I always found 
continuity or repetition,’ the Stranger observes, from amidst the ashes of his 
childhood home, in The Burned House: ‘there are scenes in my life which have 
occurred many times’ (45:98). And the ageing Strindberg, whose obsession 
with chains of significance and networks of correspondences sometimes leads 
him to find a consolation in a mode of thinking that Freud would consider 
regressive in its propensity to animism and the narcissistic overestimation of 
subjective mental processes, generally goes out of his way to re-encounter the 
past. This is one facet of a repetition compulsion that permeates the Inferno 
material, where it continually suggests a fate arranged, although not always 
consciously, by the author himself, and which also directs his steps in the 
account in the Occult Diary of a walk through Stockholm on 22 September 
1906 along streets that remind him of his past, and which concludes: ‘Then 
went home to Karlavägen; and I thought: this is really like an “Agony” or the 
very moment of death, when the whole of life passes before one, and I decided 
to write about this morning walk, during which, in an hour and a half, I had 
been given a review of my life until now.’ 
For rather than fade into forgetfulness, the past becomes increasingly 
tenacious the more Strindberg writes and the older he grows. Thus, ever more 
aware of himself as the sum of his years, the Strindbergian protagonist in the 
guise of The Unknown, The Stranger, The Hunter, or the Narrator of Inferno, 
relives and re-examines, repeats and replots the constituents of a life which is 
continually doubling back upon itself and is always inclined to return to its 
origins: as the Lawyer tells Indra’s Daughter in A Dream Play, ‘Life consists of 
doing things again…. you must retrace your steps, return by the same path, 
and suffer all the horrors of the process, the repetitions, the repetitions, the 
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repetitions’ (36:290). Indeed, repetition is the principle upon which a number 
of important late works (To Damascus, Crimes and Crimes, A Dream Play) 
are organized, and in so far as the principle underlying his writing is also the 
governing principle of a life in which Strindberg creates situations, engineers 
coincidences, and contrives to ‘bring about events which never or very rarely 
happen in fact,’43 his later autobiographical texts are uncanny arrangements of 
what in Freud’s terms is already ‘uncanny’ experience. Thus Inferno emerges as 
the accurate account of a life previously lived through the purposeful creation 
of ‘Das Unheimliche’. 
Many allusions indicate the intellectual provenance of Strindberg’s idea of 
repetition. Apart from the popular conception that at the moment of death 
the dying man’s life passes before him in review,44 he frequently alludes to 
Kierkegaard’s concept of Gentagelsen (Repetition), to Swedenborg’s idea of a 
post mortem ‘livsrevy’ (review of life), and to his own often articulated notion of 
life as an infernal scene of torture for crimes committed in a previous existence, 
a notion which he readily combines with the image of an inexorably grinding 
mill in order to endow the insistent retention of the past with a meaningful 
moral context, as when The Unknown describes how he ‘saw my whole life 
unreel as in a kind of panorama from my childhood, through my youth, right 
up to … and when it came to the end of the reel, it began all over again; 
and the whole time I heard a mill turning… and I can hear it still… Yes, 
now it’s here too!’ (29:100). According to one of his glosses on Swedenborg’s 
correspondences, the mill, an obvious metaphor for remorse and conscience, 
represents ‘scrutiny’ (47:530), and its implicit purifactory aspect is clearly 
expressed by the Teacher, in The Isle of the Dead, who describes how ‘all you 
have lived, small as well as large, both good and evil, is ground in the mill of 
memory, ground and ground until the gray husks and chaff are sifted out and 
blown away by the wind. Then only the fine meal remains, which is baked into 
the snow -white bread of life for eternity.’45 
But in all of Strindberg’s obsessive bids to discover a sensible pattern in his 
life there is, whether here in the study of its insistent repetitions or previously in 
his many early attempts to interpret his destiny in what he sees as the ravaging 
effect of Nemesis upon those he encounters, a passionate desire for coherence 
that precedes all theory. As Brandell points out in his reading of To Damascus, 
the continual re run of the past, either as a reminder of events from which 
he cannot free himself (‘I have moments when the memory of everything 
horrible I have experienced collects as in an accumulator’ (X:219), he tells his 
friend, Littmansson), or as the duplication of actual situations, is standard 
neurotic practice, and Strindberg is characterized both by an acute sensitivity 
to coincidence, parallel, and repetition in everyday life, and an inclination to 
repeat entire situations, to discover himself in familiar circumstances where 
Writing Out and Repetition 37
the same roles are distributed to new protagonists. ‘When I encountered that 
person, I remembered that one from the past’ (45:98), the Stranger explains, 
in The Burned House, and Brandell rightly remarks upon the way in which 
Strindberg conflates his first two marriages in the text of the play, where the 
lineaments of his earlier relationship are uncovered in his rapidly foundering 
second attachment.46 In retrospect Strindberg might try to turn the persistence 
of his memories and the sense that experience is a ‘circulus vitiosus’ into the 
claim that he had foreseen his fate at twenty ‘when I wrote my play Master Olof, 
which has become the tragedy of my own life’ (28: 191);47 in practice, however, 
the tendency of the same material to reappear across many years reveals not 
merely the tenacity but the impermeability to writing of certain pathogenic 
recollections. With their overlapping lists of titles, motifs, and references to 
episodes from a past already given frequent expression, the surviving papers 
in the Royal Library in Stockholm demonstrate how the same topics recur as 
if each fragment were somehow seeking its place in relation to all the others, 
whereby the whole constellation of headings would eventually add up to a 
life. Thus, for example, the episodes of the wine bottle and of his late arrival 
at Klara school, which are both treated extensively in The Son of a Servant, 
reappear once again among the jottings for later works, and he finds it 
necessary to retranscribe the Biblical narrative of Hagar and Ishmael which, 
as a determining aspect of his self-image dating back at least to the mid 1880s 
and already explicit in the title of his first volume of autobiography, was a story 
which he must by then have known by heart.48 
Most pertinent, however, is the evidence in these papers that the episode 
which haunts his writing more than any other, what he on one occasion calls 
‘The Irremediable’ (Det Ohjelpliga) and on another merely ‘Affaire W-----l’,49 
remains the least written off of all his preoccupations. At any moment material 
from his relationship with Siri von Essen and her first husband, Carl Gustaf 
Wrangel, is likely to nudge its way into a text, and for all the artistic mastery of 
two such central achievements of his ‘artistic psychological writing’ as Creditors 
and A Madman’s Defence in which he explores this material, he does not gain 
a corresponding psychological mastery over the situation they encompass. 
Invariably associated with feelings of guilt, shame and self-reproach, which 
provoke him to repeated and vehement denials of what he considers the 
prevailing view of him as a seducer, a role Strindberg repeatedly evokes in order 
to repudiate it with elaborate casuistry,50 it is, moreover, clear that the special 
potency of the Wrangel material resides in its ability to activate the archetypal 
Oedipal scenario, with its a priori role for the remainder of his life. The return 
to Norrtullsgatan 12 that is depicted in A Madman’s Defence, when Wrangel, 
with Siri von Essen at his side, opened the door of what had been Strindberg’s 
childhood home from 1864–67, and again in 1871–72 (and for once he could 
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be excused the characteristic exclamation, ‘What a freak of fate’ (MD:28) in 
his re-telling of the encounter), reconstitutes the framework of a family around 
the rootless young man of letters, whose ‘raw dissipations’ are dispelled by 
an atmosphere of ‘family peace’ and ‘homely comfort’ (MD:28). ‘The austere 
memories which were associated with the house where she lived’ (MD:34) 
awaken; ‘the lost child’ becomes ‘a member of the family’ (55:22, 65); and past 
and present fuse in his memory as he discerns a rival in the (to him) strikingly 
masculine baron, and an object of desire in the ‘virgin mother I had dreamt 
of’ (MD:44). ‘Gradually mother’s pale face fused with the baroness’s exquisite 
features’ (MD:78), Strindberg writes, as what appears a caprice of destiny gives 
way to its real determination in nature and the narrator at last possesses the 
woman of his dreams, only to ask: ‘Is it an abnormal instinct? Am I a product 
of nature’s whims? Are my feelings perhaps perverse, since it is my own mother 
I possess? An unconscious incest of the heart?’ (MD: 135) 
Once incurred, moreover, the guilt or debt (skuld) demands repayment, 
and the currency at Strindberg’s disposal is writing. The possession of Siri and 
the destruction of his new family (‘I could never separate you in my thoughts,’ 
he wrote in dismay to Wrangel, ‘I always saw you together in my dreams’ 
(1:304)) 51 feeds the treadmill of his mind, where it quickly takes its place on 
the plane of myth, first as one among the innumerable repetitions of the Fall 
that Strindberg, like Rousseau, inserts into his own history, and then as the 
inescapable harbinger and burden of his entire destiny. ‘It was thus written 
“Norrtullsgatan’”, he notes; and then, more fully: ‘Affaire Wrangel was foreseen, 
foreshadowed, therefore necessary. Firstly I am forced and tempted to the first 
divorce; then I am punished because I obeyed the command. The unreasonable 
(oefterrättlige)’.52 And while the impression he likes to give, both in the early 
letters and in the Inferno material, of being pursued by a malignant fate or 
possessed by some daemonic power, owes as much to the legacy of Byronism as 
to a personal fate neurosis, the duplication and triplication of this experience in 
successive marriages, each marked by a characteristic exogamous object choice, 
demonstrates a compulsion to repeat experience whose underlying drive he in 
fact noticed himself. For when, at the dress rehearsal of To Damascus in 1900, 
a relative observed that the Norwegian actress, Harriet Bosse, who played The 
Lady, and who was shortly to become Strindberg’s third wife, ‘was just like 
Aunt Philp (my sister Anna)’, he rapidly perceived a whole train of likenesses 
for The Unknown’s partner, each one more revealing than its predecessor: 
ß (Bosse) is like (1) my second wife (who she has played in Damascus); 
(2) my sister Anna; (3) my mother (4) Mlle Lecain, the beautiful English 
woman who wanted to capture me in Paris; and who was like them all: 
often made a warm motherly impression, so that at Mme Charlotte’s 
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I often wished myself under her warm beautiful woollen coat as in a 
mother’s womb.53
Thus if A Madman’s Defence affords the clearest articulation of the 
preoccupation with incest that often surfaces in Strindberg’s account of 
himself, the identification between his sister Anna, his mother, and sometimes 
one or all of his wives to date, as here, in The Occult Diary, indicates material 
that is never worked through. Already present in The Son of a Servant, in the 
contrast he draws between his ‘sisters, of whom the eldest resembled his mother’ 
and ‘sexual love’ (19:127), it appears in The Cloister, where he describes how 
‘everything erotic’ in his feelings for Miss X ‘had been repressed’ because she 
resembled ‘his own eldest sister’ (C:34), and again in a late note where he recalls 
both how he had been taken for Siri von Essen’s brother, and that ‘Gunnar 
Heiberg found my sister like my second wife’.54 Evidently he cannot ‘cross out 
and go on’ (34:108) any more than the Captain in The Dance of Death, whose 
advice this is,55 and it becomes clear that, as he writes,’ Everything is dug up, 
everything repeats itself!’ (30:215). 
This archaeological metaphor, so similar in scope to those in which Freud 
depicts the subterranean nature of traumatic memory traces, is often employed 
by Strindberg to indicate the relationship of the present to the past. For 
example, in Creditors, Gustav identifies ‘the secret wound’ from which Adolf 
suffers with a ‘corpse in the cargo you’re hiding from yourself!’ (23:203), and 
before he ruthlessly brings what is buried to light, he indicates the more normal 
process, which is to ‘work, grow old, and pile masses of new impressions over 
the hatchway, so the corpse remains still’ (22:204), an idea to which he returns 
in both The Dance of Death (34:40) and Fagervik and Skamsund (37:9). But 
Strindberg’s own predicament is more complex, for the writing by which he 
lives is both a means of laying the past to rest and the route whereby it re-enters 
the present. In spite of a hopeful suggestion in the material related to one of his 
late self images, the hero and poet Starkodd, that activation of the repressed 
is only a temporary effect of language (‘the latent memory rises up only when 
he sings, but he forgets afterwards’),56 Strindberg generally acknowledges that 
there ‘is no drink which extinguishes memory without stifling life’ (45:276). 
Memory is exempt from the decay that afflicts the body (44:74), and as in To 
Damascus, where The Unknown exclaims ‘Burn! Quench! Burn! Quench! But 
what won’t burn is unfortunately memory – of the past!’ (29:212), the burden 
of the past resists destruction even by what Strindberg calls ‘the terrible business 
of writing, which threatens to burn me alive’ (IV:239). Indeed, as he tells Siri, 
it is precisely ‘When one becomes warm from a memory [that] the words come 
by themselves, one doesn’t know from where’ (I:197), and like memory or ‘the 
infernal coal fire’ of sexuality, which is ‘lit to burn right to the grave’ (28:362), 
the writing to which he is committed (and which he so frequently associates 
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with fire)57 is similarly unquenchable because ultimately it is not required to 
uncover or excavate the past but to cover it over and bury it in words. 
The process is described in the novella, ‘The Romantic Organist on Rånö’, 
an apparently slight tale which sketches, in its account of the apprenticeship 
and aspirations of the young church organist, Alrik Lundstedt, and his later 
service in the poor parish of Rånö, the portrait of an artist whose practice, if 
not his achievement, resembles Strindberg’s. For in allowing his ‘all re-creative 
mind’ (21:236) to transform whatever he sees or experiences into something 
else, Lundstedt’s behaviour conforms substantially to the definition of the poet 
as ‘a man who possesses imagination, that is an ability to combine phenomena, 
see connections, arrange and sort out’ (22:269), in Flower Paintings and 
Animal Pieces; and as Karl-Åke Kärnell demonstrates, in the final chapter 
of his stimulating study of Strindberg’s imagery, Strindbergs bildspråk, when 
Lundstedt ‘relates things to one another in similes and metaphors through 
free association on the basis of some likeness between the things’,58 he uses a 
method that Strindberg employs in the majority of his scientific writings as 
well as in his fiction. 
Characterized by a word which Strindberg frequently adopts as a synonym 
for art, Lundstedt is endowed with the ‘gift of playing’ (att leka - 21:254). That 
is to say, the playful pursuit of likenesses, in which he habitually indulges, 
not only allows him to people his solitude and enrich his impoverished daily 
existence; it also provides him with a means of interpreting and so disarming 
the world. With the aid of metaphor and simile, he is able ‘to knead the whole 
of creation according to his fancy’ (21:243), so as to master its multifariousness, 
subordinate it to his desire, and reduce the power of the unknown and 
the unfamiliar to disturb him. Normally inhibited and (like Strindberg) 
constrained in his speech, metaphor affords him an ‘outlet for his feelings’ 
(21:215) and compensatory ‘shivers of respect for his own greatness and power’ 
(21:236), while an ability to discover analogies between diverse phenomena 
or between past and present, normally permits him ‘to play the disturbing 
impression away’ (21:240). In the opening paragraph, for example, he eases the 
anxiety of his departure for Stockholm by transforming the moon into ‘a large, 
friendly face, with a broad, good-natured smile’ (21:194), which he then applies 
to the aspect of his employer, of whom he is afraid, and the calm induced by his 
transposition is also evident in a later episode, in his encounter with the organ 
in Jacob’s Church, ‘which bore no resemblance to anything else in nature or 
in art and therefore disturbed him, oppressed him, and made him feel he was 
under this work of man’s hand’ (21:218). Disturbed by the anomalous and 
fearful of a chaos he cannot control, Lundstedt therefore resorts to metaphor 
and simile as he seeks ‘to trace its forms back to other things and thereby to 
draw near to it, bring it down to him and be calm’ (21:218). 
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What underlies and prompts Lundstedt’s artistry, however, is not merely a 
delight in playing but the desire to forget, a compulsion to conceal the past. 
‘Playing, a way of concealing’ (21:250), the Narrator defines at one point, with 
the subterfuges of everyday life in mind, and in the analytical seventh chapter, 
where the summary of Lundstedt’s past shifts the Hoffmannesque, Romantic 
narrative in the direction of a modern case study, it is stressed that the ability ‘to 
play’ only began alter the disappearance of his mother, as a means of allaying 
the guilt, which her obscure and violent death had provoked in the young 
child, beneath a mound of memories. 
Strindberg’s insight here is twofold. Firstly, he provides a striking account of 
the aetiology of a mental trauma, and of the way in which Lundstedt gradually 
represses his feelings of guilt beneath 
a thick covering of earth and stones, a whole cairn of other memories, to 
prevent it from rising up again. And when the trivial events of his drab 
little life could not provide material fast enough, he played events into 
being, masses of impressions, and piled up fabrications, hallucinations, 
imagined sounds in order to construct a thick layer that would cover the 
dark spot. And as soon as an impression had become a memory, it assumed 
reality, and was placed like a new stone on the cairn over the one there 
buried, which was unable to rise up. And so what was buried became as 
unreal or as real as if it had never occurred, dissolved, evaporated, and 
disappeared for long periods at a time. (21:245–6) 
In demonstrating Strindberg’s understanding of the subtleties of repression, 
this passage combines, as Göran Printz-Påhlson has pointed out, the folk 
image of the way in which the restless dead are supposed to be prevented from 
returning to haunt the living by the placing of a stone on the disturbed one’s 
grave each time it is passed, with an analysis that clearly prefigures the use 
of archeological metaphor by Freud.59 But having described how Lundstedt 
conceals the past beneath inventions contrived in play, he draws the narrative 
closer to his own experience in relating how ‘a kind of urge (had arisen) in 
Alrik to mix the real and the unreal, a desire to deceive himself had been 
implanted, a need of avoiding any confrontation with reality had grown up 
in him’ (21:246), thus evoking the testimentary letter to Lundegård in which 
he makes the often-quoted remark ‘I don’t know if The Father is a work of the 
Imagination, or if my life has been’, and adds the less frequently observed rider, 
‘If light is shed on this darkness, I will collapse in pieces’ (VI:298). By losing 
himself in roles, Lundstedt prevents the discovery of his secret and blocks the 
past off from himself, and yet, just as Strindberg finds relief in the practice of 
literature, he, too, finds a way of relieving himself of his feelings by relating 
his story in a manner no one else could understand: ‘He had discovered an 
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expressive outlet for his own feelings and perceptions in music, through which 
he could tell his story, without anyone else understanding what he said or 
becoming suspicious that he had a secret.’ (21:246) 
But secondly, and even more prescient than the way in which Strindberg 
depicts how Lundstedt secures forgetfulness of an all too faithful memory, 
is his account of the dramatic collapse of these defences wherein the past 
surges back and overwhelms the present. It is evident that the advances made 
to Lundstedt by the housekeeper on Rånö, Miss Beate, are open to a sexual 
interpretation, at least in Lundstedt’s troubled mind, and that, in forging a 
link between past and present by the repetition of what passed on some earlier 
occasion, her encouraging gesture to the tongue-tied young man somehow 
makes it impossible for the obscure events surrounding his mother’s death to 
remain repressed: ‘He had been woken up and could not go back to sleep…. 
What had struck Alrik most forcibly was that the stranger’s eyes could have the 
same expression, that her arm could make the same gesture, when she laid her 
hand upon his knee, and this similarity stretched like a thread between the past 
and the present and everything between ceased to exist’ (21:247). And whether 
or not Strindberg intended the connection to be made, the malfunctioning 
of Lundstedt’s strategies of repression, in which ‘face to face with a powerful 
reality he could not contrive to play the disturbing impression away’ (21:240), 
illuminates several of the more light-hearted episodes earlier on in the story. 
For whatever the nature of Lundstedt’s involvement in his mother’s death (and 
it is difficult not to concur with Harry Carlson’s suggestion that the idea, if 
not the fact, of incest plays a role, since this would also fit Strindberg’s other 
explanation of Lundstedt’s behaviour, namely the atavistic amorality which 
the isolation of life in the skerries fosters (21:190)), it is evident that even in the 
first part of the narrative, Lundstedt’s ‘play’ has been of particular importance 
for his relationships with women. Seated at his post in Jacob’s Church, he 
had elaborated an entirely imaginary relationship with a beautiful girl in 
the congregation, whom he calls Angelika, and when, later on, his defences 
are penetrated by Miss Beate and reality overwhelms him, his forlorn wish 
remains ‘to rather have Angelika for ever than the house-keeper on the manor 
for life’ (21:243). Real women, as the narrative indicates on several occasions, 
always render him speechless, which is why, in the solitude of his organ loft, 
he elaborates his Angelika fantasy in the first place. As Carlson observes, 
‘real women provoke irruptions from his unconscious where memories of the 
past collide with deep urges from the present, and where guilt and anxiety 
reside,’60 and when the onanistic retreat which had once preserved him from 
the blandishments of the whores of Tyska Prästgatan is dispelled by Miss 
Beate’s importunate gesture (and the gulf between past and present dissolves 
when he perceives her similarity as a woman who ‘wanted him’ (21:243) with 
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the women of the town), the memory of his mother is metamorphosised, as 
woman so often is in Strindberg, into a whore. 
What eventually permits Lundstedt to rediscover ‘the gift of playing’ and 
so ‘be calm afterwards’ (21:251) is the knowledge that others, too, ‘possessed 
their secret corners, where they hid bodies, covered them with words, hid them 
under flowers, wreathes, ribbons, showy texts’ (21:250). By recognizing that 
subterfuge is general, and that words often provide ‘the protective disguise’ 
(VII:138) on which it depends, ‘The Romantic Organist on Rånö’ anticipates a 
theme that dominates much of Strindberg’s production after Inferno, when his 
life-long experience in the manipulation of language confirms that men live not 
in the real world but in their imaginative projections. That Strindberg himself 
uses language ‘to bury’ the past and so escape a sense of guilt is something he 
virtually admits when, in a letter to Harriet Bosse during the writing of what 
would become A Dream Play, he recalls: ‘I am writing ‘The Growing Castle’, 
great, beautiful as a dream… I wander here like the Organist on Rånö and 
transform ruins’ (XIV:131). Elsewhere he goes further. In Legends, for example, 
he writes openly of the use he makes of dream: ‘Do you know what makes life 
bearable for me? That I sometimes imagine it is only half-real, a horrible dream, 
which has been inflicted on us as a punishment’ (28:316); and in a A Blue Book 
he argues that ‘in order to be able to live one must be like a sleepwalker and 
one must also be a poet, dupe oneself and others’ (46:142). For many of the 
characters of the later works, the past is covered by a veil they are reluctant to 
part; to them the ability ‘to play’ or ‘poetise’ (dikta) is essential, as an exchange 
in The Dance of Death indicates: 
Kurt: I’ve noticed how you’ve fabricated (diktat) your life, and fabricated 
what surrounds you, too.  
Captain: How else could I have lived? How could I have stood it?… 
Then there comes a moment when the ability to fabricate, as you call it, 
stops. And then reality stands forth in all its nakedness!… It’s terrifying. 
(34:108–9) 
It is a view which the Captain (like the Father, a writer in uniform) shares with 
his author: as Strindberg wrote to his old confident, Littmansson: ‘And besides, 
when reality fails you, then invent an existence for yourself, as I have invented 
a person when I became tired of myself (XIV:217). 
More immediately, however, it is possible as Kärnell suggests, to relate 
Lundstedt’s practice to Strindberg’s general method in the years preceding 
the Inferno crisis. If, in explaining how ‘I live in my work, looking before 
me, sometimes looking behind me, in my memories, which I can treat like 
a child’s building blocks, making all kinds of things out of them, the same 
memory serving in all kinds of ways for one imaginative structure’ (38:173), 
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he eventually clarifies the playful use to which he puts voluntary memory 
(and as he adds, ‘since the number of arrangements is limitless, I derive a 
sense of infinity from my games’), a comment of Goethe’s, also quoted in 
Alone, suggests that writing in general provides him with the means ‘both 
to rectify my conception of the outer world and to bring order and calm to 
my inner life’ (38:199). Where writing affords ‘a sense of infinity’, it lends 
events ‘an impression of premeditated design’ (38:192), and in reading his life 
or accounting for any single event in it, Strindberg is continually engaged in 
‘seeking likenesses everywhere’. For Strindberg everything must signify, and 
intent on extracting a meaning from each fragment of experience, he is driven 
by the ‘imaginative and emotional need for unity, a need to apprehend an 
otherwise dispersed number of circumstances and to put them in some sort of 
order,’61 which Edward Said sees as inherent in narrative, to seek the universal 
design that encompasses his life, to accomplish, in the discovery of what he 
terms ‘analogies = correspondences = harmonies’ (27:357), the tranquil formula 
of peace for which he strives. For disorder pained him and the unexplained 
offended. They instilled ‘a disharmony which makes me ill’ (28:145), a sensation 
in which mental turmoil manifests itself in physical discomfort. Confronted 
by the composition of nitrogen, for example, which he describes as ‘formless’ 
(27:164), he writes to Lidforss of ‘a certain discomfort at the thought of the 
current view of the composition of air and water; I feel a lopsidedness (snedhet) 
in the whole of my being when I think of the contemporary theory of air, an 
oppression which I never experience when I regard a natural object’ (VIII:239). 
Similarly, he tells the Norwegian novelist, Alexander Kielland, that ‘when I see 
something go haywire or a stupidity or injustice take hold, I am askew (sned) 
in my body until I can sort out the question’ (VI:110): it offends the sense of 
beauty referred to in A Dream Play, where the spectator is invited to draw a 
comparison between unaligned candlesticks and the moral and intellectual 
disorder of a house ‘gone off the rails’ (på sned – 36:257), and of which he 
writes, in a late note on ‘The Imperfections of Life’: ‘If one is born with a 
sense of beauty which begins with order, and if one is brought up to complete 
orderliness, the whole of existence thus becomes an affliction… If I lose a coat 
button, and get an ill-matched button sewn awry (på sned) so that my coat is 
twisted, I become ill, I can’t help it!’62 
But whether he writes of his own life, the natural world, the history of 
Sweden, world history, or the moral order he attempts to discern behind them 
all, Strindberg’s desire is ‘to perceive the coherence of the disordered’ (24:51). 
What he seeks is a ‘Homogeneous cosmos’ (46:231), as he entitles one section 
of A Blue Book, and behind the superficial scientific rigour of the still Naturalist 
discourse of By the Open Sea, there is, in Axel Borg’s ‘scientific equations which 
could from what appeared to be only a few premises (or which seemed few, 
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because the links had been forgotten) draw new conclusions, where as in a 
chemical compound two older ideas merged with one another and formed 
a new conception’ (24:50), already a theory of metaphor metaphorically 
conveyed, that supplants the chain of evolutionary theory in which he 
had previously tried to locate himself. Proceeding by associative leaps and 
metaphorical couplings rather than by patient deduction and the methodical 
accumulation of data, he delves into his memory to organize the world (‘only 
through his enormous accumulation of memories could he relate all the 
things he viewed to one another’ (24:42)) and discovers, like Lundstedt, how 
‘to make nature intimate with himself (24:126). ‘It makes me calm [lugn] to 
know’ (24:126), Borg admits, and in its stress on peace or calm his remark 
suggests the many occasions on which Strindberg’s own speculations prompt 
him to exclaim ‘How calming [lugnande] it is to be able to explain everything!’ 
(27:599) or admit that ‘with this premise there is order and calm in nature!’ 
(27:174), speculations, moreover, which sometimes lead him to abandon the 
words in which he formulates his life for other formulas of peace. The not over-
scrupulous manipulation of chemical formulae, of atomic weights, and of the 
comparative measurements of phenomena, both man -made and in nature, are, 
like his recourse to the Kabbala, number magic, and theories of periodicity in 
history and the individual life,63 speculations in ‘Celestial Arithmetic’ (46:274), 
in ‘the formulae according to which the plans for the work of creation are 
drawn up for our planet’ (27:538), and all these attempts to decipher the code 
of ‘the master builder who has created the world with number and proportion’ 
(46:403) and read his signature in such ‘messages to earth’ (27:234) as meteors, 
stones, the wings of butterflies, the petals of flowers, the flight of birds, and 
the formation of clouds, are ultimately intended to instil calm in the author 
of the script in which all these communications appear, Strindberg. ‘The 
thought that we are everywhere at home and a part of the cosmos provides 
a feeling of homeliness and security’ (46:231), he asserts in A Blue Book (a 
comment arrived at by a method glossed by Freud in New Introductory Lectures 
on Psychoanalysis when he observes: ‘analogies, it is true, decide nothing, but 
they can make one feel more at home’),64 and the complementary discovery 
‘to the knowledge that ‘everything repeats itself,’ namely that ‘everything is in 
everything, everywhere’ (allt är i allt, överallt - 27:262), abolishes chance and 
reveals ‘the endless continuity in the apparently great disorder’ (27:560). Thus 
the hidden order and beauty of ‘la cryptographie celeste’ (27:246) intimates 
to Strindberg that his life, too, must possess a meaning if only he reads (and 
writes) it aright. 
But even in a world conceived in terms of repetition, where ‘everything is in 
everything’ and ‘everything repeats itself,’ writing offers a means of achieving a 
periodical renewal that it is easy to regard as a self-analytical cure. There is, first, 
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the confessional impulse evident in many letters (for example, those to Bjørnson 
in 1884 (IV:144) and von Steijern in 1892 (IX:29)) in which Strindberg seeks 
out an addressee to whom he feels an obligation to ‘ransack his heart’ (IX:29), 
a process that is also sketched in ‘The Romantic Organist’, where the Narrator 
describes how Lundstedt ‘bore his guilt and wished to be free of it. He wanted 
to go straight to the pastor and tell him how everything had happened, be 
spoken to firmly, take his punishment and then be calm [lugn – 21:251].65 
This process is largely a matter of the attempt, evident throughout Strindberg’s 
production, to alleviate the sense of guilt which is a fundamental constituent of 
his experience. ‘I long for a torture which will re-establish my sense of balance 
in my relationship to society, so that I don’t have to go on feeling in debt’, 
The Unknown declares (29:124), while the Narrator observes, of Johan, in The 
Son of a Servant: ‘He wanted to have a real punishment; it would restore the 
balance; it would relieve his remorse’ (19:88). The desire to achieve tranquility 
in this respect is conveyed in terms of debit and credit, of a need to balance 
the books, settle accounts, and draw up a balance sheet (bokslut) in which ‘he 
set off debt (or guilt – skuld) against debt’ (44:78). For as Ruskin noticed, in 
Unto This Last, the goddess of guilt and revenge, Tisiphone, was ‘a person 
versed in the highest branches of arithmetic and punctual in her habits’,66 
and Strindberg is able to evolve these ideas so neatly because the semantics of 
payment and debt and those of guilt are the same in Swedish as in several other 
European languages. They permit a link between morality and economy that 
allows the structural identity of guilt and debt, contract and duty, price and 
retaliation, in ‘this muddled account of in and out, debit and credit, which is 
called life’ (40:78). Moreover, both debt and guilt are retentive of the past like 
autobiography, and the idea of moral creditors, of accounts to be settled before 
life may proceed, is an insistent one in a project where justice and revenge 
are interchangeable terms.67 Initially presented as components of a Naturalist 
justice in which what is written is employed to restore the balance violated 
by the experience of a life with no recourse to the divine (hence his boast ‘I 
take care of my Nemesis Divina myself ’ (VII:298)), each book represents an 
instance of debt collecting, the consequence of an irrepressible need to speak 
out and ‘restore the balance’ (22:157): ‘Il fallait que je te dise cela!’, he tells Frida 
Uhl, as he will Harriet Bosse, ‘parce que chez moi la revanche est un sentiment 
inné, irrésistible qui joue le rôle de justice, un instinct de rétablir l’équilibre’ 
(X:299), and after each public inspection of accounts his impulse is often to 
remark: ‘A debt is paid and we were quits’ (22:157).68 
Thus the rhythm of Strindberg’s production frequently follows the sequence 
described in Black Banners, where the Naturalist writer, Zachris, conceives a 
book which explicitly recalls the writing and publication of the account of 
Strindberg’s first marriage, A Madman’s Defence: 
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There was now only one way to free himself from the poison: to write her 
out of himself; to put it all down on paper and then burn the manuscript, 
after it had been read by those closest to him, or if he was in need, to 
publish it in Germany. This thought revived him. To be able for once to 
say openly everything that had for years oppressed and pained him, at the 
same time unravelling the whole of this account which had simply run 
on without any reckoning being made; to be able to defend himself, and 
– why not? Be revenged! 
It would be to begin a new life, wiping out all the old. (41:213–4) 
This movement from a desire for self-expression, by way of a compulsion to 
unravel the past to drawing up a statement of accounts, defending himself, 
and finally, having obtained his revenge, to beginning a new life, is common to 
Strindberg’s autobiographical writings, which are written ‘in order to untangle 
my thoughts and free myself (XI:268). For renewal and the new are evidently 
at the heart of a process which is, particularly in Inferno, at once intellectual, 
moral, and artistic in its intended metamorphosis. Just as his attempts during 
the 1890s in his scientific writings to elide the distinction between the inorganic 
and the organic demonstrate his overriding preoccupation with immortality 
and the imperishability of matter, of ‘life’s existence everywhere’ (27:228) 
where ‘everything flows into everything else’ (27:687) and ‘nothing can 
cease to exist’ (27:245), so the images of transformation and metamorphosis, 
which characterize this writing, indicate a concern with the idea of rebirth 
or immortalization which centres upon himself. Thus, from observing the 
transformation of a larva into a moth (‘The larva is dead within the chrysalis, 
yet it lives and rises up… a higher form in beauty and freedom’ (27:245)), 
Strindberg develops his conception of ‘nekrobios’ (XI:114), or life in death, 
which encourages him to hope that like Saul he too ‘will be transformed into 
another person’ (XI:157). ‘Am I sloughing off my skin?’, he asks, in the essay 
‘Deranged Sensations’, ‘am I in the process of becoming a modern man?… I 
am as nervous as a crab which has cast off its shell, as irritable as the silkworm 
in the process of transformation’ (27:606), and in Inferno, where the modish 
discourse of the detraqué gives way to the no less up-to-dated is course of 
religious conversion, he relates the history of his ‘education to a new life’ 
(XI:283) as the outcome of a process he has actively promoted rather than 
passively undergone, a ‘vita nuova’ (XI:83) wherein he seeks simultaneous 
confirmation of his personal immortality, his moral salvation, and a form of 
art Similarly, ‘dead in both a physical, moral, and economic sense’ (V:277), 
in The Son of a Servant he performs what he regards as an autopsy on his own 
corpse in order ‘to begin again, undeluded, purged’ (VI:69); ‘écrit devant la 
mort’ (IX:339), A Madman’s Defence is also presented as an alternative to death 
(MD:9); and in Alone he describes how 
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… by cutting off my links with other people I seemed at first to lose my 
strength, but at the same time my ego began, as it were, to crystallize, to 
concentrate around a kernel, where everything I had ever experienced 
collected, was digested and then used as nourishment for my soul…. 
This, at last, is to be alone: to spin oneself into the silk of one’s own soul, 
to become a pupa and wait for the metamorphosis, which will not fail to 
come. Meanwhile one lives upon one’s experiences, and by telepathically 
living the lives of others. Death and resurrection; a new training for 
something unknown and new. (38:128, 145) 
Moreover, each succeeding autobiographical volume does not merely retrace 
the past. Rather, the process is a dynamic one, in which self-discovery, ‘coming 
to terms with oneself and the past’ (38:147), is continually renewed and 
constantly deferred. Each time he achieves ‘the synthesis of all the hitherto 
unresolved antitheses of my life’ (38:147), the result is not a final summation 
but a temporary halt, only to find that ‘by studying the whole of my life I have 
arrived at discoveries which I did not expect’ (VI:116). In contemplating the 
old self he has recreated in language, he finds that when the narrative catches 
up with the present it re-opens the fore closed future onto a new life which will 
in turn compel additional texts. Having written his own obituary, ‘the corpse 
stands up and publishes his memoirs’ (V:320), and it is by recovering his steps 
that Strindberg proceeds along the road to Damascus. 
Repetition thus evokes the dialectic once formulated by Kierkegaard and 
pondered in that form by Strindberg, whereby ‘what is repeated has been, 
otherwise it could not be repeated, but precisely the fact that it has been gives 
to repetition the category of novelty… when one says that life is a repetition 
one affirms that existence which has been now becomes.’69 For in the narrative 
discourse produced in autobiography, the repetition of the life once lived 
is imbued with difference: it is fashioned anew. And where Freud certainly 
identified a kind of destructive repetition which stresses ‘the perpetual 
recurrence of the same thing’,70 with the death wish, a form of repetition that 
may well suggest Strindberg’s continual reproduction of the same interpersonal 
situation, there is also a type of repetition that cannot be defined simply in terms 
of reiteration or mechanical replica, and which serves the pleasure principle 
rather than the drive to destruction. It is constructive and pleasurable because 
it transforms a passive predicament into an active situation, and in Freud’s work 
the locus classicus for this type of repetition is the celebrated description of the 
child’s game, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in which a cotton reel attached to 
a piece of string is thrown away and then recovered to the accompaniment of 
the vocables ‘fort’ and ‘da’. Here, Freud deduces, the passive situation of being 
overpowered by the absence of the mother is transformed by the child into an 
active mastery of the disagreeable experience by inflicting a simulacrum of 
Writing Out and Repetition 49
the event upon itself. In this game, which is ‘repeated untiringly’, and in all 
play in which ‘the child passes over from the passivity of the experience to the 
activity of the game,’71 there is in miniature that constructive repetition which 
Freud had previously recognized in his essay ‘Remembering, Repeating, and 
Working Through’, where in describing the transference in which the patient 
repeats the repressed material as a form of contemporary experience rather 
than as the reconstruction of the past, he remarks: 
We may say that the patient does not remember anything of what he 
has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a 
memory but as an action; he repeats it, without of course knowing that 
he is repeating it…. As long as the patient is in the treatment he cannot 
escape from the compulsion to repeat; and in the end we understand that 
this is his way of remembering.72 
In this discussion, repetition emerges not as a reproduction of a previous event, 
of something already present in the subject’s mind, but as the production of a 
piece of real experience, and as Freud points out, in relation to such psychical 
processes as phantasies, emotional impulses and thought connection, the 
irony of this type of repetition is that what is repeated is something that is not 
recalled: ‘In these processes it particularly often happens that something is 
‘remembered’ which could never have been ‘forgotten’ because it was never at 
any time noticed – was never conscious.’73 
And it is on the ground of an analogous absence that Strindberg’s 
autobiographical narratives constitute themselves. For although narrative (and 
especially autobiography) implies that it is the repetition of an antecedent 
presence, that it retraces ground already covered and repeats events that have 
already occurred, it is in fact the case that it ‘repeats’ by creating since, as 
Emile Benveniste has pointed out, ‘Le langage re-produit la réalité. Cela est 
à entendre de la manière la plus littérale: la réalité est produite à nouveau par 
le truchement du langage.’74 Thus the volumes of Strindberg’s autobiography 
(and still less his novels and plays) are not the mere repetition of prior events, 
repositories in which the past is embalmed or interred, but the means by which 
he turns it to account and fashions himself anew in a text wherein the past he 
retraces also returns of itself to create an artistic web of analogies in which his 
life is no longer a succession of discrete events but a meaningful work of art 




Writing, not Speaking:  
Strindberg, Language, and the Self
What is said is always too much or too little: the demand that one should denude oneself 
with every word one says is a piece of naiveté.  
– Nietzsche: The Will to Power 
An Author, who writes in his own Person, has the advantage of being who or what he pleases. 
– Shaftesbury: Advice to an Author
I
‘If your heart is heavy and you cannot speak, then write!’, Strindberg 
encourages his sister, Elisabeth: ‘Confide in the paper!’ (III:41–2). To reject 
the possibility of speech and entrust himself to writing, to what he regards as 
the privacy and inviolability of the printed page, is so peculiar and yet essential 
an aspect of the presuppositions underlying Strindberg’s practice that it has 
often been remarked, as has the teasing contradiction it implies between the 
author’s inordinate shyness and the brutal self-assertion with which he permits 
his intimate life to circulate in print. Two images confront one another: 
that of a man whose childhood modesty caused him to conceal himself in 
a wardrobe when he undressed (a revelation to be made by his brother, Axel, 
which Strindberg disarms by anticipation in To Damascus III: ‘We laugh now, 
when we hear he only wanted to change his underclothes in the dark wardrobe’ 
(29:302)),1 and the uninhibited writer whose methods so easily leave him open 
to the charge of washing his dirty linen in public, as in A Madman’s Defence: 
‘Now she’s reached the briefs: she chooses a pair from which the tape has been 
ripped, and without betraying a trace of what she is thinking, puts them on 
one side. But I recognized them, since it was me who, frantic with desire, 
ripped them apart in the first assault’ (MD:130–1). On the one hand, there is 
the writer who veils himself in words; on the other, the man who delighted ‘in 
being able to tear off his clothes and go naked’ (16:110). 
Sustained by numerous anecdotal accounts which confirm Strindberg’s 
partiality for indirect communication, even with those who were his daily 
acquaintance or the familiars of his house,2 the orthodox view thus emerges 
of someone in whom a fear of physical confrontation and an acute reticence 
Writing, not Speaking52
in the face of friends and enemies alike rebound in a violent desire to ‘attract 
attention in the world whatever the price’ (I:168) through the writing wherein 
he exhibits himself. And yet, while evidence certainly exists to encourage 
Torsten Eklund in his supposition that ‘there is hardly a writer who has stripped 
himself naked in his books as he has done,’3 there lurks the germ of contrariety 
in the juxtaposition of this nakedness and the complimentary image of a man 
who removes himself to a distance where he cannot be observed or molested, 
writes, and then returns, adorned in language, to exact revenge on those in 
whose presence he felt unprepossessed. 
This view is, of course, often anticipated by Strindberg’s own self-scrutiny, 
which readily discloses the compensatory drives that literature is engaged 
to satisfy. Indeed, in the letter on writing to Siri von Essen, he explains his 
preference for the written over the spoken on precisely these lines. Firstly, he 
is inhibited in company and therefore it is ‘this shyness which drives |him| to 
write’ (I:186). Secondly, writing repairs the imperfections and slights of life and 
is often initiated and sustained by a desire for retribution: ‘You are enraged by 
everything which is evil, base, and shabby’, he tells Siri, whom he endows with 
his own sensations, ‘but you cannot say so! Then write! And those to whom 
you weren’t previously able to say all this, and who would have hated you for 
the truth, will applaud you!’ (I:191). But it is also possible to find Strindberg 
acknowledging the likelihood that self-exposure might not be the candid 
procedure it at first appears. When Axel (in Playing With Fire, but the ubiquity 
of the name in the period 1887 to 1893 suggests a certain pseudonymity, or at 
least continuity of utterance) is called to account for always boasting about his 
wickedness, he replies, speculatively, ‘Perhaps it’s to conceal it?’ (25:419), and a 
similar point is made in an exchange in Creditors: 
Adolf: Do you know, I’m beginning to find your frankness painful.  
Tekla: And yet it was the highest virtue you knew – you taught it me.  
Adolf: Yes, but now it seems to me you’re hiding behind this openness! 
(23:238–9)
Moreover, if to write for the press is a matter of appearing with the curtain raised 
on a bare stage (16:143), literature involves the donning of ‘the impenetrable 
masks’ (I:193) which conceal the writer. ‘There will now be two plays one after 
the other. That is really my genre, since one doesn’t need to be seen oneself ’ 
(V:355), he tells Bonnier, while at work on The Son of a Servant, where he 
wonders if being a poet is not really a matter of trying ‘to get away from himself 
and invent another; is it the craving to dress up, is it modesty, the fear of self-
surrender, of laying bare one’s shame?’ (18:352).4 
But beyond recognizing a tendency ‘to make up a story which conceals 
the true outlines of the matter’ (MD:234), Strindberg also entertains a more 
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comprehensive distrust of language, and of spoken language in particular. This 
distrust is the perplexing context of his autobiographical project; indeed, it 
casts doubt on his attempt to represent himself in language, and is voiced so 
frequently, and with so remarkable a continuity of argument and imagery, that 
it is curious it should have provoked so little serious comment.5 And while 
it does not in itself explain Strindberg’s fascination with autobiographical 
writing, it nevertheless serves to establish the ground upon which the continual 
inscription of life into the secondariness of written discourse takes place more 
adequately than mere shyness or a self-assertion that is fortified behind the 
armour of the word. 
Notwithstanding the ease with which he customarily suggests that anyone 
can ‘relate what they have lived’ (III:41), Strindberg repeatedly maintains that 
human discourse is scarcely ever veracious but usually employed to mislead, 
conceal, and misinform. Whereas language in daily use is normally regarded 
as transparent and innocent, a clear mirror of the world or of its user’s thoughts 
(as Emile Benveniste remarks: ‘Pour le sujet parlant, il y a entre la langage et la 
réalité adéquation complète: le signe recouvre et commande la réalité: mieux, il 
est cette réalité’),6 Strindberg regularly indicates a radical discontinuity between 
man and the world, and thought and action, which language does not mediate 
fully or faithfully. Indeed, language emerges as the very sign of difference, 
the mark of an unbridgeable fissure which it obscures but cannot conceal, 
and which is the token of the language user’s alienation from a primary order 
of being in which language has no place. The apparent ‘fullness’ of words as 
bearers of meaning is therefore seen by Strindberg to mask an absence, either 
that of the reality which language displaces or screens, which was an important 
platform in his criticism in the 1880s, or of truth, whose purity is perverted 
by the contaminated medium of conventional language, or even of the writer’s 
own presence, which is evoked against the background of absence by means of 
a surrogate that does not truly represent him. 
If this last possibility is clearly fundamental to the autobiographical 
enterprise, Strindberg originally formulates his misgivings about language 
in order to characterize its social function. That ‘we are not what we seem’ 
(27:67) is a constant complaint, from The Red Room to A Blue Book, and 
language provides both the instrument and the evidence of this general 
duplicity. Men use language ‘solely with the object of deceiving one another’ 
(48:1061), extending it like a screen, ‘a web of hypocrisy and lies’ (17:68), to 
conceal their real opinions and motives. People say what they do not think 
or hide what they ought to say behind ‘the masking and dressing up of their 
upbringing’ (16:109), and Strindberg often paraphrases the aperçu attributed to 
Talleyrand, ‘La parole a été donné à l’homme pour deguiser sa pensée’, in order 
to point the discrepancy between the notion that language is a faithful and 
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adequate transmitter of fact and feeling, and its essential nature as the agent 
of invention, falsification, and untruth. In the story, ‘The Reward of Virtue’, 
the young Theodor takes refuge in ‘a phrase, borrowed from a teacher, who 
had seen it quoted as Talleyrand’s: “No, the purpose of language is to conceal 
people’s thoughts”’ (14:50),7 while the heroine of ‘Short Cuts’, after reflecting 
at length on the properties which make language so equivocal a possession, 
concludes: ‘One strikes people dead with words, deceives and intimidates them 
with words, and a great man had written what books and newspapers so often 
quote, that language had been invented in order to conceal thoughts’ (54:50). 
Strindberg’s conception of the origins of language is not, of course, unique. 
Karl Popper, for example, has recently argued that ‘lying is a comparatively 
late and fairly specifically human invention; indeed… it has made the human 
language what it is: an invention which can be used for misreporting almost as 
well as for reporting’,8 and during the 1880s, at least, when Strindberg regarded 
the acquisition of language as a rite of passage from a state of innocence to the 
social world of what he termed ‘The Public Lie’ (Den offentliga lögnen), it is not 
difficult to discern a community of interest with both Rousseau and Nietzsche. 
Even in Strindberg’s earliest writings, language denotes and facilitates a fall 
from pristine reality into the corruption of a world where illusion is fostered by 
words; with his departure from a natural state, the individual ‘tastes the tree 
of knowledge’ (54:199) and sinks into ‘the half-darkness of fictions’ (20:51), 
where he loses himself to art, the cognate of artifice, and Rousseau, too, 
imagines an unfissured pre-verbal innocence that is echoed in the language 
‘que les enfants parlent avant de savoir parler,’9 but which is irrevocably lost 
in social discourse, where it is as if ‘un mal inéluctable pervertit la société et 
fait du langage cultivé l’agent infectant d’une duperie universelle… Mensonge, 
fiction, illusion forment le milieu même où évoluent les sociétés policées. 
Brillante comme l’or, la parole, de venue elle aussi monnaie d’échange, rend 
l’homme étranger à lui-même.’10 And just as Nietzsche remarked that ‘the 
different languages, set side by side, show that what matters with words is 
never the truth, never an adequate expression; else there would not be so many 
languages,’11 so Strindberg’s linguistic scepticism evolves from a cultural critique 
that is indebted to Rousseau, into the radical questioning implicit in another 
recurring formula, namely ‘that the different languages arose among the savage 
peoples in order to conceal the secrets of the tribe from the others; languages are 
thus ciphers, and the person who finds the key will understand all the world’s 
languages’ (45:190). Moreover, the image evoked here is ‘the ancient legend of 
the Tower of Babel’ to which Strindberg often refers, observing: ‘People wished 
to storm heaven and seek the riddle of life, but God touched their tongues and 
called forth a general confusion, so that one man did not understand what the 
other said’ (19:206).12 And hence, as Lars Gustafsson suggests, in his study 
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of aberrant nineteenth-century philosophies of language,13 Strindberg also 
frequently appears to anticipate Fritz Mauthner or (especially in the Chamber 
Plays) the dramatists of the absurd in their misgivings about the capacity of 
language to represent the world or to convey one individual’s perceptions to 
another. ‘To exchange ideas is only a stock phrase, for no one exchanges his 
idea with another,’ he maintains, in A Blue Book: ‘My best friend understands 
approximately 30 procent of what I say, and I can see that he misinterprets 
every word I have said’ (46:46–7). Conversations are ‘a Babylonian confusion 
which end in wrangling and the impossibility of understanding one another’ 
(38:127), and the idea of correspondences, which Strindberg derives in part 
from Swedenborg and adapts to the pressures of his own thought, is related to 
an ancient crisis in which ‘The One God divided everything in two and into 
antitheses’ (47:551). 
Thus the obsessive research into the nature and origins of language which 
Strindberg undertook in his last years becomes comprehensible in terms of a 
quest for an undivided language, the ur-language or Adamic vernacular that 
preceded Babel, in which there is a congruence between what is said and the 
language used to say it, a correspondence between word and referent, sign 
and signified. And like the Pietists, Swedenborg, and the Kabbala (which The 
Unknown regards as ‘the wisest of all the books of wisdom’ (29:169) when he 
reads from an account of the Tower of Babel in the Zohar), Strindberg sought 
the translucent immediacy of this lost primal speech in Hebrew, where he 
believed he could discern its features: ‘One does not need more Hebrew than 
to be able to distinguish the article (ha) and the plural endings (im and ut) 
from the root, in order to hear echoes in a biblical concordance of a language 
which has probably been the same everywhere’ (47:562). Furthermore, he 
suggests that visual correspondences indicate that writing also stems from a 
primary script. In a note ‘On the Ur-Language and the Confusion of Babel’, 
he reports his accidental discovery that Mongolian, normally written from 
right to left and from the top to the bottom of the page, ‘resembled Arabic, 
particularly the old form which is used on Kufic coins’ (47:531), when it is 
placed on its side. Moreover he likewise considers that ‘the figures on the shell 
of a tortoise would have served the ancient Chinese as a model for the oldest 
written characters’ (47:513), thus provoking the encouraging footnote: ‘Anyone 
who wants to undertake comparative philology can buy the shell in Birger Jarl 
Arcade for 1 krona 50’ (47:514). 
The relevance of these apparently trivial speculations for Strindberg’s 
concern to represent himself in language may be appreciated if the conception 
of language as something that conceals and misleads, instead of serving to 
enlighten and communicate, is recognized at the heart of one of his primary 
categories, ‘the law of accommodation’, which he formulates in The Son of a 
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Servant. Previously, in the polemics of The New Kingdom and Like and Unlike, 
he had argued that ‘by living together, one is forced to place restraints on 
oneself that only long to be broken; conventions, politeness, etiquette, all 
that is necessary, but it is a terrible necessity, because it is falsehood’ (16:90). 
He had been concerned with the public lie and enquired, like Max Nordau, 
whose popular exposure of late nineteenth-century hypocrisy and humbug, 
The Conventional Lies of Our Civilisation, he briefly considered ‘the Holy Writ’ 
(IV:9), how 
… if we are born in lies and grow up surrounded by lies; if we are obliged 
to lie every time we open our mouths in public, or come in personal 
contact with any of the political and social institutions of the day, if we 
are in the habit of always speaking and acting differently from the way 
we feel and think, of enduring the perpetual contradiction between our 
inward convictions and the outward phases of life as a matter of course, 
of considering hypocrisy as worldly wisdom and duty and sincerity as 
extravagance… it is possible to retain a sincere and upright character?14 
Now, in turning inwards to examine himself, he comes to see how all social 
intercourse prevents one from being (to take the phrase literally) oneself, since 
‘when one talks to someone one adapts oneself slightly in their favour, when 
one talks to another, one makes a concession to them, and if one did not do this 
but said exactly what one thought, the conversation would end with everyone 
spitting in one another’s face and walking off, never to meet again’ (19:177–8). 
Insertion into the circuit of linguistic exchange is to lose one’s self. Within 
the symbolic order of language, in the act of speaking, one becomes another, 
or as many others as one converses with. Through his self-study, therefore, 
Strindberg discovers not character but characterlessness, and when he regards 
the contradictory images of his past self at the end of the first volume of The 
Son of a Servant, he discerns not a single, unique presence, but a multitude of 
personae assumed according to circumstance and company: 
That was the law of accommodation, which Johan did not know about. 
People were like that there was an instinct to adapt oneself, which 
rested partly on calculation and partly on unconscious or reflex actions.  
A lamb to one’s friends, a lion to one’s enemies. 
But when was one being true to oneself, when was one false? Where was 
the self-which supposedly constituted one’s character? It was neither here 
nor there, but in both places at once. The self is not any one thing; it is a 
conglomeration of reflexes, a complex of instincts and desires which are 
alternately suppressed and unleashed! (18:218) 
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That linguistic competence involves the ability to use language to sustain 
the duplicity social life requires, is an idea Strindberg never relinquishes. In 
a late fragment, headed ‘The Logic of Conversation’, which expands upon 
a section in A Blue Book entitled simply ‘Logic’ (48:1061), he argues that 
‘for the most part opinions are rooted in the flesh’ and describes how any 
overheard conversation will shock a listener by the way in which the speakers 
accommodate themselves to each other’s point of view.15 Such scenes occur or 
are evoked in numerous texts (Alone, The Ghost Sonata, A Blue Book) where 
a tension between speaking out and remaining silent is a central motif, and 
increasingly, as the title of a late Vivisection suggests, character is confirmed 
in Strindberg’s mind as a series of roles demanded by successive situations: 
‘N’est-ce pas que l’on s’adapte à chaque instant aux hommes et aux choses, que 
la réalité si variable et oscillante nous fasse varier, et que nous jouons la comédie 
de la vie sans la savoir?’ (VR:126). Indeed, the deviousness inherent in the 
social use of language is depicted as so prevalent, unconscious, and essential a 
part of the ‘accommodating complaisance, without which intercourse becomes 
impossible’,16 that Strindberg’s reaction appears excessive. There seems no 
reason why he should not accept his insights with the scepticism expressed in 
a letter to the poet, Verner von Heidenstam: ‘My writing: a seeking after the 
truth! Idiotic in itself perhaps, for the truth is only conventional!’ (VII:92). 
And yet the reverse is true. Although the mendaciousness of the medium in 
which it is formulated seems to undermine the discourse of the self at which 
he aims from the outset, it is impossible to mistake the way in which, like 
Rousseau and his claim that ‘Ma fonction est de dire la vérité’,17 Strindberg 
nevertheless repeatedly presents himself as the custodian of the truth which 
words are supposed to belie; as he informs Harriet Bosse: ‘When you talk or 
write to me, remember it is to a man who cannot, who dare not say a word 
which is not true!’18 
The Son of a Servant is clearly a key text in establishing this reputation for 
candour and probity, and Strindberg’s project obviously invites comparison 
with Rousseau’s. It is not, of course, difficult to discern an affinity between 
the belief ‘that by crowding together and mingling their existences with one 
another’s, civilized people… no longer live for themselves but only have their 
being in what others think of them’ (16:74), which develops into ‘the law of 
accommodation’, and Rousseau’s theory, advanced in the Discours sur l’origine 
de l’ inégalité (but no less anticipatory of the view of the self which the Confessions 
present), that ‘le Sauvage vit en lui-même; l’homme sociable, toujours hors de 
lui ne sait vivre que dans l’opinion des autres, et c’est pour ainsi dire, de leur 
seul jugement qu’il tire le sentiment de sa propre éxistence.’19 As Sven-Gustav 
Edqvist has shown, in his study of Strindberg’s anarchism,20 much of his early 
thinking is pre-figured in Rousseau’s account of man’s transition from the state 
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of nature to civilization, where ‘Etre et paroître devinrent deux choses tout à 
fait différentes.’21 
However, the fundamental affinity between Rousseau and Strindberg lies 
firstly in the way in which the formulations of such texts as ‘On the General 
Discontent’ are as intimately related, in substance and imagery, to the most 
personal aspects of the experience related in the autobiographical volumes, as 
Jean Starobinski has demonstrated is the case with the Discourses and Confessions: 
‘A tort ou à raison, Rousseau n’a pas consenti a séparer sa pensée et son destin 
personnel’;22 and secondly, that the role of language in the presentation and 
distortion of the social self promotes a desire to commit themselves to language 
in a discourse appropriate to themselves. In fact Rousseau’s presence shadows 
any discussion of Strindberg’s decision to write the narrative of his life, and 
it is remarkable that while his influence on Strindberg’s social and political 
thought has often been surveyed in detail, there have been few more than 
cursory discussions of their intellectual and emotional consanguinity, and 
this despite the role which the Confessions undoubtedly have as part of the 
constitutive literary intertextuality of Strindberg’s life, and of The Son of a 
Servant in particular.23 
In the utopian fable, ‘The Isle of the Blessed’, the text in which Strindberg 
comes closest to repeating the received message of Rousseau’s account of the 
rise of civilization, language is again shown as the means of transforming what 
is into what is not: ‘The children discovered that answering yes when one 
ought to answer no brought one advantages, such as rewards, or freedom from 
punishment, and therefore the lie began to flourish’ (11:94–5). Similar words 
are used to introduce this discovery, now presented as a general law, into The 
Son of a Servant: ‘One of the earliest discoveries of the awakening intelligence 
is that a well-placed yes or no can reap an advantage’ (18:16). But what lends 
it authority on this occasion is its corroboration by a primal scene of truth and 
appearance which, like the Lambercier episode in Book One of the Confessions, 
is placed at a strategic point in the narrative of Strindberg’s life, initiating much 
that is to follow and reverberating throughout the entire body of his work to 
issue in the thought and imagery of the Chamber Plays and the unfinished 
fragment, Armageddon. 
In fact the scene recounts a paradigmatic event which, whether true or 
false, is at the core of the autobiographical narrative. And yet, even granted the 
chagrin of a childhood injustice and the immediacy of direct speech, which is 
used here in the book for the first time, its resonance seems, on first reading, 
disproportionate to the occasion. In a short dramatic episode of only three 
pages (but from which it is difficult to exclude all knowledge of the slightly 
longer passage in which Rousseau, at a similar point in his autobiography, is 
mistakenly accused of breaking Mlle Lambercier’s comb), Strindberg describes 
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how Johan is unjustly punished first for denying that he had drunk from 
a bottle of wine which he had not even touched, and again for denying he 
had lied in making his original profession of innocence. What rankles most, 
however, is not the punishment itself, but the way in which the child has been 
compelled ‘to confess to something he had never done’ (18:18), an outrage 
which rekindles the narrator’s ire and prompts him to describe the family as 
that ‘splendid moral institution… where innocent children are tortured into 
their first lies’ (18:18).
And yet this scene, which is reinforced some fifty pages on (18:68) by the 
comparable episode of the iron screw nuts, where Johan is once again beaten 
into confessing he has stolen something he has in fact only come upon by 
chance in the street, is constitutive both of the work in its entirety, and of the 
life which sustains it. Sometimes evoked directly, but more often, as in The Red 
Room, ‘A Child’s Saga’, or The Burned House, leaving its trace upon the surface 
of another text in the form of an analogous incident that has taken place under 
the intense pressure of its repressed emotion,24 this primal scene of unmerited 
punishment forms part of the network of mnemonic material in an opening 
chapter which is, like the first book of the Confessions, where the Lambercier 
episode is similarly complemented by the later scene of the stolen ribbon, 
which concludes Book Two,25 at once ‘le premier acte du drame, et le drame 
tout entier.’26 As René Bourgeois has observed, in an essay, ‘Signification du 
premier souvenir’, in which he makes much of the punitive scene which opens 
the autobiographical narrative of another of Strindberg’s French precursors, 
Jules Vallés, ‘La plupart des premiers souvenirs sont dangereusement 
significatifs et révélateurs non d’une réceptivité passive mais d’une volonté de 
reconstruction systématique,’27 and the account of Strindberg’s earliest years 
in The Son of a Servant is already a kind of retrospective prolepsis. It not only 
performs its ostensible purpose, which is the recuperation of the past; it also 
delineates the features of a destiny that will be continually repeated, firstly in 
the developmental, genetic model of the 1880s, in which the man grows from 
the seeds of his physiological, psychological, and environmental inheritance, 
into the person he was always destined to be (or, as the first volume concludes, 
to remain: ‘And thus he stepped out into life! To evolve and develop, and yet 
to remain forever the person he was’ (18:219)) and then, when Strindberg 
renounces his Naturalism and no longer wishes to regard himself as continuous 
with nature, as emblematic of the fate allotted him in this, the terrestrial, phase 
of his drama.
Both these views are implicit in the episode. Seen from the perspective 
he employed in the mid-1880s, the scene projects an image of childhood 
innocence savagely abused in an environment that, ironically, predicates truth 
as the paramount virtue: ‘In Johan’s home truth was worshipped’ (18:68). It 
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represents the moment of passage recorded in ‘The Isle of the Blessed’ and is 
restated many years later by Gerda, in The Pelican, when she observes: ‘People 
call one wicked if one tells the truth… so I learned to say what I didn’t mean, 
and then I was ready for life’ (45:246). All the authority of the psychological 
and sociological discourses employed in the book combine to pin-point the 
critical moment when the child is expelled into a society that accepts the 
evidence of appearances before the testimony of truth. Quite simply, when he 
speaks the truth Johan is heard to lie. His accusers disregard the words he uses 
to represent himself and so fail to judge him as he knows himself to be, while 
his innocence as yet denies him access to that fluency of speech which would 
enable him to appear as others see him.
The traumatic nature of the episode is also evident from the way in which it 
recurs throughout Strindberg’s writing, from the errand boy in The Red Room, 
‘who was far too young and innocent to be able to get himself out of a fix with 
a lie’ (5:320), and who is beaten because he tells the truth, to the Son in The 
Pelican, who reminds his mother of how, when he told her ‘what I saw in the 
abode of sin, you said it was a lie, and you struck me as a liar’ (45:265). But 
even within the confines of the emphatically Naturalist discourse of The Son of 
a Servant, there are intimations of another reading of the text submitted by life, 
which will eventually come to preoccupy Strindberg with increasing urgency. 
When the episode ends, Johan has been cast in a role that does not suit him; 
seen a fissure open up between himself and others, and between appearance 
and reality; encountered the ambiguity of right and wrong; and become an 
object of suspicion on the periphery of society, the eventual outcast, Ishmael:
He felt like a criminal. Punished for lying, which was so abominated in 
the house, and for theft, a word never even spoken there. Deprived of his 
civil rights, regarded with suspicion, and despised by his brothers because 
he had been caught. All of this, together with the consequences, which 
were very real to him, were nevertheless based upon something that did 
not exist at all, his crime. (18:19)
Not unnaturally, too, the dilemma nurtured in the wake of this scene provokes 
in Strindberg a continual questioning as to whether or not he is guilty, and if not 
who is, and if so in what way since the punishment seems, initially at least, to 
precede the crime. And hence, as Martin Lamm has pointed out,28 The Son of a 
Servant already contains the notion that ‘life was a penal institution for crimes 
committed before one had been born’ (18:39), in which the many later, post-
Inferno scenarios of guilt, suffering, and punishment, and the many figures 
of history and myth with whom Strindberg finds correlatives for the shape 
and significance of his destiny, are clearly prefigured. The idea haunts many 
texts, sometimes discretely and impersonally, as in the description of Theodor, 
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in ‘The Reward of Virtue’, who was sometimes gloomy and ruminative, and 
felt life was not as it should be. It seemed to him that some unparalleled crime 
must have been committed in the past, and that it was now being concealed 
under a mass of deceptions’ (14:58). More frequently, however, its implications 
are personal, as when The Unknown senses how ‘Fate is elaborating her plot, 
once again I hear the gavel fall and the chairs pushed back from the table - 
the sentence is pronounced, but it must have been decided before I was born, 
for already in my childhood I began to serve my punishment’ (29:53), and it 
remains central to one of Strindberg’s last attempts at elucidating the pattern 
of his destiny in Armageddon, where the nature and function of language are 
once again a major consideration.
As Walter Berendsohn has suggested,29 Armageddon may well form a kind 
of prologue in heaven to the collected volume of Strindberg’s autobiographical 
sequence as he conceived it towards the end of his life. It can certainly be 
read as such. Not only does it contain a prophetic account of a destiny which 
in its particulars seems remarkably like a retrospective summary of the life 
Strindberg saw himself as just completing, thus suggesting that its course had 
been artistically arranged, or plotted, from the outset (hence the statement: 
‘His future fate… is already written’ (54:156)); it also breaks off shortly after 
the birth of the protagonist, Skugge, at roughly the point at which The Son 
of a Servant commences with the chapter ‘Afraid and Hungry’. Moreover, in 
describing Skugge as someone who ‘did not want to be in the way and who was 
not allowed to talk’ (54:162), it even repeats the familiar description of Johan 
as ‘frightened of being in the way’ and unable to ‘go anywhere without being 
in the way, without saying a word that did not disturb’ (18:8, 14).
The fragment relates how Skugge (cf. Sw. skugga = shadow), initially 
called Fröjdkyss (lit. ‘Kiss of Joy’), becomes a shadow of his former self once 
he ‘learned to say what he did not think’ (54:152), and how he is therefore 
expelled from a harmonious realm of ‘truth, justice… purity and innocence’ 
(54:148–9) back down into a world called Dimona (cf. Sw. dimma = mist), 
where everything is ‘ugly or false’, ‘distorted and counterfeit’ (54:155). There he 
makes ‘the child’s first great discovery in the art of life: how to avoid trouble by 
dissimulation’ (54:162), and the narrative ends abruptly with a scene in which 
Skugge ‘sat in his corner and heard how the others said what they did not mean 
and how they spoke differently to different people and on different occasions. 
This, he realized, was what was called lying’ (54:163).
Armageddon thus depicts the sentence passed before birth on a character 
whose kinship with Strindberg’s earlier self- images is unmistakable, and then 
describes his subsequent banishment to a place which is recognizable as the 
‘penal institution’ of The Son of a Servant, but which is now portrayed in the 
imagery of Black Banners, the Chamber Plays, and A Blue Book, as ‘a prison 
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and a madhouse with many names’ (54:156).30 It is a place of illusions, ‘ the 
world of delusion’ (46:34 - villornas värld), where men resemble sleepwalkers, 
and nothing is what it seems but ‘perverse, imperfect, and crazy’ (46:129), 
a world where ‘ we really live not in reality but in our ideas of reality’ 
(46:169), and ‘even the man who tries to tell the truth with an upright mind, 
gets entangled in inherited lies and is trapped’ (54:156). Moreover, what 
specifically distinguishes this world from the pre-natal paradise from which 
Skugge is expelled, a realm where everything is ‘what it pretends to be’ (44:75), 
is language, with its capacity to deceive. And here Strindberg’s own earlier 
intimations of a higher existence are realised in a terminology that now owes 
much to Swedenborg.31 Like the Chamber Plays, Armageddon relies heavily 
upon the doctrine and topography associated with the Swedenborgian notion 
of Lower Earth, to which men pass at death, and where they gradually lose the 
ability to mask their thoughts and feelings. In time, therefore, outer appearance 
becomes a mirror of the individual’s inner reality, and the prize of moralist and 
autobiographer alike, his true self, is revealed.
Yet more pertinent to Armageddon, however, is the sanction Strindberg 
discovers elsewhere in Swedenborg for his own misgivings about language. For 
in the sections of De Telluribus devoted to the inhabitants of Jupiter and Mars,32 
Swedenborg describes a type of wordless communication which Strindberg 
adopts and bestows upon Skugge’s companions, Pärlskön and Havsdroppe: 
‘They spoke but little with words, but with glances and smiles’ since ‘they could 
see one another’s thoughts with their eyes, and they could also show what they 
were thinking; their eyelids did not move, either to conceal something or in 
pretence’ (54:151). Effected mainly by means of facial expression and adequate 
because of the correspondence between what Swedenborg termed interior and 
exterior speech, this wordless communication can dispense with the mediation 
of the spoken word since the inhabitants of Jupiter are unable to ‘show a face 
at variance with the mind… because they never speak otherwise than they 
think.’33 Indeed, Swedenborg’s account of the development of language suggests 
that ‘the very first speech on every earth was speech by the face’ and that it is 
only because men learned to lie that verbal speech became a necessity. In what 
reads as a paraphrase not only of Armageddon but of Strindberg’s conception of 
language in general, Swedenborg argues: 
that verbal speech could not have been used by the Most Ancient people, 
since the words of a language are not imparted immediately, but have 
to be invented and applied to objects; which it requires a course of time 
to effect. So long as sincerity and rectitude prevailed among men, such 
speech continued; but as soon as the mind began to think one thing and 
speak another, which was the case when man began to love himself and 
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not the neighbour, verbal speech began to increase the face being either 
silent or deceitful.34
Not surprisingly, such ideas appeal to Strindberg, who finds them reinforced 
at the end of the century by Maeterlinck’s collection of essays, Le Trésor des 
humbles where, in contrast to speech, which cuts man off from reality, silence 
is described as the language of the soul and the means of true communication. 
To Maeterlinck, who on at least one occasion amended Talleyrand’s aperçu by 
observing that speech is all too often not the art of concealing thought, but 
of stifling it, so that there is nothing to conceal, silence is eloquent, revealing, 
and non-concealing, and permits what is within a person to rise to the surface 
where it becomes visible to the interlocutory glance, and Strindberg, who 
began to translate Le Trésor des humbles as a gift for Harriet Bosse, likewise 
often regarded silence as the discourse of virtue in his later works. ‘I prefer 
silence’, the loquacious Hummel claims, ‘then one hears thoughts, and sees 
the past, silence cannot conceal anything… which words can’ (45:190), while 
Strindberg himself observes: ‘One ought never to speak, only signal what is 
most vital to meet the needs of life. And when one comes together, one should 
hear music’ (48:917). 
These convictions seem to place not only speaking but even the writing 
of literature in doubt, and Strindberg does in fact remark that ‘the godly do 
not portray their marriages, and they write neither plays nor novels’ (47:735). 
But his profoundly ambiguous relationship to language, spoken and written, 
does not admit so neat a conclusion. The possibility that language does not 
convey a perfect representation of the truth may in any case be experienced 
as an affront to propriety. A classic instance of this occurs in Swift’s account 
of the Houyhnhnms, where Gulliver, ‘having occasion to talk of lying and 
false representation’, encounters a problem in conveying what he means to his 
master: 
… it was with much difficulty that he comprehended what I meant: 
although he had otherwise a most acute judgement. For he argued thus: 
that the use of speech was to make us understand one another, and to 
receive information of facts; now if one said the thing which was not, 
these ends were defeated; because I cannot properly be said to understand 
him; and I am so far from receiving information, that he leaves me 
worse than in ignorance; for I am led to believe a thing black when it 
is white, and short when it is long. And these were all the notions he 
had concerning the faculty of lying so perfectly well understood, and so 
universally practised among human creatures.35 
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With Strindberg, too, the possibility that language may be used to say 
‘the thing which was not’ seems to violate not only virtue and truth but 
also the categories of order and disorder, and justice and injustice, so 
frequently associated with them. Moreover, since disorder suggests the 
idea of dirt, the debased work in which verbal language is an unfortunate 
necessity is readily linked with the notions of purity and filth which are 
never far removed from Strindberg’s attention, as indeed, they are not from 
Swift’s. ‘He began to disturb the regulations,’ Pärlskön says, of Skugge, 
‘he learned to say what he did not think, but his falseness could not be 
concealed, for whoever tells the truth has both his eyes in equilibrium 
like the balance on a set of scales’ (54:152). Hence he is excluded from 
the company of his fellows ‘for his breath stinks sourly and he sweats as if 
from the effort of concealing his thoughts’ (54:153). Thus he is eventually 
condemned ‘to lie in foul smelling filth’ (54:160). 
In the significative system elaborated in Armageddon, therefore, verbal 
language is specific to the fallen world of dirt (smuts), falsehood (osanning), lies 
(lögn), and excrement (träck), whereas the purity of wordless communication 
is peculiar to a situation of truth (sanning), purity (renhet), innocence (oskuld), 
and justice (rättvisa) as it is portrayed in the opening scene of the fragment, 
where a number of Strindberg’s most constant and deeply-rooted desires are 
adumbrated. Thus, like the Stockholm archipelago or Switzerland which, 
according to Strindberg, have their ‘great glorious nature, and therefore need no 
surrogate’ (16:166), the purity of this landscape requires no art, nor any other 
kind of mediation. ‘He who has nature needs no art’ (4 7:656), he maintains, 
some twenty years later, and any violation of what he understood to be the 
order of nature always appeared to Strindberg to be, like Axel Borg’s optical 
transformation of the archipelago in By the Open Sea, ‘something monstrous’ 
(24:153). This landscape also reflects his abiding preference for plants over 
animal life. ‘It is mainly in the world of plants that I have found perfect beauty’ 
(47:606), he asserts, at about this time, and the rarified atmosphere of the 
world from which Skugge falls, which is inhabited only by non -carnivorous 
animals and birds who discharge their waste products into the air through 
their lungs ‘in a cleanly manner’ (54:148), denotes a recoil from the brutish 
facts of eating, excreting, and reproducing that is similarly articulated in The 
Ghost Sonata and The Pelican. For almost invariably, the notion of smuts, of 
dirt and disorder, is associated in Strindberg’s imagination with ‘excrement, 
nourishment, cooks and rotting vegetables’ (37:207), and with sexuality, as 
when Johan, coming directly from a scene with his mistress to join his sisters in 
the country, wonders ‘what the word filth (smuts) means?’ (19:127), and traces 
the disturbing image of sexual love it evokes back, by way of his sister, Anna, 
to his mother. Moreover, while Strindberg regularly attempts to discriminate 
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between marriage as ren (clean, pure) and the temptations of the bachelor as 
smuts, the distinction frequently collapses (‘to me bachelor life is filthy. Family 
life is finest – and yet, it’s even filthier, when one roots around in it!’ (XI:100)) 
and his later works indicate that for him, as for Max, in Gothic Rooms: ‘There 
are times when I believe… that our human souls have had to creep into animal 
bodies. We behave like animals, we kiss with the same mouth which takes in 
food, and we make love with an excremental organ’ (40:195). 
Since language, both verbal and non-verbal, is essential to this two-edged 
current of desire and disgust, and since it is the medium in which Strindberg has 
elected to conduct his life, the tensions and taboos generated here are of crucial 
importance to his undertaking. As the Tempter comments, in To Damascus, 
it is precisely the most purely intentioned of wordless acts which occasions the 
situation from which language recoils. ‘I have never understood,’ he remarks, 
how a kiss, which is an unborn word, a soundless speech, a silent language 
of two souls, can by a sacred act be transformed into… a surgical operation, 
which always ends in weeping and the gnashing of teeth’ (29:340). Conversely, 
as Strindberg argues, in A Blue Book, in a section which summarizes a situation 
depicted many years earlier in ‘Short Cuts’, when the apparent conversation 
of the young lovers, Tekla and Robert, in fact conceals a passionate wordless 
discussion, language also becomes the screen behind which the discourse 
of desire unfolds in silence: ‘The spoken word has frequently become a fig 
leaf which conceals shame. When you ask: “Do you love me, will you be my 
wife?” do you know what you are touching on then? You are really asking 
her, if you first may kiss her, then… and then… and then’ (48:875). Thus, 
in making his famous enquiry, ‘Will you have a little child with me, Miss 
Bosse?’36, Strindberg may be discerned shortcutting the preliminary stages of 
a sequence that is normally concealed behind the verbal fig leaf. Indeed, the 
latter is actually evoked in Creditors, where Gustav describes how Tekla and 
Adolf ‘creep behind the fig leaf, play brothers and sisters, and, as their feelings 
become increasingly carnal, invent a relationship for themselves that is more 
and more spiritual’ (23:207), a notion that is also present in ‘Short Cuts’ where 
Tekla asks Robert if ‘their souls are brothers and sisters’ and he confirms ‘the 
invisible bond’ between them. When she claims ‘it seems to me, as if every word 
you spoke was my own thought’ (54:43), they seem to be enjoying the silent 
communion that Strindberg later extols. However, their dialogue is not ethereal 
but a cloak to conceal their unspoken desire. Robert clothes the discussion in ‘a 
veil of the wonderful… so that they moved quite unconstrainedly beneath the 
light veil. They spoke freely, as if behind masks’ (54:43–4), moving gradually 
towards ‘the burning words’ (54:45) which pluck their veil aside to reveal, in 
the common memory of a youthful kiss, the nakedness of their present desire. 
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Thus the very silence which in theory constitutes Strindberg’s ideal proves 
in practice to be immoral. For it is party to the veil of lies and hypocrisy which 
sustains social life, those ‘silent agreements, public secrets which keep society 
together’ (16:91). In The Son of a Servant he relates how Johan ‘had learnt to 
speak the truth … took a brutal pleasure in saying straight out what everyone 
was thinking in the middle of a conversation where people were dallying with 
the truth’ (18:217), a reaction which persists with Strindberg to the end. In The 
Pelican, the Son recognizes ‘a duty to speak out’ (45:246), for as the Student 
insists, in The Ghost Sonata, ‘by remaining silent for too long, stagnant water 
accumulates and things rot’ (45:208), and as Strindberg informs Harriet Bosse, 
since silence implies complicity in a collective deception with both private and 
public ramifications (on this occasion, as on so many others, he is referring 
to marriage), he is always compelled to distinguish himself, to make himself 
heard. ‘A volcano of repressed opinions takes shape and it has to explode’, he 
tells her (XIV:121), for otherwise (as The Dead Man remarks, in The Isle of the 
Dead) he will explode himself: ‘Oh, that I can’t keep quiet any longer, but I have 
stayed silent for thirty years, until in the end I got so full of falsehood I was on 
the point of bursting’.37 Confronted by a society that ‘wanted to hush him up’ 
(54:71), he consequently evolves the apocalyptic notion that were the true word 
spoken in ‘the simple, raw language of truth’ (54:227), then ‘society would 
fall apart’ (17:68). This is already anticipated in his early play, The Freethinker, 
with its defiant conclusion: ‘Sooner may heaven and earth collapse, than a 
word of the truth be denied!’ (1:57), but it assumes a particular meaning in the 
scenes of undressing (avklädning) or unmasking (demaskering) in which the 
later works abound, where the word spoken in truth kills. ‘Words are forms of 
energy of unparalleled strength’ (46:193), Strindberg asserts, and the Student’s 
deadly outburst to the Daughter at the end of The Ghost Sonata is conceived 
as a speech act in which ‘He murders her with words’.38 A similar process is 
depicted in Creditors, where Gustav talks Adolf to death, and it may be related 
to another recurrent belief, which again serves to link the autobiographer with 
the recorder of sins in the Book of Life, that when a man achieves precise self-
knowledge, that is, when he sees himself (or as Strindberg may express it, his 
ghost or fylgia (23:268)) as he is, he dies: ‘But when one has seen oneself, one 
dies!’ (45: 139). Or as the Hunter muses at a graveside in The Great Highway: 
‘Here rests’ – yes, I knew you  
but you never came to know yourself…  
and you; all your life you were disguised,  
your long heavy life;  
and when I stripped you naked, you died! (51:77) 
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Strindberg thus regards the language he uses as both deadly and pure, and 
confronted by another, his immediate desire is often, like The Unknown’s 
response to the Doctor in To Damascus, ‘to speak a pure language and blow 
him up’ (29:42). But this involves the use of ‘coarse words… such words which 
most truly, that is to say most rawly reproduce thought’ (17:68), something his 
sensitivity to the role of language as a carrier of impurity and sexuality will cause 
to haunt not only the reception of Getting Married (which is in any case an 
outspoken linguistic act from which he eventually tries to exculpate himself), 
but any text which seeks ‘to lift the curtain’ (17:67) and speak the truth. Lifting 
the curtain, moreover, is similar to removing the fig leaf, and like Strindberg’s 
ambivalence about exposing himself in literature, the medium in which he 
performs this public undressing is also equivocal. It both entices and disgusts 
him as ‘a raw and repulsive occupation (V:121), and the intermittent attraction 
of a scientific discourse, preeminently of chemical formulae, may well satisfy 
a wish for a language that is immune to the contemporary accusation that his 
writing was ‘the product of a fantasy, which finds pleasure in wallowing in 
filth.’39
However, the danger of pollution is reduced because Strindberg so pointedly 
avoids immediate verbal intercourse. The raw, murderous language he espouses 
is not spoken but written in solitude on the virginal purity of the white and 
silent page to which he confides what he is unable to say. These are the terms 
on which he constantly insists when he describes writing; they elaborate the 
scene in which the page is inscribed with the life of its scriptor. Although one 
writes what one does not say, he informs Siri, ‘the secret is nevertheless kept… 
the whole art consists in inventing the impenetrable masks and – in keeping 
silent. Silence is holy. What one has once related before it has been put down 
on paper is lost’ (I:193), a prescription which is echoed in the passage in A Blue 
Book in which he exonerates himself from the indiscretions of the press which 
he periodically accuses of betraying the privacy of his written discourse: 
I confided it to the silent, printed word on the white page. It was a 
confidential communication; and the person who betrayed it was a traitor. 
Our books are made to be read in silence, to be whispered in one’s 
ear; but the newspaper always speaks aloud, it shouts the secrets out, and 
therefore bears the guilt. (48:941–2)
Both Martin Lamm and Torsten Eklund have, of course, focused their 
attention on these and similar passages,40 and it would be tempting to share 
their perplexity over the apparent disingenuousness in what seems an attempt 
on Strindberg’s part to disclaim responsibility for his own indiscretions by 
transferring the guilt incurred in making them onto other writers, whose 
medium is nevertheless also the printed word. And equally, the distinction 
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between writing and speech which he consistently sets up, also ask to be 
considered in the terms evolved by linguistics to explain the difference between 
the two modes of language use. Accordingly, Strindberg could be said to reject 
what Saussure calls ‘the natural bond, the only true bond, the bond of sound’,41 
in favour of the surrogate permanence and stability offered by the graphic form 
of words. Strindberg prefers the solitary, secondary, invented mode of writing, 
which arrests, fixes, abstracts from, and supplements experience, a mode of 
communication which eschewes the immediacy and disorder of dialogue, and 
which is characterized by a double absence, or occultation, wherein the reader 
is absent from the writing of the book and the writer from its reading, to 
what is regarded, if only because of the anteriority of speech to writing in 
the individual’s life and in history, as the primary, natural, even divine mode 
of communication, in which the voice, borne by the breath, and guaranteed 
by facial expression, gesture, tone, and inflection, signifies the presence of the 
speaker and of his companions to himself and to others, in an interlocutory 
situation that binds voice and ear in the here and now. For speech proceeds 
from an evident context, both in terms of the perceptual surroundings and 
the cultural and historical background the speakers have in common. It is, 
moreover, interruptable, an exchange, and in its intersubjectivity, it promises 
an essential and immediate proximity of voice and being.42 It also appears to 
have the virtue Strindberg denies it, in being immediately verifiable or, at least, 
open to question, since the speaker is promptly accountable for what he says 
(they are his words, unless he says otherwise) whereas writing, what Vygotsky 
terms ‘speech without an interlocutor, addressed to an absent or an imaginary 
person or to no one in particular’43 is spatially and temporally removed from 
its occasion, and is often placed under the aegis of death (presided over as it 
is in Plato’s Phaedrus, by Thoth, the Egyptian God of writing and inscriber 
of accounts before the Last Judgement), a monument to pastness not only in 
the posthumous perspective of the autobiographer but also, according to Paul 
Ricoeur, in the response to all writing: ‘to read a book is to consider its author 
as already dead and the book as posthumous. Indeed, it is when the author is 
dead that the relation to his book becomes complete and, in a way, intact.’44
In practice, however, the situation is more complex than a straightforward 
dichotomy admits. Strindberg is in any case suspicious of the notion of a 
full and present speech, and of a presence immediately recoverable from a 
spoken discourse that is transparent and innocent. All too often people do not 
commit themselves to their utterances, and in place of the noisy, soliciting, 
impermanence of the spoken word, in which the speaker dissipates himself, 
he therefore resorts to literature in order to reappropriate the presence which 
eludes him in speech. If the latter is where he is dispersed and misrepresented, 
writing is where he coheres, and in contrast to a spoken discourse in which 
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the changing motives of the various participants determine the intermittent 
flow of the utterance, the written is where the discourse seems to pass under 
the uninterrupted control of its producer, or at least, to provide him with the 
semblance of control: ‘Since I still cannot say coherently as much as is written 
on this sheet of paper’, he writes to his early benefactor, Rudolf Wall, ‘I have 
taken the liberty of writing’ (I:228). 
But if in doing so he withdraws from what Ricoeur calls ‘the bodily 
support of oral discourse’,45 this does not mean that the writing he produces is 
disembodied or that it becomes ‘more spiritual in the sense that it is liberated 
from the narrowness of the face-to-face situation.’46 Strindberg is in fact not so 
considerate or self-effacing as to abandon his texts to the anonymity that many 
textual critics regard as the domain of the written. Although he ordinarily 
refuses the facile à clef identifications that his contemporaries often made 
between themselves and the characters of his books, and eventually argued the 
virtue of ‘the protective veil of pseudonymity’ employed by ‘the writer of folk 
songs, who effaced his own self and lived only as the echo of a song’ (47:647), 
he felt the duty of the Kierkegaardian witness of truth (sannhedsvittne) to be 
responsible for his words, answerable for them, and discernable in them. What 
the reader should hear, in short, if not perceive, is ‘a heart beating in every line’ 
(II:42).
The ways in which Strindberg accomplishes this are various. A text may, 
as Sverker Hallén has demonstrated, be at once stridently contemporary in its 
literariness and a private message, directed to a single addressee. Thus the French 
edition of ‘Deranged Impressions’, Sensations detraquées, incorporates a passage 
which reads on one level as an exercise in a fashionable fin-de-siècle literary code 
of associative symbolism, and on another, as a cipher of allusions in which he 
warns his dubious Parisian benefactor, Willy Gretor, against interfering in his 
private life.47 A situation may also arise, especially in relation to Siri von Essen 
or Harriet Bosse, where Strindberg uses his writing to conceive an interlocutress 
who was simultaneously the subject, reader, and even the actress of the roles 
attributed to her. As he tells his colleague, Geijerstam, Siri will repeat the role 
in which he has cast her: ‘My wife will only play the role which is written for 
her, and which suits her’ (VII:166). For what he often seeks to accomplish by 
writing is a distribution of roles in which he does not merely try to re-present 
himself and render his self visible; he also contrives the immediate absence of 
the other and his or her presence, both in the substance of the discourse and as 
its eventual reader or actor. As a passage in Alone demonstrates, for Strindberg 
writing is speech, a kind of dialogue, but one more ample and representative 
than circumstances ordinarily permit:
I perceive my own thoughts as spoken words; I seem to be in telepathic 
contact with all my absent acquaintances, friends and enemies; I carry on 
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long orderly conversations with them, or resume old conversations held 
in convivial company, in cafes; I oppose their opinions, defend my point 
of view, and I am much more eloquent than when I am in the presence 
of listeners. (38:177) 
As is the case with Rousseau, for whom writing provides the necessary substitute 
for the improvisations, embarrassment, and imperfections in which speech 
involves him, this passage illustrates that the written word affords the once 
aphasic Strindberg a compensatory form of eloquence in which the features of 
the unsuccessful encounter are recomposed in retrospect. Lacking the ability 
to improvise a rapid response, gauche and inept, and all too sensitive to those 
factors, spoken and unspoken, which impinge upon him in the interlocutory 
situation, Rousseau is repeatedly discomfited when he commits himself to 
speech and thus concludes: ‘Le parti que j’ai pris d’écrire et de me cacher est 
précisément celui que me convenoit.’48 Likewise it is in writing that Strindberg 
becomes master of himself and of his life. Only he does not intend to hide 
himself: there, as so many commentators follow him in remarking (‘This 
shyness drives me to writing’ (I:186)), he is not shy. 
But shyness (blygsel) does not in itself provide an adequate explanation for 
this mechanism, any more than the satisfaction of Strindberg’s ‘urge to utter 
everything his thought produced’ (18:64) is simply a matter of his mental 
health. The elaborate undertaking, which situated language at the intersection 
of concealing and revealing, truth and lie, purity and filth, is far more 
deeply ambivalent. In Gothic Rooms, Dr Borg supplies another catalyst of the 
written word in ‘modesty’ (blygsamheten): ‘Modesty forbids us to speak of it, 
therefore it is a good thing it is written, the printed word is silent and wounds 
no one’ (40:25), and two related passages, one comparatively early, the other 
late, indicate the complexity of the tension that exists between the various 
constituents involved. In the section ‘His Best Feeling’ in A Blue Book, the 
written word is described as more than just the conventional attire of thought. 
At its purest, it becomes both a cloak of modesty and a vehicle of truth: 
When a man writes a letter to a really good friend, or rather, to the 
woman he loves, he dresses up in holiday attire; it is beautiful of course, 
and in the silent letter, on the white page, he gives his best feelings.  
 One’s tongue and the spoken word are so polluted by daily use that 
they could not speak out loud the beautiful things which the pen says 
silently. 
This is not a matter of posing or posturing, there is no question of 
deceit when the soul one encounters in a correspondence is better than 
the one displayed in everyday life. A lover is not untrue in his letter. He 
does not pretend to be any better than he is, he becomes better, and at that 
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moment he is better. In those moments he is true. They are the greatest 
life affords. (47:731) 
Here Strindberg once again suggests that not only Babel but the very existence 
of language predicates man’s fallen state – the imagery, for example, abuts 
such statements as the observation in The Great Highway on Aphrodite, born 
naked ‘without even a vine leaf with which to cover herself, for clothes are only 
a consequence of the Fall of Man’ (51:18). And yet, in its written form (and 
typically, Strindberg thinks in terms of a letter, the direct address to an absent 
addressee), language nevertheless represents the way in which social hypocrisy 
is circumvented and purity and truth achieved. 
Similarly, a passage in The Son of a Servant, in which he discusses the 
discrepancies between Schiller’s considered foreword to Die Räuber, and the 
furiously composed text itself, discloses the principle which permits him to 
accept the truth of written discourse: 
Was Schiller being truthful when he wrote the play, and false, when he 
wrote the preface? Just as truthful on both occasions, for man is a divided 
being and appears now as natural man and now as social man. At his 
desk, in solitude when the silent letters were written down on the page, 
Schiller seems, like other, generally young writers, to have been under the 
influence, while at work, of the blind play of his natural instincts, without 
consideration for people’s judgement, without a thought for the public or 
for laws and constitution. (18:277) 
Although Strindberg could sometimes reject inspiration precisely because it 
seemed to indicate the author’s absence from the words he wrote (‘How then 
could one dare to depend upon a writer’s words, when he has written them 
down in a condition of partial insanity… His mind has gone its own way, 
and when it has arrived at the end, the writer is not there with it’ (16:54)), 
he normally accepts ‘that the writer in his fever is led in the right direction’ 
(VII:103) and subscribes to the notion of inspiration as a privileged discourse, 
one that is authentic and full. It cuts through social circumlocutions and 
facilitates a return to the truthful, prelapsarian discourse of natural man. In 
such moments language incarnates the self. It is not something distinct from 
the writer who uses it, and no longer an instrument open to abuse. It reveals 
the writer because language and self coincide. 
II
Perhaps the most incisive comment on all these references to whiteness, purity, 
shyness, silence, and solitude, was passed, however, in another context, by 
Charles Darwin. When Darwin came, in The Expression of the Emotions in 
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Man and Animals, to review ‘The Nature of the Mental States which induce 
Blushing’, he observed: ‘These consist of shyness, shame, and modesty; 
the essential element in all being self-attention… It is not the simple act of 
reflecting on our own appearance, but the thinking what others think of us, 
which excites a blush.’49 Moreover, as Christopher Ricks points out, in Keats 
and Embarrassment, ‘the word “self -attention” had become the supreme subject 
and animus for the artist.’50 And the self-attention which Strindberg bestows 
on himself is, as with Rousseau, of precisely the binary kind that Darwin 
identifies. For if, in their writing, they place themselves out of reach of an 
immediate interlocutor, who might interrupt, curtail, or misinterpret their 
spoken discourse, they live their lives before spectators, both fancifully, in their 
day-to-day affairs, and in time through the words they present to the reader’s 
gaze. 
On a level determined by commercial requirements, both writers obviously 
publicize, as well as publish, themselves. They wish to be seen and therefore 
exhibit their exceptionality. ‘J’aimerois mieux être oublié de tout le genre 
humain que regardé comme un homme ordinaire’,51 Rousseau remarks, in 
words that Strindberg might easily have substituted for the second epigraph to 
The Red Room: ‘Rien n’est si désagréable que d’être pendu obscurément’. Or as 
a recent autobiographer, Ivar Lo-Johansson, observes: ‘Anonymous notoriety is 
an impossibility.’52 
Furthermore, this dimension of Strindberg’s activity is related to what 
might be termed presence via provocation, in which the reaction his words 
incite provides evidence that he has made his mark. Again, this is a very basic 
level indeed. As George Steiner comments, in his essay ‘The Language Animal’: 
‘We are so far as we can declare ourselves to be, and have full assurance of our 
asserted existence only when other identities register and reciprocate our life 
signals,’53 and whether by polemic, in the shock aroused by the removal of verbal 
inhibitions, or in the resolve to strip himself naked, writing confers a feeling of 
ontological security on Strindberg. Nowhere, except perhaps in Rousseau, is a 
preoccupation with what others see in him so apparent as in Strindberg, and it 
is so central a factor because the opinion others have of him prevents him from 
being himself. It is to their intervention that he attributes what he diagnoses as 
his ‘will-less character’: ‘“What will people say?’’ was then a constant refrain. 
And thus his self was eaten away, so he could never be himself, always depended 
upon the wavering opinions of other people, and never believed in himself, 
except on the few occasions when he felt his energetic soul work independently 
of his will’ (18:15). Moreover, these privileged moments occur when, removed 
from the sight of his fellow men, Strindberg experiences the plenitude that 
writing affords: ‘When I come home, however, and sit down at my desk, that’s 
when I live’, he declares, in Alone (38:155), while in the chapter of The Son of 
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a Servant entitled ‘He Becomes a Writer’, he records how ‘Now at last he had 
found his mission, his role in life, and his disjointed being began to find its 
form’ (18:343). It is on paper, in writing, that his self takes shape. 
Unfortunately, however, as Steiner goes on to remark, the communication 
of presence by language is both a negative and a positive accomplishment: 
It is in the reciprocal nature of the statement of identity, in the need for 
echo, be it savagely contrary, to confirm one’s own being, that lies the root 
of the Hegelian paradox: the need of one living entity for the presence of 
another, and the fear and hate engendered by that need.54 
Only by provoking a response will Strindberg know his words have been 
received, and what his militant strategies of attack and defence clearly 
demonstrate is the contingent nature of his undertaking. He requires another 
opinion, even as he resents and rejects it. But by making a virtue of the ‘law 
of accommodation’ and utilizing the multiplicity of the self which encounters 
with others help him to discern, Strindberg follows Rousseau in presenting 
his personality as a series of shifting facades, a sequence of roles in which he 
satisfies a desire to be interesting at any price and also avoids both the fear 
of being circumscribed within the character with which he is endowed by 
others, and the feeling of incompleteness or rejection evoked in the suggestion 
that he is ‘overlooked’ ( förbigången), a practice which suggests what R. D. 
Laing has termed ‘meta-identities’. Reading Laing in the light of Darwin’s far 
briefer observation, is to gain a substantial insight into the type of self -identity 
elaborated in Strindberg’s (or Rousseau’s) autobiographical writing: 
In concreto, rather than in abstracto, self-identity (‘I’ looking at ‘me’) is 
constituted not only by our looking at ourselves, but also by our looking 
at others looking at us and our reconstitution and alteration of these views 
of others about us. At this more complex, more concrete level, self-identity 
is a synthesis of my looking at me with my view of others’ view of me. 
These views by others of me need not be passively accepted, but they 
cannot be ignored in my development of a sense of who I am. For even 
if a view of another by me is rejected it still becomes incorporated in its 
rejected form as part of my self-identity. My self- identity becomes my 
view of me which I recognize as the negation of the other person’s view of 
me. Thus ‘I’ becomes a ‘me’ who is being misperceived by another person. 
This can become a vital aspect of my view of myself. (E.g., ‘I am a person 
whom no one really understands.’)55 
It is the ‘misperception’ in what others think of them which so often preoccupies 
both writers. Instead of the unstable but free relationship to others which most 
people tolerate, Rousseau and Strindberg experience another’s gaze as primarily 
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hostile. Rousseau, as Jean Starobinski points out, regards himself as ‘la victime 
d’un regard anonyme, d’un spectateur sans identité… le témoin hostile, qui 
n’est personne en particulier, devient virtuellement tout le monde… un OEil 
omniscient.’56 Similarly, Strindberg, informed that the golden eye in a window 
of Klara Church which dominated the landscape of his early years is ‘God’s 
eye’ (18:27), always feels himself under observation and later maintains that 
‘The eye of the ruler of the world (Världsstyraren) is not blind’ (47:704). Thus, 
whether the observer he detects is Ibsen, in the act of appropriating his life as 
the material source for The Wild Duck or Hedda Gabler57 or ‘The Invisible One’ 
who keeps him ‘under total supervision’ (XII:286), his private life is always a 
public spectacle. 
Confronted by others, therefore, Rousseau and Strindberg seem about to 
lose themselves: the image which they have of their identity is undermined and 
fretted away by the summary conception that others form of them. ‘L’essence 
de mon être est-elle dans leurs regards?’ Rousseau asks,58 while Strindberg 
reveals a recurring nightmare in which ‘Someone who has lived alone goes out 
into the world and sees and hears. Then he discovers how everyone has created 
their own image of him. He sees in their expressions, hears in their words, 
how they have transformed him. When one of them speaks out loud and says 
what they think of him he finds it horrible. It is not him but another, although 
fashioned out of all his wickedness and that of the speaker.’59 
This is the real source of the anguish experienced by both Rousseau and 
Strindberg when the words in which they speak prove inadequate as a means 
of self -representation. ‘Qu’il seroit doux de vivre parmi nous, si la contenance 
extérieure étoit toujours l’image des dispositions du cœur’,60 Rousseau 
exclaims, in the Discours sur les sciences et les arts. As in Swedenborg, perfect 
communication would dispense with words, and when enlisted to reveal the 
true Jean-Jacques to his interlocutors, who traduce his image and transform 
his unique value into the kind of superficial, limiting category that Strindberg 
identifies with an ‘automaton’ or ‘musical box’, speech is wholly inadequate. 
‘Moi présent on n’auroit jamais su ce que je valois’, Rousseau explains, and 
thus provides the context for his retreat to literature in order to ‘rendre mon 
âme transparente aux yeux du lecteur’.61 And the loss of confidence in the 
capacity of language to reflect the world and convey the perceptions of one 
individual to another, is in fact evident in its dramatic presentation to the 
reader (in whose eyes they are seeking to restore themselves) by means of the 
two paradigmatic scenes of lie and deception with which they commence 
their autobiographies. Just as Jean-Jacques discovered the impotence of the 
spoken word as a means of self-representation from his inability to lie when 
‘les apparences me condannoient’,62 so Johan learns that telling the truth 
in a house where (as at Bossey) ‘lies were punished without mercy’ (18:16), 
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is no guarantee that he will be accepted for what he knows himself to be. 
Whether from shyness, shame, or modesty, the discovery of the theft causes 
him to blush, and he then compounds the supposed crime by rebutting the 
accusation, thus discovering that the language to which he entrusts himself 
does not redeem him from these false assumptions. In short, both Strindberg 
and Rousseau find themselves miscast, and they go on to present the moment 
as irreparable. ‘From that day on Johan lived in perpetual disquiet’ (18:18), 
Strindberg declares; ‘Dès ce moment je cessai de jouir d’un bonheur pur, et je 
sens aujourdui même que le souvenir des charmes de mon enfance s’arrête là’, 
claims Rousseau.63 It marks an end of innocence, a close to early childhood, 
and the expulsion into the snares of language which repeats, on a personal 
level, something of the disaster of Babel – the loss of which both authors will 
spend a lifetime exculpating in writing.64 
‘But Johan blushes’ (18:17). Even the feature which propels his fall seems 
to substantiate Darwin and demonstrate that the nature of Strindberg’s self-
attention is directed as much to what others think of him, as to himself. And 
from the conclusion to the first volume of The Son of a Servant and the Foreword 
to Miss Julie, via Vivisections, to the deliberations of A Blue Book, he insists 
that a person’s character exists largely as a construct in other people’s minds, 
and that in fact ‘firmness of character is characterlessness.’65 This argument, 
fostered as it is by the analysis of his own emotional lability, encourages him to 
resist the one-dimensionality of the roles in which his contemporaries would 
confine him (and into which, he argues, in the essays ‘Is Character a Role?’ 
(27:617f), and ‘Pose and Gesture’ (47:679), so many of them congeal), and to 
reverse the conventional notion of character, whether in life or literature, with 
its stress on the qualities of firmness and consistency, and the positive moral 
connotations they imply. This is the view of the ironically named Blacksmith 
in The Great Highway, who has forged ‘a real character’ for himself and proudly 
boasts his resistance to change (51:46), and The Son of a Servant, written, as 
Strindberg informed Bonnier, to ‘explore the whole concept of character – on 
which of course the whole of literature rests’ (V:343), may be read as a defence 
of the inconsistent and changeable Johan against the prevailing ideal of the 
1880s and its point of departure in Ibsen’s Brand: 
Don’t be one thing today, one thing yesterday,  
And something quite different a year from now.  
Be what you have to be  
Wholly and completely, not  
A little bit here and a little bit there.66 
As Strindberg would argue, ‘Simple minds always speak of contradiction and 
inconsistencies, but everything that lives is made up of elements that are not 
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homogeneous, yet have to be opposites in order to hold together, like those 
forces which draw unlike to unlike’ (47:792). Thus he praises Ophelia as ‘an 
unconscious attempt to present the outline of a character with all the nuances 
that the vulgar call inconsistencies’ (50:77), and stressed his own achievement 
in creating, in Miss Julie, a character so overdetermined by physiological, 
psychological, and circumstantial influences that she emerges as strangely 
free of the normally inhibiting Naturalist characterization, with its stifling 
fatalism. His conception of the characterless character, as embodied in Miss 
Julie, Erik XIV, or himself, is therefore an expression of the conviction, which 
acquaintance with the theories of Ribot and Bernheim only confirmed, that 
character is not one and indivisible but many and various, and that, however 
sensitive its portrayal, it would always elude complete representation. As he 
indicated, in a typical contemporary image: 
Note how many frames must be taken in sequence by the cinema 
photographer to reproduce a single movement, and even then the image is 
blurred. There is a missing transition in every vibration. When a thousand 
shots would be needed for one arm movement, how many myriads would 
not be required to depict a human soul? The writer’s delineations of 
human beings are for that reason only summaries, outlines, all of them 
imperfect and all half false. (50:77) 
These difficulties notwithstanding, his own writing is largely concerned with 
retrieving a just image of himself from the bowdlerized versions put about by 
others. Superficially, he feels that people (and not only Ibsen) are continually 
reading and writing his life. And just as his enthusiasm for photography did 
not extend to the taking of unauthorised images of himself, so he did not wish 
to fasten in any one else’s text. Particularly in the early 1890s, his letters are 
filled with suppositions of plots, both in life and literature, in which he figures. 
Guilty himself of speculating in the destinies of his acquaintances, he infers 
that they are likewise engaged, thus betraying his sense of being constantly the 
object of other people’s attention, as well as of his own. But as Torsten Eklund 
has pointed out, his fears were not without foundation, for he appeared in 
Ola Hansson’s Fru Ester Bruce (1893), Adolf Paul’s story ‘Med flaska och det 
ärliga ögat’ (1895), parts of which were revived in Paul’s memoirs of Strindberg 
in 1915, and Przybyszewski’s Homo Sapiens (1895), as well as in Munch’s 
paintings and lithographs.67 Undoubtedly, such attention contributed to the 
sense of persecution which dominates the early stages of the Inferno crisis, 
and on the way to the creation, in Inferno, of a formal narrative structure that 
would integrate the disparate parts of this experience, his letters already offer 
many preliminary drafts in the art of reclaiming his destiny from other hands; 
as he told Paul, in 1894: ‘I have learned how to correct chance’ (X:67). But 
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the process is exemplified best by an earlier text, A Madman’s Defence, which 
according to its pseudonymous narrator Axel, was written to pre-empt the 
most terrible of all conceivable destinies, namely that his wife, Maria, would 
remarry or ‘live sumptuously [with her Danish lesbian lover] on the income of 
my “collected works” and trace the story of my life as seen through the eyes of 
a hermaphrodite’ (MD:245). He has to write the true narrative of his marriage 
in order to defend himself against the possibility of a false, literally perverse, 
account. 
This specific anxiety is related to a general feeling that ‘people demand he 
perform the role they have chosen for him, and in which he then easily remains 
stuck fast’ (48:834). It is as if by ‘rubbing up against other people… he had lost 
the best part of himself through the law of accommodation…. [and] developed 
into a characterless, smooth, sociable person’ (24:164). Thus, like Borg in By 
the Open Sea, of whom this is said, he experiences a recurring need ‘to go in 
search of himself in isolation’ (24:102). For as the partner of yet another Maria 
observes, ‘We are afraid of losing our identity through the assimilating power 
of love, and therefore we sometimes have to break out in order to feel that I am 
not you’ (37:136), and Strindberg’s own response to intercourse of any kind is 
described by Assir, in The Isle of the Dead, when, stung by the suggestion that 
he ‘doesn’t exist at all’, he retorts: ‘Oh yes I do, because I react to others; and 
if I stopped doing that, the others would engulf me with their egos, with their 
opinions, their fancies. They would kill me with their wills, I would cease to 
exist, and the whole struggle of my life has been to preserve my self!’68 
This sense of the precariousness of individual identity, with which Strindberg 
invests so many of his characters, is strikingly similar to the condition that 
R. D. Laing defines as ‘engulfment’, whereby the subject’s basic security is so 
low that practically any relationship, however tenuous, threatens to overwhelm 
him. Even their response is often as Laing charts it:
The main manoeuvre used to preserve identity under pressure from 
the dread of engulfment is isolation. Thus, instead of the polarities of 
separateness and relatedness based on individual autonomy, there is the 
antithesis between complete loss of being by absorption into the other 
person (engulfment), and complete aloneness (isolation).69
This illuminates Borg’s repossession of himself, ‘isolated like a cosmic splinter’, 
in By the Open Sea (24:29), and accords with the image that Strindberg 
circulates of himself in his last years: ‘In the end he cannot go out, because 
people’s glances alight on him, penetrate his skin, and poke into his heart’ 
(48:834). And this rediscovery or concentration of himself ‘within his own 
skin’ (37:144) is effected in his case by writing, which is an expression of ‘the 
instinct of differentiation, not to be another but to be oneself (VII:247). In fact 
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the formulation ‘His position was false, and he wanted it to be immaculate 
(ren)’ in The Son of a Servant (18:117), is typical of the impulse to withdraw 
into the silence and purity of the printed word. For in extreme situations, 
personal intercourse threatens to overwhelm Strindberg and his characters 
with the impurity, dirt, and disorder associated in Armageddon with Dimona. 
According to Max, in Gothic Rooms, it is especially ‘in a double-bed that one 
loses one’s self, one’s self respect, one’s human dignity. It is there one sells one’s 
soul and learns the art of concealment’ (40:296), and Strindberg is haunted 
by the possibility that he can even be polluted in his absence by a woman’s 
ability to draw him into intercourse with other men. As he writes in The Occult 
Diary (6 September 1901) of Harriet Bosse: ‘Unknown men pollute me by 
the glances with which they pollute her… If she is free and has an affair with 
another man, she hands over my soul and transfers my love to a man, and 
thus causes me to live in a forbidden relationship with a man’s soul or body or 
both!’ Or as Max pithily observes: ‘They seek her, and find him, for he is within 
blocking the way’ (40:210). 
In fact this spectre is often raised in the 1900s. Ten days later, he records 
how Harriet ‘goes about befouling my soul which during my Inferno period I 
washed fairly clean. It is as if, through her, I entered into forbidden relationships 
with men and other women’ (this last phrase being added above the line), and 
similar fears are expressed in A Blue Book (46:179), Queen Christina (39:251), 
and the third part of To Damascus, where the Tempter explains, ‘I was so 
constituted that I couldn’t go out with her in company because I felt she 
was soiled by other men’s glances… the whole of my existence began to be 
perverted into a spiritual concubinage with strange men – which was against 
my nature which has always craved woman!’ (29:327), as well as in He and She, 
and in the fascination with which he variously related the circulation among 
a group of friends, of what numerous letters and a late Vivisection describe as 
everyone’s ‘Aspasia’, a figure derived from the emancipated Norwegian, Dagny 
Juel, whom Strindberg first encountered in the company of Edvard Munch, 
and later lost to the Polish writer, Stanislaw Przybyszewski. Indeed, the matter 
is never far from his attention, for to elide the distinction between men would, 
like the erasure of all difference between man and woman, be a violation of 
the ‘natural’ order his writing is engaged to distinguish and maintain: ‘if 
differences do not keep them apart, then the whole world would be perverse’ 
(40:267). Thus he tells an unknown correspondent that ‘for the man a love 
affair is in fact only a delight in so far as it is between two souls, and every 
interference from outside seems like filth’ (VII:29), warns his friend Bengt 
Lidforss that ‘screwing a man’s wife is perverse! It’s a mixing of seed!’ (IX:357), 
and explains the jealousy felt by Johan for his successor in the favours of his 
housekeeper on Kymmendö as a necessary act of mental purification: 
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He had deposited pieces of his soul in this girl’s: he had treated her as an 
equal, interested himself in her destiny… Furthermore, he had mixed 
his blood with hers, given impulses, tuned the fine strings of his nerves 
in harmony with hers, so that they already belonged to one another, and 
now along came someone else and poked his nose in where he had tried 
to create order, cut off his electrical contact, retuned the strings, spoiled 
his work and brought disharmony to his soul, which he had been careless 
enough to graft on to a woman’s… (19:91) 
In this context, therefore, where to ‘wash oneself clean’ (tvätta sig ren) and 
exonerate oneself (rentvå sig) are related terms on which Strindberg often lays 
stress, his committal to the purity of the silent paper effects both a cleansing 
and a redemption from the loss of self incurred through contact with others. 
It is employed to preserve both his person and the categories with which he 
confronts the world from violation, and it is thus not entirely fanciful to see, 
in the solitary act of writing, an onanistic retreat that rescues him from the 
coition of spoken discourse, enables him to master the other in private, and 
seems to offer an opportunity of keeping himself intact. Indeed, at times he 
appears to infer such a link himself. In writing to Ola Hansson in 1889, he 
rejects Maudsley’s diagnosis of masturbation as a symptom of degeneration, 
and relates it to a symptom of ‘the strong ego which does not want to sacrifice 
its talent for dubious children who would become his competitors’ (VII:247), 
and in his portrait of the artist, Alrik Lundstedt, speechlessness in the face of 
women leads him to retreat to the private delights of his organ loft.70 
Sometimes casually, in the coarse vein of Flaubert or the Goncourts, at 
others drawing the kind of parallel between sexual and verbal ejaculation 
that Balzac espoused, writing is in any case frequently related to sexuality by 
Strindberg. ‘I acknowledge that a woman’s embrace resembles the joys of birth 
when a new thought is hatched |or| a beautiful image wells up’, he concedes, to 
Littmansson, ‘but the unsatisfied sexual instinct and half-hunger transforms 
itself into mental power. (I have written my strongest pieces – Miss Julie and 
Creditors – in 30 days during enforced celibacy.)’ (X:130). As Asta Ekenvall 
has pointed out ‘For him sexual and mental production were closely related.’71 
Miss Julie he calls ‘1st Class Seed’ (X:214) with which he has ‘fertilized’ others, 
and he regards his writing in general as a godlike procedure wherein he has 
‘begot with myself like Zeus a whole Olympus, fools and imposters, saints 
and children’ (X:130). Moreover, the implication is almost always the same; 
if in Black Banners, Dr Borg argues that the sexual act should be effortless, 
like inspiration, Strindberg repeatedly identifies writing as an alternative form 
of intercourse, one in which he demonstrates his prodigious potency and the 
fertility of his invention which peoples a world. Sometimes the two appear 
to preclude each other (‘My former wife could do what she wanted,’ he tells 
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Littmansson (X:131), ‘but I also wrote what I wanted, and therefore my spirit 
was never dominated, only my sexual impulses’), but this is not necessarily so, 
unless the writer is a woman, in which case Strindberg generally regards her as 
physiologically infertile (‘with us the marriages of women who write usually 
distinguish themselves by their sterility’ (VR:101)), since she encroaches upon 
a male domain and so sows (or reaps) only disorder. ‘One ought not to demand 
of the artist, who gives, that he should become a woman – that he should 
receive’,72 Nietzsche remarks, in a summary of contemporary ideology, and, 
as Ekenvall continues, ‘for Strindberg active sexuality and mental curiosity 
become synonymous, become potency, a proof of masculinity, while in the 
same way sexual and mental passivity become specific female characteristics.’73 
Thus Strindberg appropriates the scriptor’s role in life and in literature, and 
boasts of ‘everything I have shaken out of my britches! although Sweden was 
stony ground! Novels and poetry, plays both good and bad, histories of Sweden 
and China, and four kids, a fifth on the way, and two wives’ (IX:372).
The claim is well founded. And yet Karl-Åke Kärnell is surely correct to 
argue that ‘on the intellectual and literary level, he assigns himself the dream 
role of the potent man, the vigorous procreator, which periodically at least he 
feared he could not manage in marital intercourse.’74 It is this which gives the 
edge to his insistence that Sweden’s hostility towards him depends upon its 
hatred of ‘fertility’ that Viktor Rydberg’s jealousy as a writer is ‘the unfruitful 
woman’s terrible envy and hatred of the fruitful’ (IX:372), and that publishers 
either demand he ‘writes chastely (castratedly)’ or insist on cuts, which is to 
‘remove my testicles’ (IV:240). For he wrote to convince his fatherland that 
he was potent, and he wanted every word to be published so that ‘sterile and 
sexless Sweden will see what a fecund spirit they hated because he was fecund 
and they were sterile (VI:297). 
Strindberg’s consolation is therefore that he ‘puts other people’s brains into 
molecular movement with my pen’ (IX:374), that he ‘recognizes (his) children’ 
in another writer’s book, or sends a theatre audience home ‘pregnant with my 
mind’s seed’ (X:130), and he readily conceives himself the father and author 
to other texts besides his own: ‘Strange that I should always be the Father 
who provides the spermatoza, fertilizes’ (XI:146). But in the cluster of images 
concerning suggestion, seeds of thought (tankefrö) and molecular movement 
in the sphere of the mind, which dominates his writing in this register, the 
tension between engulfment and self-preservation remains a factor, even when 
the discourse to which Strindberg commits himself is written and not spoken. 
For if Hedda Gabler delights him because it seems to bear the features of The 
Father and Creditors (thus he writes exultantly to Birger Mörner and claims 
paternity: ‘Observe how my seeds have fallen into Ibsen’s own brain pan – and 
sprouted! now he bears my semen and is my uterus!’ (VIII:205)), the process 
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could easily be reversed. On one occasion, his ‘mental life has received in its 
uterus a tremendous ejaculation of seed from Friedrich Nietzsche, so that I 
feel full like a bitch in my belly’ (VIII:112), and he is continually on guard 
against being cast in the woman’s role wherein he would become another 
man’s creation and so contravene what he regarded as ‘natural’ law. For 
woman is created by man (as The Lady in To Damascus is given a name by The 
Unknown): the man ‘fills her with his content and can find a good helpmate 
in this, his second self, which he has trained to be like himself (17:164), 
and the image of ‘the bitch’ with which Strindberg compares himself under 
impregnation from Nietzsche is otherwise evoked in situations of degenerate 
sexuality, in Miss Julie, where Diana forsakes her breeding and her chastity and 
anticipates her mistress by coupling with ‘the gatekeeper’s pug’ (23:120), or 
in the material from an unknown correspondent that contributed something 
to the conception of Creditors, and of which he remarks: ‘Anna’s character 
is interesting, a modern degenerate, who pays no heed to her stock but like 
a bitch, copulates with several’ (VII:29). Hence Strindberg is circumspect in 
his relationships: ‘Why don’t I write to him myself?’ he remarks to Edvard 
Brandes, of Georg: ‘Because I am afraid. Afraid of him as of all fertile spirits, 
afraid as I was of Zola, Björnson, Ibsen, of being made pregnant with their seed 
and giving birth to another’s progeny’ (VI:134). 
In the ‘Battle of the Brains’, which these passages delineate, each hears, in 
company, or in the presence of books, ‘human voices bearing words, which 
wanted to eat their way through his ears into his brain, shed their seeds, 
and then like weeds choke his own sowing and transform the field he had 
cultivated with so much effort into a natural meadow resembling all the others’ 
(24:77). Encouraged by the experiments of Charcot and Bernheim, and by 
an earlier tradition deriving from Mesmer and transmitted, in a form well 
known to Strindberg, by Hartmann, who claimed that ‘the fundamental 
phenomena of mesmerism, or animal magnetism, are at length looked upon 
as scientifically accredited,’75 Strindberg embraced the idea that people easily 
imprint themselves on one another. In A Madman’s Defence, Axel sees the 
features of the Danish woman embossed on Maria’s face (MD:246); in By 
the Open Sea, Borg interprets his Maria as a ‘chaos of past stages, these bits of 
roles which she had successively played in life, masses of shifting reflexes from 
men, whom she had tried to win and adapted herself to’ (24:114); and in later 
prose works, Strindberg assumes the Romantic-Realist tradition of Balzac, 
Hoffmann, and Dickens, in which a character’s inner feelings are imprinted 
upon his surroundings. Inanimate matter is endowed with life. It displays a 
person’s innermost thoughts, and bears legible traces of the past which under 
the informed, interpretative eye of the Narrator in The Roofing Feast or the 
compiler of A Blue Book, it also lays bare as a text in which to read the hidden 
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self. As the latter observes: ‘When a married man comes home from a ball 
with his wife, he ought to look at her handkerchief, which she has fingered the 
whole evening. Then he would doubtless see with whom she would most like 
to have danced’ (46:188). 
Where the relationship is one between man and woman, Strindberg’s ideas 
are often in keeping with those of other nineteenth-century writers. Michelet, 
for example, in L’Amour, held that ‘La femme fécondée une fois, imprégnée, 
portera partout son mari en elle. Voilà ce qui est démontré. Combien dure la 
première imprégnation? Dix ans? vingt ans? toute la vie? Ce qui est sur, c’est 
que la veuve a souvent du second mari des enfants semblables au premier.’76 
And prompted by Prosper Lucas’s Traité philosophique de l’ hérédité naturelle, 
both Zola and Daudet regarded woman as tied to her first lover by indissoluble 
physiological bonds. He imprinted on her an ineradicable trace which might 
be passed on even to the features of her children by other men: ‘Elle ne l’aima 
jamais avec passion; elle reçut plutôt son empreinte’, Zola writes, in Madeleine 
Férat, and again, ‘Lorsque Madeleine s’était oubliée dans les bras de Jacques, sa 
chair vierge avait pris l’empreient ineffaceable du jeune homme.’77 
When Strindberg sees in woman an empty vessel, a clean slate, or a vacant 
place awaiting the creative intervention of man (‘All the beauty we see in her’, 
Dr Borg remarks, in Gothic Rooms (40:299), ‘is only our own projections upon 
her white and empty screen’), his discourse is therefore not unduly singular. 
But it becomes more individual when, in the urgency of his desire to abrogate 
the scriptor’s role, he continually reveals himself alert to the way in which 
character is engraved, traced, or inscribed by one subject on another. What 
fascinates him, moreover, is not the traditional concept of a secure, indelible 
inwardness, but the possibility of many and various editions, scripts which 
can be erased and traces superimposed, one upon the other. People, in short, 
represent white pages, which the stronger covers with his style. ‘He really 
confirms the idea I share with the philosopher of a tabula rasa,’ the Narrator 
says, of his companion, in the story ‘The Battle of the Brains’, ‘and now, after 
he is newly washed, I feel a great desire to write in my handwriting on his 
tablet’ (22:140–1). Gustav, in Creditors, reminds Tekla of their first meeting 
when ‘you were a little, lovable child; a small slate on which your parents and 
your governess had scribbled a few lines which I had to scratch out. And then I 
wrote new texts, to my own liking, until you thought you were ready written’ 
(23:256–7), and the image recurs, years later, in To Damascus III, when the 
Tempter speaks of the wife from whom he has been parted as no longer the 
virgin surface he had once known but ‘another: she, my unblemished white 
sheet of paper was scribbled all over with scrawls; her beautiful, clear features 
were tuned in harmony with the satyr-like visages of strange men’ (29:327). 
In this instance the experience with which Strindberg is concerned reflects 
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conflicts in his marriage to Harriet Bosse, which are also charted in The Occult 
Diary and imaginatively explored in The Roofing Feast (44:49), but what he 
writes only confirms an earlier occasion when, in 1876, he wrote to Siri von 
Essen of his fear that Wrangel ‘will scrape out every word I wrote in your soul’ 
(I:350). 
Character is thus presented as a fluid coalescence of numerous texts, the 
product of many discourses, and Strindberg indicates that people become 
copies or transcripts of one another. They not only bear the ineradicable 
imprint of their society and age (Naturalism’s milieu and moment), and the 
genetic trace of their birth; they are also marked with the imprint of each 
other’s personalities, and his modernity is nowhere more apparent than in 
his perception of the complex intertextuality of identity. The self, he tirelessly 
affirms is compiled from many discourses, ‘a composite resumé of parents, 
educators, friends, books’ (18:436). But this has several implications for his 
autobiographical project. Firstly, common to the whole complex of imagery 
centred on tankefrö and the inscription of traces, there is a desire on Strindberg’s 
part to be his own source, the author of himself, and progenitor of his own life. 
And this project is in turn interfaced with the abiding anxiety regarding his 
own possible lack of identity, an anxiety which can only be dispelled by writing 
but which, paradoxically, the very act of writing reinforces and prolongs. 
The situation is intricate. In the first place, it is the white page which 
captivates Strindberg’s imagination. For without writing he is threatened by 
emptiness (tomheten) or vacuity (tomrummet), an emptiness which he repeatedly 
evokes, and into which he fears he might disappear. Superficially, the notion 
is commonplace, as when, in The Isle of the Dead, he revives (probably inspired 
by Locke’s image of the pre-mnemonic mind as a white paper, void of all 
characters, in Book Two of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding) the 
trope of memory as a book: ‘If for a moment you could lose your memory, 
you will become like a book with white pages, less than a newborn child, and 
would have to begin again!’78 This recalls the scene at the graveside of Struve’s 
child, in The Red Room, where 
Falk remained bent in thought over the grave and stared down into the 
depths; at first he saw only a square of darkness, but gradually a light 
speck emerged, which grew and took on a definite form. It was round and 
shining, white like a mirror. It was the uninscribed tablet on the young 
child’s coffin which shone through the darkness and reflected only the 
unbroken light of heaven. (5:255–6) 
What haunts him is the spectre of an unwritten character. He is afraid of leaving 
no real trace, of writing so faintly that, as he in fact implies in the account of 
a vanish acquaintance in A Blue Book (46:86–7), he would disappear, and it is 
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therefore he finds it so natural, in the vivisection, ‘Soul Murder’, to compare 
the suppression of a manuscript to murder, since ‘a blank space (tomrum) 
thereby arises in a writer’s soul’ (22:194). The missing text represents a lacuna 
through which the writer vanishes, and Strindberg’s angoisse before the empty 
page is thus not the common dread of being unable to write, but trepidation in 
the face of a surface that does not signify – or rather, signifies only too clearly 
an absence. The white page is in fact a void which the agoraphobic Strindberg 
must populate, and his writing obeys an impulse to people it with words, an 
impulse that is betrayed in the unlikely context of the historical tale, ‘At the 
Bier Side in Tistedalen’, where he contrasts the fertility of the writer with the 
impotent warrior king, Charles XII, who lived ‘in a perpetual aversion to 
providing his country with a successor to the throne’. As the doctor exclaims, 
over the dead king’s corpse: 
Imagine, this hand, which wielded the rapier so proudly, could not coax 
a light quill pen across a sheet of smooth paper… then the mechanism 
refused to obey, then it wavered and shook, as if he had got agoraphobia 
(torgsjuka) in the middle of the white field. Indeed, he said himself he got 
dizzy when he had to cross the sheet of paper. But it wasn’t only that; his 
thoughts, which ought to have marched forward in straight columns, 
tripped one another up, trampled on one another’s toes, and once when 
I read a letter to his sister, which he asked me to correct, the words lay 
there in long strips, tangled up as if one saw the whole muddle of his mind 
unwound… (12:383) 
In this episode of Strindberg’s long-running conflict with a figure whose role, 
throughout his career, approximates to that of a Yeatsian opposite, the pen is 
matched against the sword, and word against deed. But in the image of the king’s 
‘torgsjuka’, the text discloses a hidden identity between the two antagonists. 
For in both The Son of a Servant (18:316) and ‘Deranged Sensations’ (27:601), 
as well as by implication in the story, ‘Short Cuts’, Strindberg describes his 
own agoraphobia. Here, however, he attributes the condition to his opponent, 
so asserting once more the supremacy of the new aristocracy of the pen and 
nerves over the appearance of manliness decked out in the uniform of tradition. 
As such the passage resumes hostilities in a conflict that has been fought on 
this ground in, for example, The New Kingdom and A Madman’s Defence.’79 
More immediately, however, it maintains that character is clearly written as 
characters by those courageous enough to traverse ‘the white field’ of paper 
which, to be sure, is readily turned by Strindberg’s pen into a field of battle. 
Rather than establish a character which is single and indivisible, however, 
writing fosters multiplicity. If in general ‘the danger of a long life is that the 
many roles begin to get muddled up, like an actor’s wigs and costumes when 
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he moves’ (47:681), then the writer’s life, with its multitude of assumed or 
invented roles which provide ‘reincarnations already here [on earth]’ (46:113), 
is especially vulnerable to the dispersal of identity. The danger is illustrated by 
Alrik Lundstedt’s delight in metaphor, which transforms him into a Gyntian 
metamorphoser, a man in constant danger of fatally displacing himself, while 
the figure of Askanius, in the late novel, The Scapegoat, who ‘shed his skin, and 
changed his character and face every ten minutes’ (44:183), portrays the artist 
as a protean but anonymous creature who, in spite of a compulsion to confess 
himself (44:119), remains ultimately unknown and unknowable.80 
Strindberg is in fact continually aware of the Keatsian paradox in which 
it is lack of identity that characterizes the poet. But unlike Keats, who could 
appreciate that ‘the poetic Character… has no self ’, and accept that ‘Not 
one word I ever utter can be taken for granted as an opinion growing out of 
my identical nature’,81 Strindberg found this possibility the cause of endless 
misgivings. Although he was sometimes able to transform the fact ‘that the 
poet’s life was a shadow life, that he had no self, but only lived in other selves’ 
into yet another instance of his own fertility (‘But is it so certain that the 
poet lacks a self because he does not have only one? Perhaps he is richer, and 
possesses more than the others’ (18:436)), he was more inclined to regard his 
situation as a kind of sleepwalking in which he could easily mislay himself: 
‘It seems to me as if I am walking in my sleep; as if poetry and life had got 
mixed up… Through so much writing my life has become a shadow life; it 
seems to me I no longer walk on earth but am suspended weightlessly in an 
atmosphere not of air but of darkness’ (VI:298). Condemned by the practice 
of writing to address himself to an absent (or an imaginary) interlocutor, the 
indirectness of the mediation to which he entrusts himself causes Strindberg 
to slip into a world of hallucination where he is disembodied and overwhelmed 
by a dreamlike sense of unreality. Thus, in those moments when, as it were, 
he comes to himself, he doubts his identity. In one of the many notes for the 
short fable, ‘Jubal Without a Self ’ (38:93–101), whose significance it is easy 
to overlook, unless its provisional title, ‘Johan Without a Self ’, is recalled, he 
observes how ‘Those who change their names, lose themselves’, and in another, 
he once again speculates on the consequences of a life-time of role playing: 
‘The man who denies his identity and is thereby punished by losing himself.’82 
Moreover, in so far as Zachris, in Black Banners, embodies Strindberg’s own 
deeply-rooted feelings of guilt about the parasitic nature of his writing, it 
is precisely in a lack of identity that the writer’s role playing, or facility at 
identification, is located. Zachris, ‘a selfless jelly, an unorganised matter that 
lived like a truffle on the roots of others’ (41:211), ‘had an enormous emptiness 
(tomrum) to fill and his impressionability was unbounded. He ate people, ate 
up their accomplishments, fed upon their private means, and possessed the 
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ability to enter other lives… so that he confused his person with other people’ 
(41:48). 
To confuse oneself with another, however, is the destiny from which 
autobiographical discourse is employed to secure the subject. It is to become 
another’s shadow, whereas the autobiographer wishes to relate his own story, 
in his own language. Indeed, confronted by the common patrimony of the 
language into which they are forced to translate themselves when they present 
themselves to another, autobiographers frequently speculate on the possibility 
of a means of utterance that is uniquely their own. Thus Rousseau recognizes 
the need for ‘un langage aussi nouveau que mon projet’,83 and his role as the 
model autobiographer is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in this desire 
to secede from common discourse and inaugurate his own. What he has to 
communicate is so singular that even to instate himself within the common 
vulgate by means of a radical, particular choice of vocabulary and syntax (the 
style with which he leaves his signature upon the corpus of language), appears 
too shallow a gesture. He does not want an ideolect, but his own unrepeatable 
language. 
But this vision of discovering what another copious autobiographer, Ivar 
Lo- Johansson, calls ‘the only right words’,84 the conclusive words which body 
forth ‘that full utterance which through all our stammerings is of course our 
only and abiding intention’,85 founders upon one of the fundamental principles 
of post -Saussurian thought, namely that ‘La propriété privée, dans le domaine 
du langage, ça n’existe pas.’86 The language in which the autobiographer seeks 
to convey himself not only precedes him; it is also held in common with other 
individuals, a shared circuit of exchange in which the newcomer finds the 
available words already inhabited. As Mikhail Bakhtin describes it
When each member of a collective of speakers takes possession of a 
word, it is not a neutral word of language, free from the aspirations and 
valuations of others, uninhabited by foreign voices.… The word arrives in 
his context from another context which is saturated with other people’s 
interpretations. His own thought finds the word already inhabited.… 
When one’s own personal ‘final’ word does not exist then every creative 
plan, every thought, feeling and experience must be refracted through 
the medium of another person’s word, style and manner, with which it is 
impossible to directly merge without reservation, distance and refraction.87
But if the language at the autobiographer’s disposal is embedded in the 
conventions of his time, is beset by the contingent emphasis of the moment, 
and permeated by the social and intellectual inferences of the age, it is also 
by composing himself in words and behaving as if the lacunary nature of 
consciousness were an uninterrupted, reclaimable flow, that he is compelled 
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to wonder at his own reality. For in the continual search for self-definition, he 
seems regularly to disappear into the text of which he is nominally the master, 
where he becomes not transparent but a property of the language in which he 
inscribes himself. As the intimate, lived experience passes into language, it is 
mediated by the interrelationship between the signifiers, which come in time 
to stand for the experience itself. As language displaces the past and person it 
is employed to represent (and the notion of presence is ironically evoked by the 
faculty of language as representation, the fabrication of a copy that replaces 
the original), it establishes a metaphorical narrative that secretes and accretes 
meanings which surpass and undermine the intention of the author and 
elaborate a narrative framework that subsumes the particles of autobiographical 
fact implanted in it. Private experience enters the domain of language and then 
the formal contract of literary genre, where it is enhanced with conceptual 
figures and stylistic devices, and becomes an item in the institution of literature, 
in Strindberg’s case, a material deposit of late nineteenth-century social, 
intellectual, and literary history, which contributes in turn to the production 
of other discourses, both autobiographical and critical. It is the signifier which 
moves into the foreground; the empirical facts of the life are transformed into 
artifacts; sequence is endowed with meaning and condensed into design, and 
the truth or falsehood of the material, so challenging a question for earlier 
discussions of the genre, becomes very much a secondary matter once Freud 
establishes that what is spoken or written and not what might have happened, 
is what matters. The act of stripping oneself naked in public therefore remains 
what it has always been, a metaphor, and the autobiographer remains, for all his 
effort, behind the discourse he leaves after him. The author, indeed, becomes 
a figure of the text. 
If, therefore, the defining words continue to elude him (if he remains, as 
Beckett suggests, ‘unnamable’), then this search for an appropriate language 
transforms the autobiographer into a kind of language machine, compelled 
to produce ever more words on his own behalf as each verbal account, 
having proved itself incomplete, leaves him still ‘The Unknown’ or ‘Not I’. 
The autobiographer’s dilemma is indeed an intricate one. If his purpose is 
to return to his origins and establish identity by uncovering the continuity 
of his personality over the passage of a significant period of time, then he is 
committed to narrative. For it is by means of narrative that the individual 
establishes a relationship with the world, which helps him to recover coherence 
in the face of evanesence, subdue contingency by revealing a hidden causality 
or pattern, and create the image of self-identity through time that enables him 
to act. Life can only be recuperated as a plot and a spectacle, as a story which 
the individual claims for his own, and in which he establishes himself as the 
other whom he observes making his way through the confusion and accidents 
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of the past towards the present. This is the process which has been so finely 
described by Freud in his analysis of ‘Screen Memories’, where he elaborates the 
essential distinction between the acting and the recollecting self: 
In the majority of significant and in other respects unimpeachable 
childhood scenes the subject sees himself in the recollection as a child, 
with the knowledge that this child is himself: he sees this child, however, 
as an observer from outside the scene would see him… Now it is evident 
that such a picture cannot be an exact repetition of the impression that 
was originally received. For the subject was then in the middle of the 
situation and was attending not to himself but to the external world.88 
But in spite of the inevitable rupture between the recollected and the recollecting 
subject, it is by the imaginative process of story-telling, in the enchainment of 
the text, that the autobiographer shapes his life. In fact Rousseau dates the 
unbroken consciousness of himself from his earliest reading, and in Mme la 
Tribu’s lending library he discovered other exemplary plots by means of which 
he could create a kind of specular image of himself through identification and 
reverie, and Ivar Lo-Johansson, too, records the transition from a time when 
memories were not yet enchained, and the past had not become a narrative 
composition, to a more consciously structured existence when he ‘began as 
though playing with building blocks to fabricate with the aid of my memory 
connections between events which I had not even bothered about before… I 
consciously ‘invented’ people and occurrences, and I made a kind of poetry or 
sketches out of them.’89
The autobiographer is therefore confined to a life in language, according 
to criteria which are often sustained by the conventions of the alternative, 
dominant genre, the novel, where language also fabricates a person, and 
narrative condenses a life into a destiny. And as Lacan writes, of the analogous 
discourse of the patient in analysis, by recounting a past event ‘he has made 
it pass into the verbe, or more precisely, into the epos by which he brings back 
into present time the origins of his own person. And he does this in a language 
which allows his discourse to be understood by his contemporaries, and which 
furthermore presupposes their present discourse.’90 Thus, while the language 
in which the autobiographer composes his narrative allows him a point of 
purchase which permits him to locate himself, either by assuming a personal 
pronoun which is open to everyone (and which, as Francis Hart has pointed 
out, is chosen to perform the structural role in the narrative for which it is 
variously designed)91, or as a proper name, which ‘guarantees the unity of our 
multiplicity [and] federates our complexity of the moment and our changes 
in time,’92 each entry into what Lacan has termed the symbolic order, where 
the subject attempts to situate himself, represents an inevitable surrender to 
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the vast, supra-personal archives of the word and a rupture of the self-narrator 
along the lines described by Freud in ‘screen Memories’, but now inscribed in 
his use of language. 
Even the image which the writer conceives of himself, therefore, becomes 
to some extent a misprision, differ in only in scale to the misconceptions 
conceived of Rousseau and Strindberg in the paradigmatic scene of their 
respective autobiographies. For the ‘I’ who writes is both the subject of the 
discourse and the personal, historical object of his own verb, at once present 
and absent in the ‘I was’, where he is another. He is always represented by a 
stand in (his appearances, as the Unnamable remarks, in Beckett’s novel, ‘must 
have been put in by other parties’)93 and as Bakhtin observes: 
Even if he is the author of an autobiography, or of the most truthful of 
confessions, the writer nevertheless remains, as their creator, outside the 
world depicted in them. If I tell of (or write about) an event which has 
just happened to me, I, as the teller (or writer) of this event, am already 
outside that time-space in which this event has occurred. It is impossible 
to identify absolutely myself, my ‘I’, with that ‘I’ of which I am telling as 
it is to lift myself up by the hair.94
Since the self is only constituted in language (and thus, when written, requires 
the attention of a reader to re-animate it, as Lacan’s many suggestions that the 
signifier is that which represents the subject for another signifier insistently 
imply),95 it is a verbal construction essentially different from the events it 
recovers, as St Augustine was already aware: ‘with regard to the past, when this 
is reported correctly what is brought out from the memory is not the events 
themselves (these are already past) but words conceived from the images of 
those events.’96 Autobiography is therefore not something that exists in the 
past, awaiting narration. It is the story told, structured, and organized with all 
the devices of literature, and what it does not accomplish is the denuding of 
the self held out by the illusory promise of a unique, full language. It remains 
a reflection, the site of a temporal and logical organisation by which the writer 
produces, from the dialectic of his narcissistic identifications with the external 
views of himself in which he fears capture, an opaque image which, for the 
moment, he imagines to be true. 
These are factors in writing the autobiographical discourse of the self which 
become increasingly prominent the further Strindberg proceeds with his 
project. Although initially he avoids the first person and its enticing promise 
of identity, the better to analyse himself in the spatial and temporal distance 
afforded both by the third person and by the mantle of a name (his forename, 
Johan, and the significant act of nomination in which he christens himself 
‘The Son of a Servant’, and thereby assumes a destiny on the plane of myth), 
Writing, not Speaking90
he is not unaware of the way in which he becomes a creature of the text, that 
he is in fact engaged in an inexhaustible cycle of attempts to capture the self. 
Indeed, he could find in one of his mentors, Ribot, a precise statement of 
the contradictory nature of his undertaking: ‘le vrai moi est celui qui sent, 
pense, agit, sans se donner en spectacle à lui-même; car, il est par nature, par 
définition, un sujet; et pour devenit un objet, il lui faut subir une réduction, une 
adaptation à l’optique mentale qui le transforme et le mutile.’97 The individual’s 
conception of himself was, Strindberg knew, an abstraction, a specular image 
which gave back the contour of whatever technique is used to capture it 
(‘Where does the self begin, and where does it end?’ he asks, in Jardin des 
plantes, ‘Is the eye adapted to the sun? Or does the eye create the phenomenon 
called the sun?’ (27:354)). Notwithstanding the implied consent to prevailing 
nineteenth-century notions of character growth and development, which the 
basic linearity of the narrative method in the first volumes of ‘the history of 
a soul’s development’ (en själs utvecklingshistoria) would seem to sustain, it 
therefore becomes clear that Johan is not encompassed by any of the images 
presented of him, and that the promise implicit in this narrative mode, that 
eventually the subject will be seen to have become himself, that with the turn 
of the page he will suddenly come into sight, will not be honoured. ‘The self is 
not any one thing; it is a conglomeration of reflexes, a complex of instincts and 
desires which are alternately suppressed and unleashed’ (18:218), he concludes, 
at the end of the first volume, and when he finishes the fourth, he is no closer 
to a final statement. He had embarked upon the autobiography because he 
found, when looking at himself, only ‘a motley jumble which lacks substance, 
which changes its form according to the observer’s point of view and which has 
perhaps no more reality than the rainbow, which is there to be seen, but which 
doesn’t exist’ (19:277). Now, having brought the enterprise to the moment of 
writing a conclusion, he can only gesture towards the words themselves as the 
problematic and by no means final version of himself: 
Where does the truth for which he was seeking lie? It lies here and there 
in the thousand printed pages; look them up, collect them, and see if 
they can be summarized, see if they are valid for longer than a year, five 
years, consider if they have a chance of being so, when that requires their 
receiving general acceptance. And do not forget that the truth cannot be 
found, since it is always in the process of continual development. (19:278) 
‘Development’ (utveckling) thus becomes the negation of the being he set out 
to find. The ‘true’ self, he discovers, is no fixed image but a set of tensions, 
mutations, dialectical oppositions, which take up the discursive formations 
or determinacies that impinge upon the individual and make of him a 
complex montage of ideas, feelings, attitudes, gestures, misconceptions, and 
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which cannot be conveyed as a single, evolving trace, however copious and 
circumstantial, but as the product of many traces which cover and recover 
one another, as in the engraved complexity of the design upon the vase from 
Benares, whose surface of interlacing lines and intricate patterning provides 
him during the experimental re-exploration of the past in which he engaged 
during the Inferno period, with a more sinuous and elaborate model for the 
record of the self he resolutely continued to pursue.

Chapter Four 
Plot and Counter Plot,  
or Reading and Composing the Text of the Self
Life is that which comes already constituted in literary language.   
– Roland Barthes 
My life has always tended to take the shape of novels…  
– Strindberg to Hedlund
I
In her analysis of the way in which the modern critical notion of intertextuality 
has supplanted the concept of intersubjectivity, Julia Kristeva observes that 
‘tout texte se construit comme mosaique de citations, tout texte est absorption 
et transformation d’un autre texte.’1 Each new work invites interpretation 
through its relation to other texts, which provide codes and conventions with 
which it can be read by a subjectivity which is in Roland Barthes’ provocative 
description ‘déjà lui -même une pluralité d’autres textes, de codes infinis, ou 
plus exactement: perdus (dont l’origine se perd).’2 Moreover, even the most 
personal utterance reaches the receiver as a cultural as well as an expressive 
inheritance. Not only the language at an author’s disposal, but the forms 
to which he succeeds and the contemporary discourses through which he 
interprets and renders his lived relation to the world, the discourses that is, 
which constitute the system of intelligibility in his text, are suprapersonal. The 
text produced can therefore be apprehended in its interplay with other texts, 
both literary and non-literary, rather than by its reduction to a private and 
personal utterance that recedes into an author’s subjectivity, a subjectivity that 
is in any case largely composed of a montage of ideas, attitudes, and emotions 
which the writer has in common with his society, his class, and his profession. 
In relation to the writing of autobiography, where the writer’s life is itself 
a text to be read, interpreted, and re-written, these ideas assume a particular 
resonance, for it is in the transcription of the discursive formations and 
determinacies that have ‘written’ the life of the autobiographical subject into 
the text of the autobiographer that this general intertextuality becomes most 
palpable. The narrated life encompasses both a text to be read by the writer in 
the profusion of data accumulating in his wake, and the production of a more 
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specific reading of other texts, first by the writer who decodes the patterns 
whereby the past becomes readable according to the available modes of insight 
and representation, and then by the reader, who brings his own experience 
of other texts to bear on recreating the relative stability of the writer’s self-
projection as it is assembled and takes shape in the figures of the text.
Indeed, Strindberg frequently drew attention to the way in which the self is 
composed of a plurality of texts, of how identity is produced by a multiplicity 
of competing and complementary discourses. In The Red Room characters are 
already described as an amalgam of ‘ragged scraps’ (traslappar – 5:236), an 
image that is developed in a self-analytical letter to Bjørnson in 1884, where 
Strindberg inventories his own ‘ancient rats’ nest of a soul, where scraps of 
old Christianity, shreds of art-worshipping paganism, shavings of pessimism, 
splinters of general world contempt lie jumbled together’ (IV:144),3 and with 
the writing of The Son of a Servant he discerns, in what in The Roofing Feast he 
will call ‘this patchwork canvas of upbringing, textbooks, people, newspapers’ 
(44:79), the script of a written corpus in which the self appears to be a veritable 
mosaic of quotations from a multitude of familiar and unfamiliar sources. Like 
Miss Julie and the other major characters, who are ‘conglomerations of past 
and present cultures, scraps from books and newspapers, fragments of people, 
torn scraps of fine clothing that has become rags, in just the same way that the 
soul is patched together’ (23:104), Johan is the formation of what in the The 
Occult Diary and Inferno Strindberg comes to portray as literally the currents 
that flow through him. A site traversed by forces and events rather than an 
individuated essence, he emerges as ‘a patchwork’ encompassing ‘a quadroon of 
romanticism, pietism, realism and naturalism’ (18:92), and just as Strindberg’s 
evolutionary methodology encourages him to regard every individual as ‘a 
geological record of all the stages of development through which his ancestors 
had passed’ (19:46), which means that Johan bears the phylogenetic traces of 
his European past, of Arian ideas of caste, Christian asceticism, Renaissance 
hedonism, and an enlightened scepticism, so his ontogenetic history reveals 
him to be the offprint of his ‘blood inheritance, temperament, position in 
society’ (19:189), that is to say, as a contemporary article bearing the unique 
signature of a particular childhood. He is the legatee of a personal inheritance, 
but an inheritance that is also fostered by the public discourses, religious, social, 
scientific, philosophical, and artistic, of the period in which he lives, both as 
they contribute to his formation and as they provide the codes and conventions 
which establish the parameters within which his life may be represented in 
an autobiography. For as Michael Sprinker has pointed out, the written self is 
primarily ‘the articulation of an intersubjectivity structured within and around 
the discourses available to it at any moment in time.’4 
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Since an autobiography is itself an event in the life it relates, a distinction 
between the way in which contemporary discourses inform the life related 
and their role in the method of its relation is difficult to maintain. In The 
Son of a Servant, Johan is, as the Narrator observes, ‘a mirror which reflected 
every ray that struck it’ (18:127). Consequently, any comprehensive account 
of this ‘history of a soul’s development 1849–67’ requires not only evidence 
of his ‘inheritance from his mother, father and wet nurse; the situation during 
pregnancy; the economic circumstances of the family; the attitudes and beliefs 
of his parents; the nature of his acquaintances, his school and teachers, his 
friends, his brothers and sisters, and household servants and so on’ (18:452), as 
the Author acknowledges in the preface, but also of his encounters with specific 
and dispersed currents of nineteenth-century intellectual and political history, 
as is indeed the case in the later volumes, where Johan reflects in turn the 
rays emitted by Byron and Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, 
Darwin and Spencer, Rousseau and Marx, as well as the more diffuse but 
no less penetrating light cast upon him by Pietism, Socialism, or Naturalism. 
Like many autobiographies from Vico’s Autobiografia onwards, a large part 
of The Son of a Servant is a text about texts, a book that traces and examines 
the origins of its own discourse in the discourses of other writers, and hence 
emphasizes the paradoxical lack of originality in the unique life of its subject. 
The text would, he told Bonnier, include ‘the story of the origin of all my works, 
including commentaries on the circumstances in which they were written, 
their milieux, the ideas behind them, and their execution’ (VI:18). Thus it also 
includes an account of the works that generated the discursive practice now 
known as ‘Strindbergian’. But as the narrative converges upon the present of 
its narration, it becomes evident that these formative influences also constitute 
the same texts which the autobiographer has at his disposal to contrive the 
reconstruction of his life. It is by their light that he reads and writes his life; as 
he informs Bonnier once again: ‘I have simply taken the corpse of the person I 
know best, and made readings in anatomy, physiology, psychology, history on 
the carcass’ (V:344). 
Moreover, in the projections which the individual writers make available, 
and especially in the scripts to be discovered in Myth, Literature, History, 
Psychology, Religion, and Superstition, Strindberg has access to an abundance 
of blue-prints for his own recovery. Literary or other models, which facilitate 
the perception and creation of character, offer a multiplicity of parts in 
which to find himself as the appropriate hero of a Case History (‘after having 
read Maudsley’s Maladies de l’Esprit I have a complete diagnosis of myself ’ 
(V:333), he writes enthusiastically, in 1886) of a Bildungsroman, a Drama of 
Redemption, or as the agent (or victim) of Nemesis. Even single words such as 
‘calling’, ‘sacrifice’, or ‘suffering’ function as metaphorical projections that help 
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him to organize his experience within a narrative framework that lends purpose 
and consequence to the succession of his acts, and from his conception within 
the defining ideology of the patriarchal family, which imprints upon him the 
lineaments of his own family romance, and which he later acknowledges is a 
plot that went awry (‘I was born for family life and a mate – and look what 
happened’, he notes in the diary, 6 September 1901), to the Pietist text which 
promises him the chance of being born again, to Kierkegaard’s dialectical 
notion of ‘Stages on Life’s Way’, to the history countenanced by current 
evolutionary theory, and finally in the destiny implicit in the eschatology of 
Swedenborg and the infernal topographies of other authors (for to ascertain 
where one is may establish a narrative system, incorporating notions of guilt 
and atonement, and suffering and punishment, which extends not only 
to the facts of his own life but to the lives of those among whom he lives), 
Strindberg has on hand a series of more copious intellectual paradigms. They 
offer elementary modes of coherence, cultural models that form part of his 
birthright and endow him with a number of a priori plots by means of which 
he can examine the data of his experience under a series of titles (‘The Son 
of a Servant’,’ Inferno’, ‘To Damascus’) that already possess the ability to 
intend what follows. Determined to discover ‘the whole equation in which 
my life can be solved’ (XII:324), he tries on different views and vocabularies, 
and experiments with diverse ways of seeing, an approach for which he finds 
authority and a terminology in Kierkegaard, but which is fostered by his own 
questing temperament. He constantly betrays a tendency to see his life as a 
journey, and to interpret it in terms of stages, phases, or epochs. ‘Thanks for 
good company on this stretch of the way, and be happy if you can’ (VII:92) is 
his leave -taking from the poet, Verner von Heidenstam, one in a succession of 
correspondents in whom he confides his progress, for he is embarking upon ‘new 
phases of my fragmentary life’ (VII:72), ‘new stages on life’s way’ (VII:108) and 
will now be travelling in different company. Meanwhile, many years later, in a 
remark that also conveys his conviction that the writer must have experienced 
all of life in order to portray it, he explains to his translator, Schering, that 
he is ‘nur ein Dichter der sein Pilgerfart durch alle Stationen Menschlicher 
Entwickelung lebe um Menschen schildern zu können!’ (XIII:262). And 
it is in this context that he regards himself as a ‘scrupulous researcher’ who 
undertakes ‘experiments’ (40:45) in which he uses his own life as the field of 
his research. ‘I want to test everything, but not to retain it all’ (X:154), he tells 
Hedlund in 1894, and like Voltaire, whom he praises because he ‘experimented 
poetically with every problem’ (17:277), he sees writing as an opportunity to 
examine and project different points of view. ‘After having experimented my 
way through socialism’ (VI:162), he adopts the aristocratic radicalism which 
he associates with Nietzsche (‘I intend to experiment poetically with it for ten 
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years’ (VIII:32) he tells a correspondent in 1890), ultimately abandons his 
atheism as ‘an intellectual experiment which promptly failed’ (XII:324), and 
then recommends his readers to ‘Leave your own self, if you have the strength, 
and adopt the point of view of a believer; pretend that you believe, and then 
test that belief to see if it corresponds with your experiences’ (46:21). 
Moreover, whereas he often claims that ‘the contradictions in my writing 
are a result of my having adopted different points of view in order to be able 
to see the question from many sides’ (VII:92), he also stresses the historical 
relativity of truth, ‘of truth as something in the process of eternal development’ 
(19:28), from the application of his enthusiastic early reading of T. H. Buckle’s 
History of Civilisation in England, in Master Olof, to the Hegelian account of 
Pater Uriel’s life in To Damascus III. Thus he notes that an author’s career 
ought to be responsive to the pressures of his time, a whole of several aspects: 
‘A writer should be an adequate expression of his age; if he lives in – through 
– several epochs he will have several physiognomies.’5 Hence any coherence 
in the material he collects and analyses depends upon the model with 
which he is currently working, and upon ‘the desire for order of the mental 
apparatus’ (19:180), and either in their most extended form, as the projection 
of a comprehensive destiny indited by Nemesis, or the laws of Nature, or the 
hand of God, or only as mere taxonomies of order, such as he discovers in the 
Tarot pack or the Kabbala,6 each positional reading that this tireless observer 
and indefatigable interpreter makes of his career derives its authority from 
the text against which it is being read. Indeed, the bibliomancy to which he 
sometimes resorts, particularly after 1895, is ultimately only a specific mode 
of his characteristic search for textual authority, one that will reveal (or so 
he hopes) the definitive plot of his life. ‘Read Isaiah Chapter 54, opened at 
random, which seemed as if it had been written especially for me’ (XI:274), he 
confides to Hedlund. In what he reads he finds himself and his destiny: as he 
frequently remarks, of his experience: ‘it was written’ (XII:135).7 
But if the assumption behind much of his later writing (namely that ‘in old 
age, when the eye can finally see, one discovers that all the little curlicues form 
a design, a monogram, an ornament, an hieroglyph, which one can now read 
for the first time: this is [your] life’ (45:97)), is no tone in which Strindberg has 
sufficient confidence in practice to withstand the temptation of continually 
supplementing his earlier accounts, it nevertheless remains possible to perceive 
in this succession of superimposed images the legend of their author. For 
underlying all the attempts to revitalize his life is the power of narrative to 
animate the past in the present of the reader. The paradoxical nature of this 
reversal is suggested by Sartre in La Nausée, where the biographer and historian 
Roquentin defines living as ‘une addition interminable et monotone’.8 In life, he 
argues, days are tacked on to days in a succession without point or purpose, as 
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a brute accumulation of accident and circumstance. Occasionally, a particular 
event or the sense that one phase of life has ended may encourage the subject 
to interrupt the onward flow, to pause in order to estimate his position and 
take a temporary reading of the situation. But it is only the extended practice 
of narrative that transforms duration into orientated and meaningful time 
and endows life with a sensible coherence. According to Roquentin, narrative 
is a universal characteristic of man: ‘un homme, c’est toujours un conteur 
d’histoires, il vit entouré de ses histoires et des histoires d’autrui, il voit tout ce 
qui lui arrive à travers elles; et il cherche à vivre sa vie comme s’il la racontait.’9 
But the writer, with his professional awareness of the available plots and the 
devices and subtleties of storytelling, is particularly adept both at finding 
himself and his destiny already described in the pages of literature and myth, 
and of seeing his life in terms of writing at the moment of experience, as well 
as in retrospect. 
That literature, and novels in particular, contribute substantially to the way 
in which life is understood (or, Cervantes and Flaubert might argue, how it 
is readily misunderstood) is a point that has recently been made with great 
eloquence by Philippe Sollers: 
LA ROMAN EST LA MANIERE DONT CETTE SOCIETE SE 
PARLE; la manière dont l’individu DOIT SE VIVRE pour y être accepte 
… Notre identité en dépend, ce qu’on pense de nous, ce que no us pensons 
de nous-mêmes, la façon dont notre vie est insensiblement amenée à 
composition. Qui reconnaît-on en nous sinon un personage de roman? 
(Qui reconnaissez-vous en moi qui vous parle sinon un personnage de 
roman?) … Le roman, avec le mutisme de la science, est la valeur de notre 
époque, autrement dit son code de référence instinctif, l’exercice de son 
pouvoir, la clef de son inconscience quotidienne, mécanique, fermée.10 
Through novels the individual can discover something of the complexity 
and multiplicity of life, may recognize himself and his contemporaries, and 
find the technical means to frame and articulate his own story. But more 
specifically: in the nineteenth century the conception of the world as a network 
of signatures, as what Strindberg once called a ‘cryptographie céleste’ (27:436) 
in the handwriting of God, had been largely superceded by a world in print, a 
world, moreover, that was rendered visible and made comprehensible through 
the very novels which helped produce the situation to which Sollers refers. If 
the realistic novel in general aspired to the accurate reproduction of the world it 
frequently claimed to mirror, both Balzac, in Illusions perdues, and Strindberg, 
in Black Banners and The Red Room, depicted the manner of its writing, the 
way in which works were transformed into products and personal experience 
immediately written up in literary form. And even after he had returned to 
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the belief ‘that the whole of creation is planned and sometimes expressed in a 
kind of code’ (46:272) which is visible in nature, Strindberg not only retained 
the view advanced in the Foreword to The Son of a Servant, that all notions 
of the other are fictional in so far as ‘character only exists as representations 
of other people’, and hence requires the same combination of deduction and 
imaginative speculation that gives life to characters in literature, but also 
continued to approach his own experience in terms of fiction and drama since 
they, too, are a major source of information about his own life. For his stance is 
continually interrogative (‘I still ask: how the hell did I get here? And what am 
I doing here?’ (XI:313)) and literature the ground upon which he prosecutes his 
inquiry. ‘What’s behind all this?’ he wonders, in a letter to Pehr Staaff during 
his eventful stay on the Frankenau estate at Skovlyst in 1888. ‘I don’t know, 
but I will try to sort it out in a novel’ (VII:131). Moreover, having translated his 
perplexity into a text (in this instance the story ‘Tschandala’), the implication 
is that he can then interpret the meaning of his experience, although (as an 
entry in The Occult Diary for 7 May 1904 indicates) the intelligence the text 
communicates is not always entirely clear: ‘Have read Inferno and Legends 
again in a reverent frame of mind, but I still don’t understand the intentions 
of Providence – if we are to suffer in order to learn or if we are to be punished 
and frightened off’. 
A persistent problem, therefore, and not only in the period after 1895, 
when its solution is pursued more urgently, is to what extent he figures in an 
already prepared script composed by God or by Nemesis, or whether (if it is 
not merely an accumulation of events amassed by chance) he is the author of 
his own life. Regarding his contemporaries, it sometimes seems to him as if 
‘there was a consequence and an order in their lives’ (37:60) whereas it is only 
by writing that he can achieve’ an impression of an intended design’ (38: 192) 
in his own. Occasionally, his reading reveals his life already accommodated 
by a pre-existing plot. He finds himself and his second wife, Frida, in the 
text of Louis Lambert, for example (‘das Buch ist für mich und Frida-Mama 
geschrieben, oder von uns Beide’ (XII:28) he tells their daughter), and again in 
Bulwer-Lytton’s novel, Zanoni: 
Lese jetzt Bulwers Zanoni! mit Entsetzen! Alles is da: Ich, Frida, Mädi. 
Und noch: der Dämon verfolgt den Armen Zanoni (eine Reincarnation) 
jede Moment wenn Er sich aus der Materie heben will und in der 
Einsamkeit sich in frommen Gedanken versenkt. Geht Er aber in 
lustigem Gesellschaft, da flieht der Dämon! So genau me in Fall! 
Und Zanoni hat ein ockultes Kind, der ihn immer anschauet mit ihren 
grossen ruhigen Augen. Und ihre Mama flieht den Zanoni aus Furcht fur 
‘das Unbekannte’ in seiner Person. Er ist Rosenkreutzer, macht Gold, 
ist zwei tausen Jahre ‘jung’, kann nicht sterben weil er die Lebens-elixir 
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getrunken! Er sucht immer seine Viola, und die flieht obschon Sie ihn 
liebt! Les’ mir das Buch! 
Fillide (Aspasia) ist auch da! (XII:80) 
Usually, however, he is the plotter of his own destiny and can sometimes be 
observed creating a situation in his life that conforms to his current standpoint 
on, for example, the nature of woman, her rights, and the institution of 
marriage, and then (as in A Madman’s Defence) reproducing the text he has 
prompted in a book. 
Moreover, once a text is written life expectantly follows the course it 
predicates. This is particularly the case with the interaction between certain 
plays and the autobiographical works which they follow or precede, until in 
the mind of the author, as in the eyes of the reader or spectator, any clear 
distinction between invention and a record of events, is erased. For as an 
enlightened reviewer of The Father commented in the satirical journal Figaro 
shortly after the play appeared in 1888, for its author, reality was one with the 
construction of his imagination: 
Nevertheless the book certainly makes a gripping if not very satisfying and 
hardly truthful impression. Although we feel that the writer has curiously 
enough experienced or, it is perhaps more correct to say, believed he has 
experienced what he has portrayed. Although – even stranger – he seems 
first to have portrayed it and then believed he has found its image in 
reality.11
Strindberg, the reviewer observed, had difficulty determining whether life or 
literature took precedence, a problem which his own comments on the play 
in the testimentary letter to Lundegård reveal, and a detailed analysis of the 
rapid succession of naturalist works during this period would indicate how The 
Father elaborates upon its author’s ‘personal circumstances’ (VI:141) and then, 
once written, constitutes an image of the past that superimposes itself upon 
the present and influences the distribution of roles in subsequent works, the 
wife he portrays in A Madman’s Defence, for example, being a refraction of the 
image of Laura, and of Berthe in Comrades. 
Similarly, the confusion of categories to which Figaro’s reviewer alludes 
becomes especially acute with Harriet Bosse’s almost simultaneous assumption 
of the role of The Lady in To Damascus on stage and, by marriage, in its author’s 
life. The situation is full of intrigue. Harriet enters a dramatic text in which 
she repeats lines that evoke, on one level, the period of Strindberg’s second 
marriage to Frida Uhl. But the events which this text encompasses were, as 
Frida Uhl herself observed, themselves adapted from a previous script. In her 
memoirs she recalls how her life with Strindberg seemed to follow an already 
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developed scenario in which (and the prohibition which he placed on each of 
his wives regarding their reading his books, from the fourth volume of The 
Son of a Servant onwards (VI:103), suggests that he was not unaware of the 
predictive, anticipatory nature of certain texts): 
The past swallowed up the present, the shadow ate up the reality. 
Sometimes Strindberg assumed situations between us which did not 
exist, and which could not. But for him they were real, exactly as they 
occurred in his dreams. Then he could say to me something which I had 
already read and recognized. In his eyes I was wearing his first wife’s 
clothes and acted, according to him, exactly as she would have acted.12 
With Harriet’s entrance, however, the drama of To Damascus was no longer 
only a formation of the past, with one level superimposed upon the other, but 
something lived forward from day to day by the playwright and the actress 
who animated a figure of the dramatic text. Indeed, with his appeal to her that 
she decide the fate of The Unknown in the as yet uncompleted third part of the 
play in progress, Strindberg in fact temporarily relinquished the denouement 
to her since she was asked by Strindberg to decide whether the hero married, 
died, or entered a monastery. And as an accomplished actress, she (like Frida) 
appreciated her role – at least upon the everyday, if not the astral, plane which 
also engrossed Strindberg. As Guy Vogelweith has observed, Harriet’s presence 
meant that 
L’auteur va donc vivre dans la réalité le dénouement d’un drama qu’il avait 
commencé d’écrire. Il vale faire selon l’inspiration d’une femme qui aura 
joué le rôle de la Dame et qui accepte maintenant de devenir son épouse. 
Il y a là comme une rencontre insepérée des possibilités sans nombre que 
promet une réalité encore neuve et des ressources si imprévisibles de la 
création littéraire.13
For it was always the writing of literature that mattered most to Strindberg, 
and from the outset he protected himself against the possibility of a debacle 
in life by erasing the distinction between dream and reality and emphasizing 
the value of any experience as matter for literature. ‘Suppose it is all make-
believe (dikt), and remains so?’ he muses, of his relationship with Harriet, in 
The Occult Diary (1 March 1901), ‘What then? Then I shall write a poem 
(dikt), which will be beautiful!’ 
The notion that life is already literature, or that it naturally composes itself 
into novels and dramas, is therefore one that Strindberg often entertains. 
He is always alert to the appearance of ‘new novels in reality’ (IX:93), and 
complementing his own unremitting self-scrutiny there is a constant inclination 
to view any episode in which he plays a part in literary terms. Detaching himself 
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from centre stage for once, he spends much of 1893 following what he calls ‘the 
story of Aspasia’ (IX:202), his name for the events surrounding the turbulent 
career of the Norwegian, Dagny Juel, among the writers and artists in the circle 
around Strindberg and Edvard Munch at the Ferkel tavern in Berlin. ‘Oh, it 
is a novel! She lays waste families and men’ (IX:188), he exclaims delightedly, 
as Dagny passes from one man to another. But shortly afterwards, it is the 
theatrical possibilities that attract him in what he observes: ‘I think you ought 
to introduce Heiberg right now in the fifth act to resolve the Aspasia drama’ 
(IX:199), he suggests to Adolf Paul, who plays the role of dramaturge, just as he 
shortly recommends the arrest of Dagny Juel for prostitution as an apt coup de 
théâtre (IX:352), one that remains unused, however, until he employs it himself 
in the third act of Crimes and Crimes. Nevertheless, in fresh information about 
Dagny’s further circulation among the Ferkel group, the eventual author of To 
Damascus, in which the final scene of part one repeats the location of the first 
by way of all the other settings through which the protagonists have passed 
in the early scenes of the play, recognizes a masterly finale to the structure of 
life’s events: ‘This ending satisfies me completely. Chapter I: Munch-Juel in the 
Ferkel … Chapter XII Munch-Juel in the Ferkel… (end!?)’ (IX:347). 
And after 1895 in particular, he continually stresses the theatrical 
dimension of his experience, sometimes assuming the one role he fills with 
complete assurance, that of the dramatist (‘The poet sits and sees himself in 
certain scenes. Discovers that he has been given roles’),14 at others pausing 
only to speculate on the intentions of the dramatist in whose plot he finds 
himself. ‘Who stages these scenes for us, and with what purpose?’ (XII:273), he 
wonders, in 1898: ‘Is it possible that everything terrible I have experienced has 
been staged for me?’ on 24 January 1901; while in Black Banners, Falkenström 
observes that ‘It has actually seemed to me from an early age that my life was 
staged before me so that I would be able to observe all its facets’ (41:196). 
Frequently, he recognizes the stage setting before the event occurs (thus, on 
arriving in Lund he recognizes it as his Canossa and realizes ‘it is here I have 
to drain my cup to the dregs’ (28:180)), and whatever the occasion, the laws 
of life and those of drama appear to him as one. As he writes to his daughter, 
Kerstin: ‘Scenesveränderung kommt in allen Dramen vor, Personenwechsel 
auch aber im letzten Akt kommen doch Alle zum Vorschein und der Verfasser 
darf keinen Einzigen vergessen. So ist das ewige Gesetz des Dramas und des 
Lebens!’ (XIV:41). And it is, finally, this sense of life as both a series of scenes 
and as ‘staged’ (satt i scen) for him, as something in which he acts but at which 
he also spectates, that facilitates the accomplishment of the dramatic form of To 
Damascus, a vehicle of self-scrutiny and a pilgrim’s drama in which the familiar 
scenes are repeated, a vehicle which is capacious and supple enough, moreover, 
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to accommodate additional episodes as the drama of his life continues to 
unfold beyond the point at which the first part concludes.
II
If this characteristic erasure of the boundary between the written and the 
existential self enables Strindberg to suggest that the ego is an imaginary 
construct composed of multiple projections and introjections and apprehended 
as a character in the literature which affords it so many of its incarnations, 
the text which perhaps illustrates most clearly how life assumes the guise 
of literature, and how it is domiciled by the ensemble of symbolic systems 
with which its culture provides him, is the epistolary novel He and She. 
More immediately than most texts, it exemplifies the complex intertextuality 
of Strindberg’s experience into the written text of his life, which is already 
perceived in terms of literature. Moreover, as he points out to Bonnier in 1886, 
that year was not the first occasion he had contemplated publishing the letters 
written by the protagonists of the marital drama which followed rapidly upon 
his first meeting with Siri von Essen and Carl Gustaf Wrangel: ‘For our own 
sakes, and for the sake of our children, my wife and I have often thought of 
publishing our correspondence during the rupture in 1876, anonymously and 
with no names, under the title, He and She’ (V:356). 
In arguing the prompt publication of He and She as part of the ‘famous 
portrait of my career while I’m on the go and interested’ (V:356), Strindberg 
described the projected volume as ‘an intimate novel (själsroman), not invented 
and arranged, however, but lived’ (V:357). The remark indicates the blurring 
of categories at which the book contrives, and the uncertainty which surrounds 
its genre and the domain (whether fact or fiction, public or private) to which 
it belongs. These are all matters which preoccupied Strindberg when, in 
1886, he considered the propriety of including the letters concerning his early 
acquaintance with Siri von Essen within the general framework of The Son of 
a Servant, where they had a natural place after the third volume, ‘In the Red 
Room’. 
When he first broaches the idea, he points out to Bonnier that life itself 
connives at a dramatic plot (‘Part 3 runs from 72 to 75 and ends with the 
fatal chance which sent the hero, then Royal Secretary and extraordinary 
amanuensis to Norrtullsgatan 12, where he saw his future wife’ in the context 
of his childhood home) and therefore what he now terms ‘the so unusual and 
high romantic drama’ (V:356) ought to assume its rightful chronological place 
in the text to which it belongs. Furthermore, this idea is given immediate 
encouragement by the discovery that in ‘these remarkable documents’ he has 
on hand ‘a whole volume’ (V:357) virtually ready and waiting for the press. 
The letters emerge as an example of his thrifty literary housekeeping, and any 
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suggestion of opportunism in his purpose is conveniently disarmed not only by 
the theoretical standpoint from which he regarded the writing of imaginative 
literature in the mid 1880s, but also in the categorical ‘A writer is only a reporter 
of what he has lived ’ (I:190) in the highly contrived discourse on writing with 
which he had initiated his correspondence with Siri von Essen in 1876, and 
which was originally intended to form the opening section of He and She. 
Anticipating Bonnier’s objections, and the suggestion that he veil the material 
by recasting it as fiction, he maintains that were he to ‘construct a novel now, 
it would be coloured by new points of view and become untruthful’ (V:357). 
And while he concedes that publication would entail an intrusion upon 
the privacy of other people (‘but, unfortunately, one does not possess one’s 
experience in isolation’), he regards the scientific nature of his project as a value 
that transcends the personal: ‘The question arises, however, if the interests of 
a number of private individuals should not be set aside in order that such an 
important matter as the truthful account of the whole of a man’s life may for 
once see the light of day’ (V:356). Or as he develops both points a few weeks 
later, when Bonnier’s disapproval of the scheme was plain: 
Apart from that |encroaching upon the privacy of others| the collection 
of letters has great psychological interest and, to put it bluntly, seems to 
me better than any novel. A novel would always look like self-defence and 
would occasion contradictions, misinterpretations, and not be in keeping 
with the grand and unique work I have now accomplished. A man’s life 
in 5 vols. (VI:17-18) 
In the light of A Madman’s Defence, which would eventually absorb so much 
of the material whose publication Bonnier would not now countenance 
unvarnished, in the form of letters, the idea of a novel as a form of self-
defence is an example of prescient self-criticism. But even in the text of the 
letters which Strindberg prepared for publication in 1886 (and which only 
appeared posthumously in 1919, after he had stubbornly continued to insist 
on their essential place in his œuvre in the contract for his Collected Works, 
which he drew up with another Bonnier, a year before he died) the issue is not 
without ambiguity. If the implications of his overtures to Bonnier are that the 
letters should therefore appear unaltered, then even the suggestion that they 
be published anonymously, or as he later proposes, with asterisks replacing 
the names of the correspondents, is itself a significant concession to a fictional 
mode: as he remarks, ‘One can of course believe they are fabricated letters’ 
(VI:17). In fact, as in ‘The Quarantine Master’s Second Story’, that other hasty 
adaptation of an autobiographical text into a fictional guise, the published 
version of He and She is full of inconsistencies in nomination and detail. 
Since the correspondence is to form part of The Son of a Servant, the letters 
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originally written by Strindberg himself are allotted to Johan. Meanwhile, 
Sofia In de Betou, Siri’s cousin, who was cast in the role of the other woman 
in the Wrangel household by the more than affectionately familial feelings she 
aroused in Carl Gustaf, is dubbed ‘Mathilde’ in the correspondence, as she will 
be in A Madman’s Defence, a detail which prompted the editor of Strindberg’s 
collected works, John Landquist, to christen the other two, hitherto unnamed 
protagonists, Gustav and Maria, when he prepared the manuscript of He 
and She for publication. Even so, identification is not so much obscured as 
merely confused (and as Strindberg suggested, ‘the public ought to be kept in 
ignorance as to whether it is a matter of actual events or mystification’ (VI:74)). 
Sometimes asterisks give way to authentic initials (‘The Honourable Lady E. 
v. E.’ (55:146) indicates Siri-Maria’s mother, Elisabeth von Essen, for example, 
while on page 206, best wishes are sent to ‘A. and H.’, Strindberg’s sister Anna 
and her husband, Hugo von Philp), at others there is a marginal displacement 
in their attribution (thus Algot Lange becomes ‘Herr A’). But in any case, the 
mention at intervals of Master Olof and ‘Uncle Augis’ (55:64) would have 
dispelled most contemporary doubts as to the identity of author and hero. 
What he achieves, therefore, is an uneasy blend of document and epistolary 
novel, carelessly prepared and uncertain of purpose. By the addition of a title, 
a subtitle, and several chapter headings (‘Under fire’, ‘Unsuccessful Flight’, ‘A 
Fly in the Ointment’, ‘On Fire’, ‘Men of Honour’, ‘Separation’, and ‘Beautiful 
Weather’) which pace events from suspense, to climax, and on to resolution, 
the published text displays a narrative shape hardly discernible in the short 
term composition of the successive letters, a shape, moreover, and a title which 
evokes a specific literary model. For if, in his first letter to Bonnier regarding the 
correspondence, Strindberg referred in passing to George Sand and Sandeau 
as an earlier instance of the publication of such intimate material, the text 
itself makes clear that, even at the time of their original composition, it was 
George Sand’s relationship with de Musset, as imaginatively chronicled in the 
epistolary novel, Elle et lui, that he had in mind both in writing and arranging 
these letters, the deft reversal of precedence in his title, along the lines of Paul 
de Musset’s rejoinder, Lui et elle, notwithstanding. 
In this way, a series of private communicative acts, at first sight apparently 
unrelated to the organized text of a literary work (but which were nevertheless 
conceived in the light of an already published correspondence) are transformed 
into a printed book, to be bought and sold as one among the many articles 
produced over the signature of August Strindberg. And even though he 
shuns (‘No foreword and no notes’ (VI:17)) the editorial apparatus accorded 
the epistolary novels of, for example, Richardson and Goethe, the letters are 
detached from the original circuit of communication in which they appeared 
and endowed, by their publication in book form as part of a sequence of 
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works displaying characteristics of the dominant marketable literary genre of 
the day, with the substance and difference of literature. They are cut off from 
the communicative presence of their authors, who did of course meet in the 
intervals between letters in order to augment, qualify, and very necessarily 
clarify their respective texts for each other, and delivered up to the interpretative 
ingenuity of the reader. 
But this ingenuity is severely tested. For even a cursory comparison of the 
letters as they appear in He and She with those written by Strindberg as they 
are printed in the first volume of Torsten Eklund’s scholarly edition of the 
correspondence, reveals a significant number of variations in order, and many 
inconsistencies of detail. Thus, on this level alone, the reader is confronted by a 
degree of confusion and opacity in the text which would be unacceptable were 
this in fact a contrived novel. If, for example, Eklund’s arrangement of the 
sixty surviving letters written by Strindberg to Siri von Essen, her mother, or 
her husband during the period covered by He and She (1 July 1875 to 25 June 
1876, that is between letters ninety six and one hundred and sixty seven in 
Eklund’s edition) is taken as correct (and inevitably certain ascriptions of date 
remain hypothetical even after a close scrutiny of the textual evidence), then 
putting aside the nine letters which Strindberg purposefully excluded from his 
compilation, the sequence of the remaining fifty one in the order established 
by Eklund emerges as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 16, 10, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 11, 
12, 21, 20, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 26, 31, 32, 34, 30, 36, 33, 35, 37, 39, 40, 41, 
46, 44, 45, 47, 48, 38, 50, 49, 51, in Strindberg’s version, and the possibility 
of confusion is naturally compounded by similar omissions and relocations 
in his preparation of Siri von Essen’s letters.15 Thus the reader is not only not 
in possession of much of the necessary background information to which the 
writers were privy, and which the author of a genuine epistolary novel would 
have been obliged to work into the text, either in the form of editorial comment 
or in the letters themselves; the two main sequences of letters, those which pass 
between Johan and Maria, do not always even correspond with one another. 
That the book remains readable at all, therefore, depends firstly upon the nature 
of the generalized effusions contained in many of the letters, which allow the 
incorrigible interpreter of texts to comprehend them according to the codes of 
sense and feeling they nevertheless contain, and secondly because in He and 
She specific allusions and even the precise course of events are to some extent 
recoverable because the reader also has access to the work of commentators or 
to Strindberg’s own retrieval of the situation in A Madman’s Defence, which is, 
however, hardly an unimpeachable source, and one which also depends upon 
the sequence reconstituted in these letters by his evidently faulty memory. 
But if mistakes arise in chronology, despite all the precautions taken 
by Strindberg in the pencilled comments he appended to both sets of 
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correspondence,16 the omission of specific letters was certainly intended. These 
omissions were made in order to point particular aspects of ‘the so unusual 
and high romantic drama’ rather than from prudence. For if the removal 
of several pages devoted to Johan’s relationship with a former mistress is a 
deliberate and to some extent surprising suppression of written evidence by 
Strindberg (it is excised physically from the letter printed in I:216, too), the 
deletion of the phrase, ‘I never suffered when I lay outside your bedroom – oh 
yes, once!’ (I:288), in one of Johan’s letters, avoids a possibly risque association 
that would confuse the purity of his love with what is portrayed as Gustav’s 
sensual behaviour, behaviour from which, in this letter, as elsewhere in the 
correspondence, he is concerned to distinguish himself. Similarly, a sequence 
of three letters (numbers 146 to 148 in Eklund’s edition) are unromantic, 
concerned with practical affairs, and sometimes irritable in their concern to 
‘put aside all lovers’ quarrels’ (I:318), and they are thus deleted by Strindberg 
because, like several of Siri von Essen’s letters following her return from the 
journey to Copenhagen, which marked her initial separation from Wrangel, 
their inclusion would have complicated as well as deepened the sweep of the 
romantic drama on which he was focusing. They raise problems beyond those 
with which the published letters engage. Not until A Madman’s Defence, for 
example, was Strindberg prepared to confront or raise in print the possibility 
that ‘She’ remained physically close to her husband even after she had declared 
her love for Strindberg himself, and the way in which her leaving with him 
compelled her to abandon her first child was (like the death of their own first 
child in the custody of a nurse, two days after birth) something he also remained 
unwilling to face. Again, when Johan exclaims, ‘What does Providence mean 
by the enormous sufferings and trials it has imposed upon us?’ (55:166), 
the thrust of his question suggests involvement in a moral predicament that 
would have been undermined by the accompanying and deleted reference to 
the actual cause of his distress, namely the unwillingness of his landladies in 
Kaptensgatan 18 to rent the rooms adjacent to his own to Siri, whereas when 
he passes over the visiting card on which he has written 
I am coming to you tomorrow at noon, 20 years older – an outlaw – 
disinherited – mother and fatherless – alone in the whole wide world – 
but faithful to my promise still in good spirits – Be indulgent to me! Be 
kind for God’s sake even if you have your own sorrows. You are two – I 
am alone! (I:270) 
he actually sacrifices an opportunity to give substance to the image of Johan as 
a homeless and accursed wanderer, and hence to relate the later impersonation 
of ‘The Son of a Servant’, Ishmael, to the Byronic image which these early 
letters often project, no doubt because it would introduce the complexities of 
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his troubled relationship with his family (a topic on which the later volumes 
of the autobiography, and not only He and She, are strikingly reticent) into 
a text in which he wished to focus upon the’ Affaire W-----l’.17 Thus, while 
some of the material a reader would expect to see provided as essential to the 
plot of a fully developed epistolary novel (such as Mathilde’s letters to Gustav, 
for example, which Maria mentions on page 89, and the disturbing letter of 
Gustav’s which is referred to on several occasions (pp. 142, 144, 183) and 
which causes great disquiet when Johan makes its contents known to others) 
are not included because Strindberg did not have access to the originals 
and refrained on aesthetic grounds from invention (and were this a genuine 
epistolary novel, such letters would have offered an opportunity of developing 
the parallel plot at which, even so, He and She sometimes hints in its allusions 
to the affair between Gustav and Mathilde),’18 there is considerable editorial, if 
not authorial, interference in the text that remains. 
The domain occupied by this text is therefore difficult to locate with 
precision. Strindberg operates with uncertainty. Refusing an explicit pact 
with the reader, he takes advantage of conventions developed in order to give 
an impression of substance to invented characters by apparently protecting 
them with a considerate anonymity, and evokes the appearance of invention 
by masking a real situation with some of the accoutrements of fiction. But 
if Strindberg’s indeterminate practice is ultimately acceptable because the 
writing and reading of novels has blurred a fine distinction between life and 
literature, the foundation of his enlacing of fact and fiction has its source not 
in the editorial work of 1886, but in the writing, and even the living, of the 
experience the letters record. 
The literariness of these letters is, of course, suggested by frequent quotation 
from, and allusion to, a variety of literary texts. They include passages from 
Heine, Goethe, Longfellow, Topelius, and Dietrichson, and in their original 
form, as private communications, the use of quotation was even more copious.19 
It is also stressed by their use for stylistic exercises, whose exuberant virtuosity, 
at least in Johan’s contributions, draws attention to the nature of the letters as 
writing. That it proved so easy to transform them into something resembling 
an epistolary novel was facilitated by the opening ‘Monologue’, dated 1 July 
1875, with which Strindberg first introduced himself to the Wrangels in the 
guise of a conventional, faded Byronic Romanticism. It provides the letters 
with an introductory self-portrait in which inevitable and dramatic events 
are prepared for by the image it projects of its writer as one ‘who seems born 
to wreak destruction’ (55:5), after having been presented at the font by the 
Devil himself. By turns playful and self-indulgent, Strindberg cultivates this 
demonic impression and sustains the tempo with a succession of performances, 
including letters in French, English, and German like the one written at Dalarö, 
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when he jumped ship to abort his attempted escape to Paris from feelings he 
could no longer master, which was addressed to ‘Herr Jesus von Nazareth! 
Himmel, Milchstrasse, rechter Hand (von Gott gerechnet!)’ (55:28). In such 
letters he sometimes depicts himself in the third person or takes advantage 
of the dramatic present which the epistolary form permits, whereby the 
virtual contemporaneousness of the event and its narration is given a striking 
immediacy. This is so in the Dalarö letter, where the writer records the effect 
of drinking absinthe on a fellow guest during the time it takes him to write his 
letter (and most probably the guest is an imagined reflection whom the writer’s 
own predicament is projected, as in the obviously more sophisticated use of the 
Beggar in To Damascus), and again in the hurried note to Maria, now on her 
way to Copenhagen, which is written at ‘The Inn in Katrineholm, 5 minutes 
after the train’s departure for Malmö’ (55:177). 
In composing a diplomatic letter to Maria’s mother, meanwhile, Johan 
includes the parenthetical commentary on his text which Strindberg had 
originally provided for Maria’s benefit and his own delight (55:146f), and 
within the compass of individual letters he stresses the dynamism of events 
by the use of a rapid succession of registers. Thus, on the eve of her departure 
for Denmark, Johan opens with a passage of elevated rhetoric in which he bids 
Maria ‘welcome to the league of those who suffer and struggle and conquer in 
the name of the Eternal One’ (55:174), moves on to dispense practical advice 
on how she might profit from her stay in Copenhagen, and then, after playfully 
suggesting he has something distressing to tell her, leads his now captive reader 
towards the declaration: ‘I love you’ (55:176). 
In the same letter, he also employs literary allusion with great subtlety to a 
more serious end when he takes one of Kierkegaard’s favourite texts, the tale 
of Abraham and Isaac, which is discussed in Fear and Trembling, in order to 
convince Maria of the virtue of sacrificing her daughter. What the occasion 
demands, he writes, is ‘a sacrifice as great as Abraham’s, when he gave his child 
for the sake of the Lord – Rest assured he demands as little of this sacrifice from 
you as He demanded it of him. He only wants to try you – chasten you – see 
if you are worthy! ’ (55:172). The Hand of the Lord, he claims, is implementing 
His design in their lives; she must not resist, and in return for this sacrifice she 
will experience ‘this wonderful turning inside out of the soul – which is what 
art demands’ (55:173). As for the physical turn their relationship has taken, 
which is so at odds with the notion of the chaste, non-sensual partnership 
originally sketched in the letters that distinguish their affair from Gustav’s 
inartistic pursuit of his cousin, this is defused by a conventionally poetic 
natural image and a further appeal to God. Where Maria had urged, ‘let us 
forget all things earthly’ (55:117), and feared that physical contact would ‘soil 
this holy fire, drag what is heavenly in the mire’ (55:103), Johan points to ‘the 
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swallow which sweeps the gravel when storms approach’ and ‘God himself ’ 
who ‘could descend to earth and dwell among us’, among those who ‘grub and 
dig in what we call the prose!’ (det vi kalla prosan, 55:172). Why, then, should 
they hesitate to abandon the discourse of poetry for prose: ‘What belongs to 
heaven can endure becoming earthly for a moment’ (55:172). 20
But the evident ease with which the letters are transformed into an epistolary 
novel undoubtedly has its basis in the very events they record. The shaping of 
the material, however slight, in which Strindberg indulged when preparing the 
letters for publication, was performed on material recognized from the outset 
as already on its way from a raw state into literature. The events in themselves 
constitute a novel en plein jour. From the beginning, the protagonists were 
aware of themselves as participants in a drama, or as characters in a novel. 
As Anna Philp recalled, ‘They suited one another well, with their artistic and 
literary interests’21 and the tone and direction of what follows is already set 
by the letter on writing, entitled ‘The Art of Becoming a Writer’, with which 
Strindberg first approached Siri von Essen, and in which he insists repeatedly 
upon the facility with which experience can be turned into literature: ‘He who 
has lived through something has something to relate, he who has something to 
relate is a writer!’ (I:190). 
Indeed, Siri reveals herself a competent pupil, both at learning how to find 
consolation for suffering in literary composition (‘I have now truly noticed 
that when one grieves, the safest method is to let one’s sorrow flow away by 
means of the pen. When I was able to write down my pain, the weight on my 
breast became lighter’ (55:180)),22 and in recognizing the literary nature of the 
situation. When Strindberg (who on one occasion compliments Gustav on his 
‘excellent way of playing your role of martyr in this play’ (55:119)) eventually 
comes to write A Madman’s Defence he will be implementing an idea that had 
already occurred to Maria, who remarks, ‘someone ought to write a novel 
about this – if I had the courage to get to grips with it, I would do it’ (55:101).23 
Shortly afterwards, meanwhile, the aspiring actress, Siri-Maria, perceives the 
situation to be a drama of parallel plots and neat exchanges, a contemporary 
comedy of manners (pièce rose rather than noir) in which the main participants 
are all finally united with the partner they desire:
Why should I be so cruel as to deprive him (Gustav) of compensation 
for the freedom he grants me? You are my betrothed – she is his – also 
betrothed (nothing else). It is quite charming!!! The situation is superb – he 
falls still more in love with her-she with him… he will himself request his 
freedom, I – go along with it – we separate as friends – and then nothing 
else remains in order to round it all out properly, than to celebrate our 
weddings together in complete harmony – on the same evening – and go 
about together like affectionate brothers and sisters. (55:154)24 
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In fact the attempt to give their story a literary form was hardly delayed. 
Among the letters in the Royal Library are two drafts in which Siri is seeking 
to transform one phase of her experience into poetry, the more rhythmical of 
which reads: 
Jag stod vid fönstret ensam, så ensam stod jag der  
Fast han fans uti rummet, fast barnet var mig nära.  
Det hängde på mitt hufvud ett vemodstak – så tungt.  
Och tanken den var mattad, men än var…25 
More pertinent, however, is the intention, encouraged by Strindberg among a 
profusion of suggestions for translations (of François Coppée’s Le Passant, and 
from the Norwegian), a travelogue portraying life in Helsinki, and for articles 
‘for Dagligt Allehanda on the theatre and other things’ (I:319), that Siri write 
a short novel utilizing events in progress. He had continually encouraged her 
to write (‘Well write then! It is your duty as a woman to give your opinion on 
questions which men have never been able to express themselves’ (I:192)) at 
the expense of her passion for the stage, from which he sought to wean her, 
and in ‘The Art of Becoming a Writer’ he demonstrated precisely how she 
could usefully transform her experience into literature, firstly by pretending 
that she was merely writing an intimate letter, and then, whenever necessary, 
by employing a kind of Stanislavskian transfer of emotion from an event in 
the past to material in the present, in order to rekindle faltering inspiration. 
Now, to flesh out the novella in fifteen chapters for which he provides the plan 
which Karin Smirnoff later published in her account of her mother’s marriage 
to Strindberg, Strindbergs första hustru,26 he discovers an immediate use for the 
real letters she has already written to him. ‘Les lettres – toujours les lettres!’ 
he exclaims, in the outline for a narrative which, presumably in order to veil 
and distance the intimate nature of the material, was to be – like A Madman’s 
Defence – written in French, the characters rechristened Armand, Cécile, 
Caroline, Inez. Catching events on the run (for as he reveals, the outcome is as 
yet unknown because unlived: ‘la fin – qui sans doute se fera voir avant que la 
nouvelle sera achevée’), what he sketches is a romance in the spirit of the letters, 
‘cette correspondance intime des âmes, ce saint amour, ce feu sacré par lequel 
le jeune auteur va être guéri de ses erreurs fatales et retourne à la vertu et ses 
Muses, reconcilié de ses anges dechus, ses idéales cassés, et en croyence sur ce 
qu’il y a de beau et de bon.’27
This redemption of the poet by a woman whom destiny has thrown in his 
path introduces a motif to which Strindberg will often return, notably in the 
first part of To Damascus, where Maria’s role is taken by another Madonna, 
Eve, whose ‘voice sounds like my dead mother’s’ (29:13), and at whose feet The 
Unknown, another accursed and homeless writer, like Byron’s Cain a fugitive 
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and vagabond on earth28, also contrives ‘to become a child again’ (29:23). But 
in the draft of the novella, as in the letters of He and She, the script which 
Strindberg prepares is not uniquely his own. It is an expression of what in The 
Son of a Servant he calls ‘the desperate devil worship of late romanticism, which 
saw in woman the saviour, the angel’ (19:130), and, as Ulf Boethius points out, 
his specific conception is for ‘a story in the spirit of George Sand, both the plot 
and the ideas recall her novels’,29 most pointedly, Elle et lui. 
Strindberg had George Sand’s epistolary novel on loan from the Royal 
Library from February to September 1876.30 It was reading he eagerly shared 
with Siri von Essen and together (somewhat ominously) with one of the key 
nineteenth-century texts concerning adultery, Flaubert’s Madame Bovary,31 
and a medieval Swedish text, the ‘Love-letter from Ingrid Persdotter’, which 
he quotes at length in his historical study, The Swedish People, and also has 
in mind in that other reworking of the material of He and She, the play 
specially written for Siri, Herr Bengt’s Wife, Sand’s book forms the immediate 
literary intertextuality of their correspondence. Indeed, on several occasions 
it seems to offer a basis for their intrigue. Responding to Sand’s account of 
her relationship with Musset, in which ‘elle’ (Thérèse) seeks vainly to save the 
fallen and baneful poète maudit ‘Lui’ (Laurent), whose predicament as a post-
Byronic hero he shares, Strindberg uses the letter in which Johan first writes 
openly of his feelings for Maria to develop a prominent theme from Elle et lui, 
namely the fine distinction between love and friendship. However, he foresees 
a more fortunate outcome to their own situation than to the one in which 
the dissipated Laurent finally escapes the tutelage of Thérèse. ‘But we have a 
duty which is greater than love – read Elle et lui to the end – do – I am Lui 
– but you are better than Elle and you can govern me’ (55:111), he tells her, 
addressing her shortly afterwards as ‘You who can give this country its greatest 
writer’ (55:115). Meanwhile, her reading of Sand’s text prompts Maria to an 
alternative interpretation, which she puts forward in the course of her own 
declaration, written at the same time as Johan’s (and well before Miss Julie!): 
‘I would trap you in order to arouse wicked passions in you – for the pleasure 
of seeing you at my feet like a slave and then to play the magnificent and 
charming woman à la Thérèse!?!’ (55:86). In fact, Maria’s insight into the self-
deluding mechanism of reading and the danger of mistaken identities appears 
for the moment to be greater than Johan’s; as she points out, when the image of 
the text fails to accord with the woman of the world: ‘You had read the book, 
it was another Thérèse you saw in me’ (55:87).32 
Thus, even if he had not yet achieved the public notoriety of George Sand or 
Musset, which was the precondition for the transformation of that relationship 
into common literary coinage,33 Elle et lui provided Strindberg with an early, pre 
-Naturalist example of the profit to be made from the public exploitation of the 
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private domain as marketable literary merchandise. But where a recent editor 
refers to Elle et lui as ‘cette étonnante version hagiographique’ of’ ‘l’histoire 
vraie’,34 what distinguishes Strindberg’s book from Sand’s is that the letters 
he uses were not reconstituted after an interval of twenty years, in response 
to a rival account (Musset’s La Confession d’un enfant du siècle) but appeared 
as immediate Romantic transcriptions employing the codes of Sand’s novel. 
Reading Elle et lui, itself the distillation of prevailing Romantic attitudes, gives 
Johan and Maria access to the means of fashioning their own lives. It is there 
they discover formulations for their own experience and precedents for the 
situations in which they find themselves, both as regards the collapse of frail 
and cherished distinctions and the formulae of piety, sophistication, and tact 
by means of which they gain a purchase on experience and convey it to others. 
These include a sanction for their rejection of convention in favour of a life in 
art,35 for ‘She’ a role at first chaste as a sister and then as ‘une maîtresse tendre 
comme une mère’,36 and for ‘He’, the aspect of a divided self, torn between 
the abyss and childlike innocence, in thrall to Satan (‘j’ai rendu à Satan ce 
qui appartient à Satan, c’est à-dire ma pauvre âme’) and reduced at an inn in 
Florence by ‘un accès de fièvre cérébrale’37 to a condition resembling Johan’s 
on Dalarö, from which Laurent awakens to see Thérèse in the company of the 
manly Palmer, much as Johan saw Maria with the martial Gustav, standing 
beside his bed. 
With its speculations on ‘une mère prudente, un ami sérieux, une première 
maîtresse sincère’,38 Elle et lui is in fact hardly more certain of the roles taken 
by its protagonists than the actors in He and She, where on one occasion a 
confused Maria addresses Johan as ‘My own beloved – own friend – brother 
– betrothed – or whatever I should call you’ (55:163). In writing, at least, the 
parts of lover and mistress are replaced by other nominations, on a sliding scale 
of intimacy and responsibility. Once again as in Elle et lui, the most common 
are mother and child (‘When I write, I want to be great; otherwise let me be 
your little child, and you cannot imagine how much you mean to me in every 
way, as a mother, a sister – anything you like, but not my mistress! Let me be 
your child’ (55:165)) or brother and sister (‘fate which has in you sent me the 
brother I have lacked ever since my childhood’ (55:71), Maria tells him, adding 
later: ‘I love you with the devotion of a sister, without coquettish caprices, 
without anything that could be called a forbidden love’ (55:86)),39 the latter 
disposition of roles being one which Strindberg later examines in Creditors, 
where another Gustav describes how his wife was stolen from him under cover 
of an artful nomenclature. When the lovers sense their illegitimate passion 
awake, he explains: 
… they become uneasy, their consciences are disturbed, they think of 
him [the absent husband]. They look for protection and creep behind the 
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fig-leaves, play at being brother and sister, and the more physical their 
feelings become, the more spiritual are the surroundings they invent for 
themselves.
Adolf: Brother and sister? How do you know that? 
Gustav: I guessed it. Children usually play at mummies and daddies, but 
when they grow up they play brothers and sisters. To hide what must be 
hidden! – And so they take a vow of chastity – and then they play hide-
and-seek – until they find one another in a dark corner, where they are 
sure no one can see them! (23:207)
Moreover, just as Gustav’s formidable omniscience here and in his suggestion, 
shortly afterwards, that the lovers ‘feel within themselves that someone sees 
them through the darkness’ (23:207), helps to clarify in retrospect the unease 
that fosters the circumlocutions of He and She (and in a note omitted from the 
novel, Strindberg informs Siri that ‘Now there is only You and I and God!’ 
(I:320)),40 so the parlance of these letters affords glimpses of other roles that 
also emerge in many later texts, notably the poet and his muse, the plebeian 
and the aristocrat, and the swineherd and the princess, as they inform Herr 
Bengt’s Wife, The Father, Miss Julie, and A Madman’s Defence, where we are told: 
‘The son of the people has conquered the white skin, the commoner has won a 
girl of breeding, the swineherd has mixed his blood with that of the princess’ 
(MD.121). 
III 
The question of roles, of which part and in what script one appears, is, of 
course, complex. How one is regarded by the other may well decide one’s own 
assumption. Thus, in a letter omitted from He and She, Strindberg writes, in 
some perturbation, ‘Answer me! Do you consider me your betrothed or your 
lover or your friend? I must know for the sake of my destiny and in order to 
clarify my unpleasant role!’ (I:320). Usually, however, he is responsible for the 
distribution of parts, which are generally legitimized by literary inspiration. 
Behind his reading of the situation there lies his reading. For example, Thérèse’s 
final letter to Laurent, in which she concludes: 
Dieu condamne certains hommes de génie à errer dans la tempête et 
à créer dans la douleur. Je t’ai assez étudié dans tes ombres et dans ta 
lumiére, dans ta grandeur et dans ta faiblesse, pour savoir que tu est la 
victime d’une destinée, et que tu ne dois pas être pesé dans la même 
balance que la plupart des autres hommes. Ta souffrance et ton doute, ce 
que tu appelles ton châtiment, c’est peut-être la condition de ta gloire.41 
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‘Génie’, ‘grandeur et faiblesse’, and in particular, ‘douleur’, ‘destinée’, 
‘souffrance’, and ‘châtiment’, are all key terms tantamount to switch words 
or nodal points of compressed meaning in the field of discursivity, whether 
French or Swedish, whereby Strindberg recovers his life. Among countless 
other texts, Elle et lui mediates a corpus of Romantic attitudes by means of 
which the writer identifies himself, and the experience recounted in these 
letters substantiates itself according to expect a firms that are fostered by the 
socially given text of the world in which their writers live, and by means of the 
general cultural text which enables both Strindberg and Siri to communicate 
with one another, and, eventually, with a wider literate public. 
Moreover, those words about which meaning clusters at its most intense, 
program or initiate a reading of events that renders experience legible and 
endow it with coherence and purpose. The letter written on the eve of Maria’s 
departure for Copenhagen is in fact a dense matrix of meaning, employing 
almost the entire current register of interpretation, which permeates not 
only this correspondence and Strindberg’s early works in general, but recurs 
throughout his production. Particularly notable is the complex of signification 
formed by his appeal to the concepts of suffering, as a sign of distinction and 
elevation, a source of and a spur to achievement, of genius and ‘the magnificent 
halls in the temple of Art’ (55:111), of a sacred calling, opposition to which 
represents ‘a sin against the H. Spirit’ (I:199), of martyrdom, which is really 
‘sweet’ and ‘the reward of genius’ (55:114), and of sacrifice, the pain of which 
validates the pleasure which art affords.42 
It is not, of course, difficult to trace the provenance of these ideas. Out 
of a general Romantic inheritance there emerges a familiar compound ghost 
of influence, embracing Ibsen’s treatment of the notion of the poet’s calling 
and the skald’s gift of sorrow in Brand and Pretenders, Kierkegaard, Byron, 
Schopenhauer, and von Hartmann. In the latter two, for example, with their 
determination to uncover the inborn error that man exists in order to be happy, 
Strindberg finds philosophical authority for the intelligence that Byron depicts 
poetically, namely that 
Sorrow is knowledge; they who know the most  
Must mourn the deepest o’er the fatal truth, 
The Tree of Knowledge is not that of Life.43 
And this expression of ‘the ancient myth of the tree of knowledge’ wherein 
‘conscious life was pain’ (19:60), which Strindberg discusses in The Son of a 
Servant and quotes among the preliminary notes for Inferno (another text 
which, like Byron’s Cain, divides the path of love from the way of knowledge) 
is also developed, with the encouragement of Kierkegaard, into a belief that 
the writer represents mankind precisely because of the extent and depth of his 
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suffering. In the passage in Repetition in which he discusses one of Strindberg’s 
principal later identifications, Job, Kierkegaard observes: 
Nowadays people are of the opinion that the natural expression of sorrow, 
the desperate language of passion, must be left to poets, who as attorneys 
in a lower court plead the sufferer’s cause before the tribunal of human 
compassion.44
This represents a notion that Strindberg stresses both in the letters of He and 
She, where he urges Maria to ‘suffer, suffer, so that your heart wants to break; 
it doesn’t break, it merely increases in size! – You must suffer everything if 
you wish to be an artist’ (55:174), and in A Blue Book, in the text ‘The Poet’s 
Sacrifice’. The writer is thus both ‘the representative of the human race’ (I:201) 
and someone for whom life is ‘staged before him… in order that [he] should 
both suffer and describe it’ (XV:356). 
But the language in which Strindberg presents himself in He and She 
indicates a still more far-reaching dimension to the context in which he reads 
life. The most persistent incarnation in these letters, and one that is associated 
with the conception of Nemesis which colours the opening monologue, is 
the view of himself as one who is ‘born to wreak destruction’ (55:5). This is 
expressed to the point of tedium, in the form of a self-consciously melodramatic 
literary pose which occasionally suggests the element of Romantic titanism in 
Strindberg’s work, an element that reaches its full amplitude in the second part 
of To Damascus, when The Unknown wishes, quite literally, to have the last 
word: 
I am the destroyer, the annihilator, the world-burner, and when everything 
lies in ashes I shall wander starving among the ruins and rejoice at the 
thought: it is I who have done this, I who have written the last page in 
the history of the world, which can thereby be considered at an end. (29: 
175)45
Besides Cain, The Unknown’s antecedents in this established repertoire of roles 
by now includes Merlin and Robert le Diable; but even the earliest instances of 
what Brandell follows Strindberg in calling his ‘crisis religion’46 are formulated 
in terms of recognizable religious and mythical categories. In the Dalarö letter, 
he already sees himself on the way to Damascus. ‘The Lord has struck me’, he 
exclaims, but ‘the cry Saul! Saul! never came’ (55:33); the defiant and scarred 
Jacob of the later autobiographical volumes and To Damascus is even now a 
familiar: ‘I have rebelled against God – I have blasphemed – I have fought 
against him like Jacob… but now the tendon of my thigh is paralysed’ (1:238), 
he informs the Wrangels, and again, ‘If I meet him I shall wrestle with him, 
however paralysed I am already in my left side!’ (1:238); while in his many 
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references to his ‘stony way’, ‘station after station’, and ‘the thorns in the wreath 
pressing into my brow’ (1:324-5), he displays an evident readiness to view his 
life in the light of Christ’s. 
Writing in an age when Renan had transformed Christ into what Albert 
Schweitzer described as ‘eine lebendige Theaterfigur’47 it was, as Nils Norman 
points out, ‘a short step’ for Strindberg ‘not only to associate [events in his 
life] with episodes in The Gospels but also well-nigh identify himself with 
Christ.’48 And he did so not in the spirit of an imitatio, but in the terms of 
a Naturalist identification in which he recreates Christ in his own image. 
Indeed, throughout his life, Strindberg had occasion to read his experience in 
this way. As a writer and ‘the representative of the human race’, he is already 
‘a kind of Christ’ (I:201) and so continually forced to ‘empty another chalice’ 
(IV:103). ‘Now when I go up to Jerusalem, perhaps my Golgotha, to keep the 
Passover, alone, without disciples’ (VII:37), he writes, on the eve of his return 
to Stockholm in 1888, and in 1894 he castigates the Judases among the writers 
of the 1880s who have betrayed him, and advises his old friend Littmansson: 
‘If you are really serious, if you wish to make anything of yourself… then take 
up your cross and follow me’ (X:131). ‘Soon I shall go to eat the lamb of the 
Passover at the Ferkel before I go to Golgotha in Plötzensee’ (X:7), he tells his 
irreverent fellow reveller, Bengt Lidforss, while only a year later, in the midst 
of the Inferno crisis, he adopts a different tone but the same register to inform 
Hedlund, ‘I want to return home again, after I have been up to Jerusalem and 
spoken to the people’ (XI:81). The role, moreover, is one that merges naturally 
with the projection of himself and the writer in general as a scapegoat who 
assumes the burden of general suffering, and in particular with the most 
sustained and comprehensive of his self-images as ‘the son of the huts and 
tenements – The Son of a Servant – Hagar’s – the desert’s’ (XIV:144), with its 
clear association of his identification both with contemporary impoverishment 
and the Biblical narrative of Ishmael, in which he habitually found a correlation 
for his own destiny. For all these roles are associated with the wilderness; each 
(whether Christ, scapegoat, or Ishmael) is an outcast in the desert to which 
Strindberg saw himself condemned even before writing the first volume of his 
autobiography.49 ‘My way leads into the wilderness, without friends, without 
being permitted to have any friends’ (V:110) is a recurrent plaint. It crops up 
both as a casual image (‘je n’étais plus seul dans le desert’, he comments, in 
a letter to Le Figaro, after discovering Jollivet Castelot’s La Vie et l’ âme de la 
matière), and as a carefully primed account of his destiny, as when, in 1900, 
he writes to Nils Andersson: ‘My greetings to Herrlin! Tell him I never attain 
harmony! But it is in the nature and idea of Desert wandering never to arrive!’ 
(XIII:265). 
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But whether or not he pauses to make a specific association with Christ or 
an Old Testament predecessor, the use of these and similar images is typical of 
the way in which Strindberg promptly sees his experience in terms of myth and 
legend. In even the most apparently casual statement, as Harry Carlson suggests, 
what begins as a chance series of associations immediately assumes a form and a 
context. The symbol develops into myth and the myth into cosmogony within 
the space of a few lines.50 Or at least, the identification appears spontaneous 
because, as the bearer of the appropriate cultural information, and having 
already allotted himself a role, his surroundings and the people he encounters 
are rapidly composed into the context he expects. With his mind on matters 
infernal, it is not surprising that the landscape around Klam in Austria, where 
he is staying with his parents-in-law, should remind him of Dante’s Inferno or 
that the dog discovered on the threshold of Munch’s house in Paris suggested 
Cerberus to him. And in many of the notes preserved in the Royal Library, it 
is possible to observe how he enlists a number of interrelated identifications in 
order to explore and ascertain his situation. Thus in the drafts for a play entitled 
‘Mäster Ensam’ (Master Alone), he tried on a number of familiar guises he had 
used elsewhere in his plays (Merlin, Robert of Normandie, Hercules, Socrates), 
before, in a typical instance of cross-fertilization, he settled momentarily upon 
‘Socrates and Omphale’ and proceeded to apply it to current matters: 
Socrates against a disorderly world. However he behaves, he is criticised. 
If he lives with a woman, he is tormented; if he is loving towards her, he 
is called sensual; if he is as restrained as he would like to be, he is mocked 
as decrepit. If he lives alone, chaste, he is called depraved. If he goes to 
women, he is called lecherous. If he is indifferent as regards religion, he is 
called a godless blasphemer; if he is religious, he is called a hypocrite when 
he cannot bring his life and faith into harmony (which is an impossibility.) 
The envious commit wrongs against him and when he does not want to 
suffer wrongs even against himself, he is called envious.51 
Thus, as Carlson again remarks, ‘Thinking mythopoetically was not a 
momentary, periodically recurrent aberration, it was as natural for him as 
thinking dramatically,’52 and alongside the correlations which he fashions for 
himself, those with whom he lives are also alloted roles into which they, too, 
disappear, or are raised, like Strindberg in his own particular assumptions, to 
the status either of ‘dramatic personae’, such as Yeats also described in a volume 
of his Autobiographies, or of participants in a mythical or literary text from 
which, as Omphale, Beatrice, or Cinnober, they cannot escape. 
Having made the identification, however, Strindberg then builds upon it 
with great care and industry. His description of the landscape around Dornach 
and Klam leads him by means of etymological speculation and association 
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(‘törnetagg’, ‘törne’, ‘törnestigen’ – prickle, thorn, way of thorns) to recall 
the wood of the suicides in the Inferno and so confirm a link with Dante’s 
poem, while in general terms it evokes both the crown of thorns and ‘the field 
of thorns’ (28:176) to which his destiny appears to have condemned him. 
Moreover, the document humain, Inferno, is – as Eric Johannesson suggests 
– perhaps the most literary of all hells,53 the outcome of assiduous research 
in which Strindberg ransacked not only Dante but also Virgil, Swedenborg, 
Byron, Hesiod, the Rigveda, Viktor Rydberg’s Undersökningar i germanisk 
mytologi and Medeltidens magi as well as Balzac, Wagner, and Péladan, in order 
to confirm, and to confer shape on, his own infernal experiences. The metaphor 
of hell controls the narrative, accounts for what material is developed and what 
is omitted, and governs the course of events. Incidents that are insignificant in 
themselves gain in substance and meaning only by the narrative in which they 
are placed, where they are worked over and written up as events plotted and 
paced with conscious literary intention. The title and chapter headings indicate 
this procedure, of course, but two minor and amusing instances may exemplify 
Strindberg’s practice. One is the dramatic irony at which he connives when the 
goldmaker is reduced to beggary; another occurs in the retouching in which 
he indulges in the description of the scenery around Dornach. Along with such 
infernal trappings as the remorseless mill, the goat’s horn, a sinister broom, 
and the miller’s boys, ‘as white as the false angels’ (28: 135), he comes across a 
wooden building of which he writes: 
It was a low, oblong shed with six oven doors.… Ovens! 
Good God, where was I?  
The image of Dante’s hell rose up before me, the coffin with the sinners 
being baked red hot – and the six oven doors! (28:134) 
This description, with its allusion to Canto 9 of the Inferno, is based on an entry 
in The Occult Diary for 9 September 1896, which also incorporates a sketch of 
the forbidding building (in fact, in commonplace reality a malodorous pig-sty) 
made at the time. However, the sketch reveals that initially Strindberg noticed 
and drew eight openings. Only afterwards, possibly when composing Inferno, 
were two of these crossed out to bring it into line both with Dante and with the 
mystical interpretation of numbers since, as an insertion beneath the drawing 
points out, ‘6 = a bad number’. 
Inferno, however, represents only the culmination of a period of close reading 
in which Strindberg scrutinized every occurrence in order to penetrate to the 
text which lay beneath the surface. Probably the most striking of the many 
examples of the ingenuity with which he pursued his researches, and the detail 
on which he founds his reading, is the extraordinary venture into comparative 
biography which he conducted in the letters to his daughter Kerstin, The 
Plot and Counter Plot120
Occult Diary, and Inferno, where he traces a network of relationships between 
himself, Napoleon, and the Greek hero, Ajax. Initially playful, this speculation 
becomes an experimental field of research in which he enlists the resources of 
history, mythology, etymology, number magic, and iconography, in order to 
establish a correspondence that would also substantiate the eschatology of guilt 
and suffering on which he is concurrently working. This whole topic has been 
studied by Nils Norman in his exemplary article, ‘Strindberg och Napoleon’, 
which demonstrates that ‘in Strindberg’s mythical world, however bizarre it 
might seem, there was a logic of symbols,’54 and only the kind of detail in 
which Norman recovers Strindberg’s own minute tracing of the etymological 
and mythological correspondences which link the three figures can adequately 
convey the reach and precision of his method. But a limited example of the kind 
of symptomatic reading in which Strindberg excelled can be seen in a letter to 
Hedlund, in which he reads his life according to the text of astrology. Born 
under the sign of the ram, and hence predestined to be a scapegoat (‘This sign 
represents the sacrifice’ (XI:281)), he perceives that ‘Every success is followed by 
sufferings; every trace of happiness is smeared with dirt; every encouragement 
is a mockery, every good deed punished with the cross’, and that this is a 
prescription that establishes the unmistakable contours of his own destiny. 
But the sign also signifies renewal, and he gains some encouragement from its 
Cabbalistic and Biblical implications. Moreover, in a reference by Manilius to 
‘The Ram, famous for its fleece of gold’, he discovers not only a correspondence 
to his current interest in alchemy, but also to his ‘first performed play, In Rome, 
which deals with Jason, whose statue with the golden fleece was Torwaldsen’s 
first’. Likewise, the jewel related to this sign is the amethyst, his own favourite, 
notwithstanding that his is ‘in pawn in Paris for 3 francs’, and among other 
pertinent factors he recognizes in the Martian provenance of the Ram (‘Out of 
his mouth went the two-edged sword’) an affinity with ‘the motto of my first 
publication [The Freethinker] – I am not come to bring peace but the sword’.55 
It is naturally tempting to regard Strindberg’s recourse to myth solely in 
terms of psychology, either to discern throughout the capacious embrace of the 
Great Mother, as is unfortunately the case in Harry Carlson’s otherwise often 
stimulating study, Strindberg and the Poetry of Myth, or, like Donald Burnham, 
to stress the purely therapeutic value of his identifications. Burnham maintains, 
for example, that ‘by means of these outer representations [Strindberg] was able 
to confront, work through, and gradually accept the reinternalization of his 
conflicts.’56 It is certainly true that symbols and myths permitted Strindberg to 
reorganize himself and his relationship to his experience; in Inferno, Legends, 
and Jacob Wrestles the use to which he puts the figures of Jacob and Job, allowing 
the one largely to replace the other as his involvement in events passes from 
passive suffering to active engagement, provides one obvious example. But the 
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stress placed by Burnham on the therapeutic underestimates a number of other 
factors, among them the amount of sheer play in his speculations, and – in 
cases where Strindberg relies on detailed if idiosyncratic research – the purely 
literary dimension. For it is in literature that the reorganization takes place. 
Strindberg’s use of myth is situated within a recognizable literary tradition, 
and its primary purpose is lo provide him with the means of organizing a 
literary text rather than the reorganization of the existential, unadulterated 
text of himself. 
Furthermore, many of the identification she makes, among them the 
comprehensive image of himself as ‘The Son of a Servant’, are not so much 
therapeutic as the means of self-aggrandizement. They confer distinction, elevate 
him to a singular destiny, and ultimately contribute not to the revelation of his 
hidden or unknown self but to the screen across which his image flits in one 
(dis)guise or another. They are, as Gunnar Brandell has indicated, ‘conceptions 
to which Strindberg has recourse for self-defence when his situation appears 
unendurable’,57 and the fear that the assumption of many roles might deprive 
him of his own identity, that he would become featureless, like the figure of 
his story, ‘Jubal Without an I’, was not without foundation. The multitude 
of incarnations in which he deposits some aspect of his experience, from 
Ahasverus, Asmodeus, Christ, Hercules, Jacob, Job, Jonah, and Joseph to 
Tobias, The Flying Dutchman, Loke, Starkodd, Svarte Balder, or Ån, Cain, 
Ishmael, Merlin, Napoleon, Robert le Diable, and Satan, are components 
of a multiple image, the contents of what amounts to a theatrical wardrobe 
composed in language and providing a looking glass in which, somewhat in 
the manner of the experiments with superimposed photographic images of his 
contemporary, Francis Galton, to which Strindberg alludes on the first page of 
The Occult Diary, an ur image might be perceived. But if this is the promise, 
the example of To Damascus is salutary. Caught up in the median order of 
symbols, he confronts himself as ‘The Unknown’. The final signified eludes 
him because it belongs not to literature but to the real. ‘We all travel incognito’ 
(51:30), the Hunter admits in The Great Highway, and the epitaph with which 
the play concludes, ‘a cursory inscription’ (51:100) written in the snow, is only 
a final gesture, one more version of the myth with which, above all others, 
Strindberg has been engaged, the myth of himself. 
For the remarkably consistent portrait which emerges in the successive 
representations of himself throughout his life is a personal myth, based upon 
a system of private associations. In the biography he evolves for himself, he 
frames a portrait in order to represent himself in the form in which he wishes 
to be regarded, both by himself and by others. The act of symbolization 
removes him from direct participation in the events he records. If it facilitates 
his reorganization, it also places him at a distance; that is, it replaces the event 
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with an account of it in which it enters the domain of the imagination. To 
quote Lacan: 
The drama of the subject in the verb is that he faces the test of his lack of 
being. It is because it fends off this moment of lack that an image moves 
into position to support the whole worth of desire: projection, a function 
of the Imaginary.58 
Moreover, since he is neither the creator of the symbols nor the founder of 
the myths which he employs to convey this image, but their inheritor, in 
using them, he is formed by them. Wherever he finds himself, he discovers 
precedents, from Joseph in Potiphar’s house in several of the naturalist novels 
and plays, to Saul on the road to Damascus, and thus, as Ernst Cassirer writes 
The more richly and energetically the human spirit engages in its formative 
activity, the farther this very activity seems to remove it from the primal 
source of its own being. More and more, it appears to be imprisoned in its 
own creations – in the words of language, in the images of myth or art, 
in the intellectual symbols of cognition, which cover it like a delicate and 
transparent, but unbreachable veil.59 
In the versions of himself which Strindberg transcribes, he sees therefore not 
himself but his reflection as it is fashioned by his desires and his regrets. In 
short, he is a prisoner of the mirror in which he regards himself.
Chapter Five 
Publishing the Private, 
 or The Economics of Experience
Sometimes it has occurred to me that a man should not live more than he can record, as a 
farmer should not have a larger crop than he can gather in.  
– Boswell: The Hypochondriack 
 
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a 
property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself  
– Locke: Second Treatise on Civil Government
I
In a finely tempered and persuasive record of her encounters with Strindberg 
in Switzerland in 1884, Hélène Welinder recalls a conversation in which his 
young compatriot’s sympathetic concern prompted the tired and harassed 
writer to describe the condition of almost permanent literary production in 
which he lived with unusual clarity. ‘I cannot rest, even if I would like to,’ he 
is reported as saying:
I have to write for my daily bread, to maintain my wife and children, and 
in other respects, too, I cannot leave it alone. If I am travelling by train or 
whatever I’m doing, my mind works without ceasing, it grinds and grinds 
like a mill, and I cannot stop it. I get no peace before I have put it down 
on paper, but then I begin all over again, and so the misery goes on.1
Whether or not the image of the remorseless and insatiable mill reached this 
quotation as a direct transcription of Strindberg’s words is, of course, open to 
question. Nevertheless, even if it belongs entirely to Welinder’s reconstruction, 
it is apposite, for it not only features frequently in Strindberg’s later work as 
an image for the treadmill of conscience and the tenacity with which the past 
clings to the present;2 it also encompasses the suggestion that to write out 
what experience provides affords at best only temporary relief. But there is an 
additional complication at which it also hints, and which is inseparable from 
the publication of such writing, namely that in relieving himself of what he 
has lived, the professional writer consumes his experience and hence needs 
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constantly to renew his primary material if he is not to become, or appear to 
become, ‘written out’. 
This tension between the pressures of ‘writing out’ and becoming ‘written 
out’ highlights a polarity which informs the whole of Strindberg’s career. He 
is caught between the subjective drive which compels him to write (‘and in 
other respects, too, I cannot leave it alone’) and the inescapable exigencies of 
a market with which his inspiration and his fund of material may be out of 
step, and which either devours what he offers it and then demands more, or 
rejects his products as unsaleable. The law of supply and demand enters into 
an uneasy partnership with the fluctuations of inspiration, which sometimes 
flood the market when the latter is slack (and no market could accommodate 
the extraordinary series of sixteen plays, including To Damascus I and II, The 
Dance of Death, Erik XIV, and A Dream Play, which the prodigal Strindberg 
produced between 1898 and 1901) or remains unresponsive to its seasonal 
needs, or to specific commercial advantages as regards length, genre, style, and 
material. 
A few weeks in the spring of 1888 are typical. Forced to produce a quantity 
of what he considers inferior material ‘which could be sold as summer reading’ 
(VII:80) merely in order to live, and speculating privately over the sale of 
several older works in manuscript to earn some ready money,3 Strindberg fears 
for his talent. He is casting about for an alternative source of income in order 
to escape the deleterious effects of overproduction ‘in this age of specialists 
and the division of labour’ (VII:82) when suddenly ‘a narrative set in upper 
Sörmland (150 pages perhaps) called The Sexton in Vidala’ (VII:89) erupts into 
a publishing schedule which is geared to the short pieces of Life in the Skerries 
(Skärkarlsliv),4 and it is only with some violence to the text in hand that the one 
can be reconciled with the other. Indeed, the new narrative, which becomes 
‘The Romantic Organist of Rånö’, rapidly outgrows Strindberg’s expectations: 
‘It was intended to be a trivial sketch of an uninteresting organist fellow,’ he 
tells Bonnier, ‘but has turned into something much more than that’ (VII:103). 
Meanwhile another text is taking shape in events at Skovlyst where Strindberg 
is for the moment impecuniously and precariously lodged (‘This will be a novel 
later’ (VII:112) is his ominous comment to Edvard Brandes, when he sends 
him an interim report), and Miss Julie, which he shrewdly estimates is a work 
‘which will go down in history’ (VII:104), remains unpublished even though 
he relinquishes every pretension to a reward which would be commensurate 
with what he recognizes is ‘the flower of my production and of Swedish drama’ 
(VII:106), and asks of Bonnier only the most meagre of returns, its labour cost 
at a subsistence rate of pay: ‘My conditions are only the production costs for the 
manual labour (= one month of life)’ (VII:104). 
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Strindberg was, of course, aware that the reach of his talent and his 
productivity were too capacious and versatile for the restricted Swedish market, 
and he recognized a more appropriate stage for his labours in Berlin or Paris. 
‘My enormous productive urge (and the word Strindberg uses, produktionsdrift, 
indicates both an innate urge and its actual marketing) requires the book 
markets of several countries’ (VI:80), he told the dubious Bonnier in 1886, and 
even if it meant forsaking his native language, he had frequently to live and 
to write accordingly. With a majority of his recent plays either unpublished or 
unperformed in Sweden, an essential aspect of his departure for the continent 
in 1892 was the need to discover new outlets for his work. ‘After trying for 
so many years to live as a Swedish writer, I have realized it is impossible and 
am at crisis point’ (IX:5), he informed a colleague earlier that year, and in the 
period which followed many works, among them Inferno, were fashioned and 
written either wholly or in part with a foreign public in mind, as he found 
himself once again a (not so) young man from the provinces laying siege once 
more to ‘die Hauptstadt des XIX. Jahrhunderts’. And he knew enough not to 
arrive empty handed ‘Am bringing 100 pages of a feuilleton in French with 
me’, he told his contact in the city, Littmansson. ‘Will start straight away with 
some sensational articles so that Paris will be astounded’ (X:225). Worldly wise 
at least in this, he knew by now that the writer is his own product and must 
display himself spectacularly. 
For his predicament was by no means unusual during a period in which 
the writer was generally confronted by what Goldsmith, a century earlier, 
had described as ‘That Fatal Revolution whereby Writing is converted to a 
Mechanic Trade.’5 Produced in private for an anonymous and dispersed public, 
and increasingly dependent upon the author’s subjectivity for its matter (and 
the shift which Georg Lukács detects from the multifaceted participation 
in society of Goethe, Stendhal, and Tolstoy, to the writer’s confinement to 
the specialism of his trade in keeping with the capitalist division of labour, 
is an essential element of Strindberg’s career),6 writing in Europe becomes 
capitalized in the nineteenth-century: that is to say, as patronage recedes and 
it becomes impossible for literature to escape the general division of labour, 
the writer who seeks a living by his pen alone, puts his thoughts and feelings 
into circulation on the open market, where the work of art in which they are 
rendered purchasable, becomes another commodity, in competition with all 
the others. 
This is a mill to which all is grist, but the process has rarely been so clearly 
expressed as in a letter from Balzac to his publisher, Mame, after a visit to 
the Grand Chartreuse. The experience had, he maintains, been profound and 
uplifting, but within a week he is writing: 
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Redoublez d’attention Maitre Mame
J’ai été, depuis longtemps frappé et désireux de la gloire populaire qui 
consiste à faire vendre à des milliers incommensurables d’exemplaires, 
unpetit volume in – 18 comme Atala, Paul et Virginie, le Vicaire de 
Vakefield, Manon Lescaut, Perault, etc.
La multiplicité des éditions compense le défault du nombre de 
volumes; mais, il faut que le livre puisse aller en toutes les mains, celles 
de la jeune fille, celles de l’enfant, celles du vieillard et même celles de la 
dévote. Alors, une fois le livre connu, ce qui est long ou bref, selon le talent 
de l’auteur et (celui) du libraire, ce livre devient une affaire importante, 
exemple, les Méditations de Lamartine à 40 000 ex(emplaires) et les Ruines 
de Volney, etc.
Mon livre est done un livre conçu dans cet esprit, un livre que la portière 
et la grande dame puissent lire. J’ai pris l’Evangile et le Catéchisme pour 
modèles, deux livres d’excellent débit, et j’ai fait le mien. J’ai mis la scene 
au village, et, du reste, vous le lirez en entier, chose rare avec moi.
In thus describing an as yet unwritten book (but which eventually appears 
as Le Médecin de campagne) Balzac promptly transforms a moving spiritual 
experience into an item for sale, citing the prolifically selling New Testament 
as one of his models and outlining the type of public at which it is aimed. And 
while, as a professional writer, he is immediately able to place it in terms of 
genre and style, and is certainly in no doubt that he can write this instrument 
of his ‘gloire populaire’ when he chooses so to do, as a businessman he can also 
gauge its sales potential and see it will prove a sound investment. 
Throughout the Inferno period, it is clear that Strindberg is also constantly 
examining his experiences with a similar view to publication. From the outset he 
is intent on producing ‘my book about everything I have “seen” and experienced 
since last December’ (XI:193), and while he occasionally considers reverting to 
an earlier, pre-capitalist mode of publication by allowing the book to circulate 
only in manuscript (XI:323), his more practical schemes fluctuate between 
the novel and autobiography, the document humain and a work of speculative 
natural science. Moreover, however alarming the experiences he is monitoring 
become, there is no doubt that in seeking to interpret the enigmatic script 
of what he terms makterna, the capricious powers who seem to him in turn 
to be monitoring his life, he continues to function as an author, accustomed 
to publishing his experiences on a market that is, in its own way, equally 
capricious and enigmatic. On one level, the central phase of the Inferno period 
is inaugurated as a business project in which, with Torsten Hedlund as his 
agent back home in Göteborg, he secures a period of relative financial stability 
that allows him to conduct the experiments with the data of his own life which 
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will eventually contribute so much to the text of Inferno, by ensuring, against 
various promisory notes of future writing, a privately donated sum of 1,200 
kronor paid in monthly instalments by what he gathers is a group of business 
men, on occasion directly to the locations where the drama of his life is acted 
out, the Hotel Orfila and Mme Charlotte’s Crêmerie (XI:135–8) where he 
sleeps and takes his meals. ‘I propose this consortium as follows’, he writes to 
Hedlund: ‘that I write a series of [articles as] letters [for publication in Göteborgs 
Handelstidning], straight from memory and my notes, without taking your 
paper or its readers into account, but so that every letter can form a chapter in 
a book which, if you like it, I then offer you |the chance of publishing|, and for 
no honorarium if it does not promise to earn one’ (XI:138).
Traces of this plan remain in the letters to Hedlund which Strindberg 
wrote between 6 and 22 July 1896 on manuscript paper rather than on the 
ordinary writing paper he used for several other more mundane letters to the 
same correspondent, paginated consecutively from 1 to 59 across the intervals 
in their composition.
These letters evidently encompass a provisional attempt to organize the 
material he later incorporated in the early chapters of Inferno, and already betray 
the ongoing process of artistic rearrangement of lived experience, for example 
in the account of his discovery of the French chemist Orfila, the instance of 
bibliomancy connected with the latter’s book, and the general description of 
his predicament at the beginning of July, all of which is similar in tone and 
effect to the opening pages of Inferno (XI:245–6).8 And even if he claims 
only to be ‘preparing a book in manuscript – which I am writing for myself 
and de Enkelte (Strindberg uses the Kierkegaardian term); without bothering 
about publishers, newspapers, old maids or the magistrate’s court’ (XI:388), he 
nevertheless also knew precisely when it was opportune ‘to re-establish contact 
with life’ (XI:310) and resume the profitable exploitation of his experiences in 
literature, once he had accumulated the necessary experience. Indeed, both 
the beginning and the end of the Inferno process as a whole demonstrate a 
remarkable combination of self-awareness and business acumen. The letter 
in which Strindberg initially reopened contact with Hedlund as the possible 
intermediary his future project would require, was written the day after he 
had sent his current intimate, Littmansson, the retrospectively significant 
information, ‘What destiny now awaits me I do not know, but I feel ‘The 
Hand of the Lord’ resting upon me. It heralds a change upwards, or straight 
down to the centre of the earth, who knows!’ (X:152),9 a clear sign that he 
intended a new departure, and it was followed by another in which he refers to 
his need for ‘raw material in large quantities, observation, preferably my own, 
for I cannot depend upon other people’s’ (X:206–7). And having thus primed 
what proved to be an effective avenue to the support he needed, he was equally 
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astute some two years later in recognizing when ‘the period of grace’ (XI: 304) 
afforded him by his backers was over and he had to ‘take up the yoke again and 
work for my bread’ (XI:303) by recommencing his literary career. Moreover, 
he revealed a similarly astute awareness of when this material had been fully 
exploited. In a letter to Gustaf af Geijerstam in March 1898, he admits what 
is so often the case with his projects, namely that he ‘has miscalculated the 
extent of the manuscript’ (XII:271) he has on hand. Although his current 
work, Jacob Wrestles, was not yet finished, he considered ‘my religious conflicts 
at an end, and the whole Inferno saga over’ (XII:271), and a few days later, 
impatient now to continue the playwrighting he has resumed in To Damascus, 
he contemplates a solution to the problem of his scanty copy which is no less 
mercenary in its implications than Balzac’s plans for Le Médecin de campagne. 
Writing from Paris, he suggests:
A new plan!  
On my journey to Lund (or Copenhagen) sometime early in April, 
depending on the money, I might stop off for a few days in a 
Benedictine monastery in Belgium to which I have been invited. I want 
to describe my impressions in Inferno II. 
You can see that this will be a ‘clou’.  
So: a delay! 
Why have a fiasco of a book, when we could have a success! To bore the 
public by reappearing with Part III in the autumn won’t do! Two stout 
blows, and then full stop. (XII:278)
Thus as Lukács remarks, when discussing the novel in which this process is 
depicted most comprehensively, Balzac’s Illusions perdues: ‘From the writer’s 
ideas, emotions, and convictions, to the paper on which he writes them down, 
everything is turned into a commodity that can be bought and sold’10 Or to 
quote Arne Melberg, whose language permits the point to be made very neatly 
indeed, literature is now a fusion of work and commodity or verk and vara:
the nature of literature as work is determined by conditions in the sphere 
of circulation, where it also becomes an object and commodity. And the 
work (verket), as an aesthetic and meaningful unity (enhet), emerges as 
precisely a closed totality (helhet) in consequence of the market where it is 
forced to circulate as a commodity (vara).11
Melberg’s formulation aptly indicates both the context in which the professional 
writer may produce his works under contract, to a specific length, and at so 
many words a day, in order to earn the going rate per page or column (and as 
Strindberg discovers, when he negotiates the asking price per sheet according 
to the number of spaces per line with his publisher and compares his rate with 
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the fees several of his contemporaries can command, not all writers or subjects 
realize the same rate (III:288)), and the attempt by a minority of writers, like 
Baudelaire and Mallarmé, to detach the work of art from market forces by 
disclaiming its utility value. And yet, as Roland Barthes has pointed out, it 
is precisely in order to preserve the work of art from the rough and tumble of 
the market place that such writers are also drawn to stress the labour involved 
in writing as a value in itself. Gautier, Flaubert, or Gide, Barthes observed, 
‘substituer à la valeur usage de l’écriture, une valeur-travail… L’écriture sera 
sauvée non pas en vertu de sa destination, mais grâce au travail qu’elle aura 
couté. Alors commence à s’élaborer une imagerie de l’écrivain-artisan qui 
s’enferme dans un lieu légendaire, comme un ouvrier en chambre… passant à 
ce travail des heures régulières de solitude et d’effort.’12
The consequences of this situation are far-reaching. Whether it is shrouded 
in the notion of impassibilité or shamelessly solicits attention by parading the 
author’s personality in public, the work in which the writer disposes of his 
qualities and abilities, as if they were objects he could give away, diminishes 
and impoverishes him. ‘L’homme n’est rien, l’œuvre tout’, Flaubert asserts,13 
and from ‘Le Chef d’œuvre inconnu’ to L’Oeuvre and When We Dead Awaken 
or Mallarmé’s ‘Herodiade’, numerous nineteenth-century works maintain that 
when the product is imbued with life, its creator dies to life. Once completed it 
enters upon a life of its own, and into a series of relationships with other texts 
and other men, in keeping with the ideas developed by Marx in the section 
on estranged labour in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, where the 
dehumanizing consequences of the product’s domination of its producer are so 
eloquently described ‘The more the worker produces’, Marx write ‘the less he 
has to consume; the more values he creates, the more worthless he becomes; the 
more his product is shaped, the more misshapen the worker; the more civilized 
his object, the more barbarous the worker’, and deprived of direct, immediate 
contact with his audience, the writer, too, is plundered by his creation and 
deformed by his revelations. As Marx goes on to write, in words that have a 
particular poignance where the autobiographer is concerned:
The worker places his life in the object: but now it no longer belongs to him, 
but to the object… What the product of his labour is, he is not Therefore, 
the greater this product, the less he is himself. The externalization of the 
worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, 
an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently of him 
and alien to him, and begins to confront him as an autonomous power; 
that the life which he has bestowed on the object confronts him as hostile 
and alien.14 
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Dispossessed of his identity by the initial estranging transfer of the self he seeks 
into the language in which it is sought, the autobiographer thus confronts 
himself in the work as an alien figure whose life resembles but is no longer his 
own, and as the market on which he is launched becomes more impersonal 
and his readership more dispersed, so there is a complementary tendency for 
the writer to grow more intimate and his books to become the increasingly 
personal explorations of private experience. On the one hand, there is the 
inhospitable, strange, and alien world dominated by the impersonal powers of 
the market, in which the imperilled self (and this is a theme in Jacobsen’s Niels 
Lyhne and Hamsun’s Hunger as well as of By the Open Sea and Inferno) lives as 
it were with no fixed abode, while on the other, the diminished social role to 
which he is restricted by specialization, hands the writer over to self-reflection 
and self-projection. 
In part, this has to do with the role subjectivity plays in the competitive 
struggle for the attention of a public the writer has to woo. A form of 
self-advertisement, it is a way of marketing his product the individual 
consciousness seeks to distinguish itself, to affirm its incomparable originality 
and uniqueness. And if the style is the man, the man is what he produces. 
He develops, and the public purchases, a work that is identifiable with the 
name of its producer, a name that becomes associated with what he produces. 
He seeks to be unmistakable, and beyond a characteristic style, a personal 
matter is one means by which the literary work identifies its progenitor, selects 
its readership, and demarcates the boundary separating the property of one 
author from another. Thus, dependent as he is for his livelihood on the interest 
of the public, attention devolves upon the person of the author, upon the image 
of himself that his works project, either in the form of a direct and strident self 
-exposure, in which he lives shamelessly in the eyes of the public, or through 
the creation of biographical images within the work whereby, as ‘The Son 
of a Servant’ or ‘Joseph K’, the writer is identified. The art of scandal and 
provocation is therefore linked with the other arresting images of the writer, 
including what could be termed the canonical set of actions which a culture 
expects him to carry out, and the legend of himself which the writer creates is 
thus itself a literary fact, a constituent part of the work for sale, and one which 
plays a structural role in the formation of the text. 
This notion of self-reflection and self-projection is central. Where a previous 
generation (and in Sweden it is the group of writers known as Signaturerna who 
‘are the last representatives within Swedish belles-lettres who exist as a literary 
grouping outside a literary institution that is determined by the demands 
of the market place’)15 could write without attending to themselves (as Stig 
Torsslow suggests, ‘they did not dream of being themselves – they did not 
even understand what that meant – but strove to write what criticism expected 
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of them’),16 Strindberg is brought by what he once termed ‘the application of 
mercantilism to literature’ (4:206) to place the author’s own tribulations and 
possibilities at the centre even of what is ostensibly an historical drama, Master 
Olof.17 Freed by private resources, a position at the university, or a civil service 
post, from the need to publicize themselves, the writers of the Signatur group 
were, according to their spokesman, Carl David af Wirsén, the Secretary of the 
Swedish Academy and Strindberg’s long-standing opponent, preserved from 
the demoralizing effects of the professional writer’s life, and not least from that 
loss of character for which Strindberg in all his provocative variousness and 
apparent instability, was so often accused, not least by Wirsén himself:
Being employed upon precise tasks in the service of the state has given 
character a healthy firmness, and the muses, whose appearance is 
as fleeting and unpredictable as it is sweet, have thus come unbidden 
and, as they love, shown their favours without having been troubled by 
importunate and indelicate requests to be present at all times.18 
As he strove to establish himself as an independent man of letters. however, 
Strindberg recognized that ‘even when he is recognized a writer is nothing 
in himself, but everything by virtue of the opinion others have of his talent’ 
(37:151), and he therefore claimed that writers had ‘always worked with a 
great deal of noise; if they have not succeeded in making that quantity of 
bruit at which they have aimed, they have once again vanished into the eternal 
silence.’19 ‘Rien n’est si désagréable que d’être pendu obscurément’, as he was 
tempted to add to the title page of The Red Room;20 and hence the writer, if he 
is at all well known, becomes a kind of public property, even a public spectacle:
The writer is a person who appears in public. The public follows his 
apprenticeship and watches his progress. The newspapers follow his 
work both with affectionate care and microscopic attention. He walks 
a tightrope over a waterfall. As long as he goes elegantly, no one dares 
whistle. On the contrary, people outdo each other in their applause to 
show they have taste. But as a public, they cannot avoid feeling a certain, 
why not say pleasure, if he falls. (16:53)21 
Thus, when he threatened ‘to travel around in Sweden and show [him]self for 
money’ (V:272, but the idea recurs, and finally as a metaphor for his career as 
a writer in the late prose text, ‘The Inevitable’ (46:71)), it was only an extension 
of this primary appearance before the public that Strindberg had in mind. Had 
he not already sought to exhibit himself in language, there would have been no 
question of this physical spectacle. 
When, however, it is ostensibly the writer himself, or his pseudonymous 
representative, who is repeatedly launched upon the market, the situation 
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wherein the writer makes a business out of his inner life becomes particularly 
transparent, especially when retailed with the nakedness with which Strindberg 
appears to display himself.22 Indeed, Strindberg generally regards private 
experience as a form of primary capital, to be accumulated and then invested 
in language. ‘Better, however, an unhappy marriage than none at all. One 
goes through it and comes out more experienced than before, and experience 
is capital’ (41:290), the literary entrepreneur, Smartman, maintains, at the 
close of Black Banners, and Strindberg, too, evidently considered the events 
he sometimes instigates in order to acquire the material he needs for his work 
as kapital (capital) to be transformed into kapitel (chapters). ‘Well, I got a new 
chapter out of it’ (I:151), he remarks, after parting from an early mistress, much 
as when the hero of the late autobiographical novel, The Cloister, salvages his 
sinking courage on the way to meet his estranged wife’s family by adopting 
‘as usual the writer’s point of view: “If I don’t come out of this with honour, 
I shall at least get a chapter for my novel!”’ (C:92). Or as he observes again, 
some five pages later, when he relates how he ‘went out to botanize and look at 
the landscape, and worked himself up into an irresponsible creative mood in 
which he thought about the piquant aspects of the situation: “This is a scene 
which no one has experienced before! It is mine, even if it’s going to make my 
skin smart”’ (C:97). 
It is such ‘collections of experienced material’ (18:274 – materialsamlingar 
av erfarenheter), as he calls them, which form the basis of his production, and 
either immediately or in due course, they are turned to his account by a talent 
which authorizes the accumulation of experience irrespective of the cost to 
others which its exploitation occasions. ‘He considered his talent was also a 
kind of capital; even if it brought no profit now, it gave him the right and duty 
to live whatever the cost’ (19:27), he explains in The Son of a Servant, just as 
he later confesses that ‘for me life is only material for dramatic works’,23 and 
acknowledges in a diary entry for 25 January 1901 that ‘if my life had passed 
calmly and quietly, I would not have had anything to relate.’ Moreover, as a 
practising author he prides himself on the ability to perceive not only what is 
valuable in experience, but also how it should best be utilized. Hence the delight 
with which he realizes that some events, for example Dagny Juel’s appearance 
in Berlin, come ready cut and trimmed (klippt och skuret) for literature (‘Oh it’s 
a novel!’ (IX:188) he exclaims, with relish) or fall into the appropriate literary 
form when exposed to a tutored ear. In the Vivisection ‘La Genese d’une 
Aspasie’, the accomplished man of letters instructs the novice: ‘Installé dans la 
même maison le maître dédie une éducation complète au petit, le fait narrer sa 
vie, lui indique où gisent les motifs avantageux. “C’est du théâtre, lui enseigne-
t-il; voici une nouvelle; voila un roman’’’ (VR:22)
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The experience behind such mastery is intimated early in The Cloister, 
which opens with the writer reflecting upon recent events: ‘By lying in bed 
and chewing over his experiences like this, he converted them into literary 
currency, and thus engraved or riveted them so securely on his mind that he 
could draw on them for future use as safely as if they were funds deposited in 
a bank’ (C:14). Again the image is characteristic. Nothing may be squandered: 
the trace of every event is jealously guarded and, his spendthrift inspiration 
notwithstanding, Strindberg frequently refers to this steadily augmented basic 
capital in terms of prudent literary house-keeping. For the question is often how 
much he has in his current account and how much is deposited for the future or 
lying unused or unexploited in the form of already written but unpublished or 
out of print works that represent ‘dead capital’ (V:278) on which he demands 
the ‘interest’ (IX:205) due to him. Thus when writing The Son of a Servant he 
deliberately leaves certain motifs on the shelf. This is particularly the case with 
his experiences on the island of Kymmendö in the Stockholm archipelago, and 
with the history of his first marriage. For the time being both are allowed to 
gather interest, but in May 1886 he tells Bonnier that ‘when I have finished 
part II, I have been thinking of writing a little book of Swedish idylls for the 
Christmas trade… These are savings (sparpenningar) from The Son of a Servant, 
in which the scenery has been intentionally neglected’ (V:320), and some six 
months later he already sees their realisation in ‘a Swedish rural novel in which 
I shall invest my large reserve fund from Kymmendö, which I have not used as 
long as I had hopes of returning there again’, adding, with a rare and passing 
tolerance: ‘To be sure, young Geijerstam has drawn a small compulsory loan 
on my fund, but I have seven years’ savings and so many feathers left that I 
can donate a little down to the goslings’ (VI:122). As for the history of his 
marriage, he merely remarks, darkly: ‘We’ll come back to the matter’.
This attitude to the relationship between the writer’s work and his lived 
experience is not, of course, unique to Strindberg. At about the same time, 
Victoria Benedictsson wrote to Axel Lundegård that ‘we writers have no other 
capital to draw on than our knowledge of human nature. This is therefore the 
capital which we must accumulate’,24 and Béatrice Didier has recently written 
persuasively of the way in which the intimate journal becomes a deposit 
account for ‘le capital fondamental: le moi’25 as it is augmented or misspent 
from day to day. But in Strindberg’s case, rooted as it so firmly is in the spirit 
of Protestantism to which Didier often alludes in her analysis, it is exacerbated 
by his pronounced sense of property rights, both as regards his own person and 
the ideas he entertains. Writing, which acts as a daily inventory in which he 
monitors the debit and credit of his account with the world, is also entrusted 
(and not only in the period when he was preoccupied with the notion of a 
‘battle of the brains’) with the preservation of the writer’s intellectual domain. 
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‘It is surely the case’, he argues, in the late essay, ‘The Mysticism of World 
History’ 
that when someone has adopted an opinion or viewpoint, it is somehow 
assimilated into their person and becomes a property which at first 
requires defending, and then that one goes on to the attack in order to 
increase it, like any other type of property. To surrender one’s opinion to 
another’s is really like being conquered, becoming another man’s slave, 
and one does not want that to happen. (54:370)
Thus the intensity with which Strindberg maintained the principle that ‘what 
one has oneself experienced is of course one’s own, and he who wishes to take 
it away from one is a thief (X:216), and hence the lasting aggravation to which 
he was provoked by an embezzler of other people’s experience such as Gustaf 
af Geijerstam, whom he repeatedly accused of filching his material.26 For if, 
as The Unknown declares, ‘what I have lived through is mine and no one 
else’s’, then ‘what I have read has (also) become mine, because I broke it in 
pieces like glass, melted it down, and out of the shapeless mass blew new glass 
in new forms’ (29:322), and Strindberg consequently resents all interference 
with his script since, once written, it has the creditworthiness of any more 
orthodox financial transaction: ‘Altering a text which is signed by an author 
ought really to be considered tantamount to altering the value of an accepted 
bill of exchange’ (54:236). 
However, the kind of conspicuous consumption of private experience 
in which Strindberg engages is ultimately a form of self-consumption. 
Paradoxically, in displaying his riches so generously, he periodically 
impoverishes himself and needs to replenish his resources. ‘My purpose in 
travelling to Berlin’, he informs Schering, ‘is for study and to get some new 
ideas, for here the sleep of winter prevails all the year round, and I have lived 
up the whole of my stock which I brought back from abroad the last time’ 
(XIV:220). For the kind of primary capital accumulated in lived experience 
or drawn from other books (and topping up experience could be expensive, as 
Strindberg indicated to Bonnier apropos the story ‘Rebuilding’ (Nybyggnad): 
‘the novella is composed, studied (I have read 100 francs worth of books)’ 
(V:8)) is rapidly exhausted, and a professional writer such as Strindberg elected 
to be, is forced, as Waiter Berendsohn once pointed out, continually to
look about him for a new motif, which stimulated and attracted him, but 
which also saved him from repeating himself and boring his readers. 
Originality, not to come again with the same thing, to be new and in 
the vanguard of intellectual development, are clearly conscious demands, 
which he placed upon himself and his creativity.27
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Always afraid of ‘falling behind’ (V:343 – att bli på efterkälken) in the advance 
of contemporary ideas, this is one reason for the apparent inconsistency of 
Strindberg’s work, its frequent shifts in direction, the rapid introduction of 
new subjects, styles, and genres, the continual enticement to experiment with 
fresh standpoints, to change his mind, his place of residence, or even his wife, 
in accordance with the modernist doctrine that Baudelaire formulated so 
succinctly: 
Plonger au fond du gouffre, Enfer ou Ciel qu’importe?  
Au fond de l’inconnu pour trouver du nouveau!28
As the autobiographical persona of the barely fictional narrative “Sequestration 
Journey’’ (Kvarstadsresan) points out, ‘All my work is only a matter of changing 
opinions’ (17:18), in part because – as Strindberg once expostulated to 
Littmansson – ‘It must be new! New!’ (X: 189), and the consequences of such 
an attitude are to be found in A Madman’s Defence, fruit of ‘an experimental 
psychological investigation’ that is ostensibly undertaken ‘merely to enrich my 
literary fund’ (VI:242), in The Cloister, where Axel has ‘consumed most of his 
experiences’ (C:73) and therefore sets out to replenish his stocks by finding 
what Strindberg at the time liked to call ‘novels in reality’ (IX:104), or in 
Inferno where, already adept at cultivating sickness and passion in himself in 
pursuit of the truthfully observed motif, he commences his return to literature 
by adopting the mood of deceptively casual receptivity that he attributes to 
Axel in The Cloister:
I have no opinions, only impromptues, and life would become pretty 
monotonous if one were to think and to say the same thing every day. It 
must be new; the whole of life is after all only a poem, and it is much more 
amusing to float over the swamp than to stick one’s feet down and search 
for firm ground, where none exists. (C:58)
On occasion, at least, this was the spirit in which he embarked for the continent 
in 1892 to fill what became known as ‘Gröna säcken’, the green canvas bag into 
which he put his notes and scientific records, and the seemingly directionless 
period in Berlin, his short second marriage included, emerges as a time in which 
Strindberg accumulates the capital of experience without at first knowing how 
to make use of it in literature. It offers an image of Strindberg as the plaything 
of chance, at drift, allowing events to happen to him (‘I feel liberated, drifting 
on the surface of a sea’ (28:10), he recapitulates this mood later) but trawling 
fresh matter to replace his exhausted copy. ‘I act by improvising; that makes 
life more amusing’ (28:78), he explains, and while his striving for some kind 
of transmutation certainly retains a role for the improvident goldmaker 
with which his existence during this period is most dramatically associated, 
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it is pertinent to notice that the immediate crisis is artistic, a combination 
of factors to which Strindberg, with his acute feeling for the pulse of literary 
history, was especially sensitive.29 Sensing that ‘the naturalistic period… has 
now come to an end’ (28:182), and in any case no longer wishing to locate 
himself in a moral and intellectual framework with which he had never been 
entirely at ease; responsive to the challenge which Verner von Heidenstam’s 
literary manifesto, Renässans, directed against his already eroded standing in 
Sweden;30 encouraged by the example of Przybyszewski’s and Munch’s artistic 
experiments in Berlin and his acquaintance with Gauguin and the Symbolists 
in Paris, where he discovered an art that was alert to ‘l’inépuisable fond de 
l’universelle analogie’31 and not prostrate before the superficial transcription of 
external reality (and as he told Hedlund ‘I abandoned writing literature to avoid 
being superficial’ (XI:138)), he ‘commence aussi à sentir un besoin immense 
de devenir sauvage et de créer un monde nouveau’.32 In short, he recognizes 
the need to renew a genre which he had himself brought to fruition in Miss 
Julie and Creditors, and his ‘Inferno Crisis’, with its issue in the achievement 
of To Damascus and A Dream Play, is thus undoubtedly best apprehended in 
the light of Boris Eichenbaum’s shrewd judgement upon an analogous and 
contemporary case: ‘At the core of all Tolstoy’s crises lies the search for new 
artistic forms and for their new rationale.’33 And if this new rationale is to 
be seen as fundamentally ‘mystic’, as is now sometimes the case, then it is 
worth remembering that, as A. G. Lehmann wisely points out in his study of 
Strindberg’s French contemporaries: ‘mysticism affects aesthetic theory not by 
enabling its adepts to ‘believe anything’, but by giving them, or attempting to 
give them, an explanation why they find art valuable at all.’34 
For the process of self-consumption inherent in his Naturalist aesthetic 
frequently overwhelms Strindberg with feelings of disgust that extend to 
his practice as a writer in general. In a letter of 1898 he described himself 
as someone who ‘gehe… wie ein Menschenfresser und Henker herum. 
Welch’ ein Lebensberuf Schriftsteller zu sein: wie ein Fleischhauer töten und 
verkaufen’ (XII:342), a description in which the characteristic conflation of 
text and flesh recalls both the famous quatrain from his volume of poetry, 
Sleepwalking Nights: 
Där hänger på boklådsfönstret 
en tunnklädd liten bok.  
Det är ett urtaget hjärta  
som dinglar där på sin krok. (13:209) 
(There hangs in the bookshop window / a thinly clad little book. It is a 
gutted heart / which dangles there on its hook.) 
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and the even earlier critical observation on another writer from 1876: ‘A writer 
is not a writer just because he has written a book, for he has not had the courage 
to give his own blood, give a piece of his own inner life, instead of those events 
he has only encountered by chance. It is a grisly task to place one’s heart on 
a montre. It is the cruelest kind of sacrifice to be a writer – but that is how it 
is!’35 And these doubts, shored up as they are by the notion of self-sacrifice, 
are only compounded when he recognizes the impossibility of writing openly 
of himself without encroaching upon the property of those about him, an 
anxiety which informs the account of the writer’s life presented in The Cloister, 
where Axel’s consumption of his outstanding experiences reveals (if somewhat 
disingenuously, since the book implicitly in question, A Madman’s Defence, 
had in fact been written by Strindberg some years earlier and in different 
circumstances to those in this retrospective reconstruction of his life) how 
exhaustion and poverty compel him to encroach upon a proscribed domain: 
Approaching penury had forced him to sit down unwillingly to write, 
but as he had consumed most of his experiences he was obliged to 
misappropriate a subject that was really proscribed. He suppressed his 
own feelings, overcame all discretion, and began. (C:73–4)
The irony of the situation, in which the writer who preys upon himself and 
offers up his flesh for others to consume also battens upon those close to him 
and devours them like a cannibal or vampire, is in this case multiple. In order 
to provide both for his previous wife and children, and for his new attachment, 
the only narrative he has on hand is ‘the merciless portrait of his first marriage’ 
(C:75). Unable to produce a new work, in part because the already written 
account of this marriage so disgusts him, and quite unable, too, to invent 
or imagine a text with no basis in his experience, the unpublished book is 
nevertheless his only immediate means of support. And yet, by publishing it, 
his revulsion at his trade as a writer becomes too great even for the role of 
scientific vivisector which he evolved during the 1880s to exonerate him from 
writing as he does so explicitly of others. Torn between the morality of telling 
what he regards as the truth and the immorality of publishing the private (or 
put another way: unable to reconcile himself to satisfying the demands of a 
voracious market by continuing to prey upon himself and others), he now 
experiences how 
… the increasing distaste which he had for some time felt for his profession 
as a writer developed into an abhorence. 
What an occupation: to sit and flay one’s fellow human beings and 
then offer their skins for sale and expect they should buy them. To be 
like the hunter who in his hunger hacks off his dog’s tail, eats the flesh 
himself and gives the dog the bones, his own bones. To go about spying 
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out people’s secrets, to betray one’s best friend’s birthmark, use one’s wife 
as a guinea pig (vivisektionskanin), behave like a Croat, chop down, defile, 
burn and sell. (C:130–1)36 
Thus it is that when Strindberg attempts to recapture the spirit and ideas of the 
years leading up to his Inferno crisis, in a narrative that is inevitably coloured 
by his later experiences, his representative in the book, Axel, is already depicted 
as trying consciously ‘to purge himself from the leaven of Naturalism’ (C:20) 
which produced so brutal a book as A Madman’s Defence, at the same time as he 
is shown up as the unwilling writer of such a book because unlike Strindberg 
when he came to review these years, he has not yet developed an alternative 
way of seeing the world.
II
Whatever the anachronistic obscurities of The Cloister, however, it is not 
surprising that as the most transparent and far-reaching example of his 
naturalistic art, A Madman’s Defence should so compel Strindberg’s attention. 
Of all his works, it is the one which disturbs him most, and it intrudes into 
many other texts besides The Cloister, where he claims it was ‘written in self-
defence and as a testament, because in finishing it [he] intended to take his 
own life’ (C:79). Obliquely, its presence is already felt in Creditors, where Tekla 
uneasily deflects discussion of the book she has written about her first marriage 
(23:253); it reappears, unexpectedly but appropriately, in Black Banners, in 
Zachris’s plans for the publication of a similar story in Germany ‘if pressed 
by necessity’ (41:214 – A Madman’s Defence was, of course, first published 
in Germany as Die Beichte eines Thoren); and it is also a central motif in To 
Damascus I where, as the embodiment of his guilt and of his misused talent, it 
relates The Unknown’s situation in the first scene to the hiatus in his literary 
career which comes to light when he admits ‘I am bankrupt, for I have lost the 
ability to create’ (29:101) partly as a result of his most recent book, the account 
of a previous marriage which he forbids his companion to read. It is only when 
he acknowledges this link between his guilt and his literary impotence that 
he begins his progress along the road to Damascus, and towards the rationale 
which provides him with the basis of a new art. 
Moreover, Strindberg’s often contradictory and perplexing, sometimes 
ingenious, and on occasion deliberately misleading comments on the book 
between 1887 and 1894, indicate the continual disquiet, embarrassment, and 
uncertainty it caused him, not only as regards the propriety of what he had 
done in writing so intimately and with such venom of the private life he shared 
with others (and here the barbarous deformation of the producer referred to 
by Marx in his account of alienated commodity production is again a relevant 
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factor), but also as to what kind of writing the book represents, to which 
domain, public or private, it belongs, its genre, who should read it, where, 
and in what language and what form. For beyond what the book reveals of 
Strindberg and his intimate life is what it conveys of the nineteenth century 
literary institution, of the writer’s confinement to a largely private sphere of 
existence, and the conflict between the exploitation in literature of private 
material and the economic necessity of its publication, a conflict accomplished 
by a shift in public expectations, which now anticipate the lineaments of the 
author in every kind of literary text. 
If combining what Zola terms ‘une méthode chirurgicale, s’appuyant sur 
la science, aidant la science’37 with a Kierkegaardian sense of duty seems to 
sanction his right as a writer ‘to intervene with his time-honoured freedom 
in human lives and destinies, as a calling and a duty’ (37:108), and thereby to 
satisfy ‘the spirit of the time [in its challenge] to write about the living and not 
the dead’ (VI:191), then Strindberg feels justified in overturning the reticence 
of a previous generation (and the shift can be observed in a comparison with 
Trollope’s remark in his autobiography: ‘My marriage was like the marriage 
of other people, and of no special interest to anyone except my wife’)38 and 
publishing what he originally called the ‘Histoire de mon marriage’, a work he 
claimed was ‘plus sincére que toute le reste’ (X:86) and warranted because ‘it 
is my story stark naked… It is a terrible book, but it is a true one’ (VIII:188). 
Initially he regarded it as ‘a whole original novel in French’ (VI:381) which, 
with Zola in mind, he often called his ‘Oeuvre’,39 and in March 1888 he was 
already sounding out Hans Österling with a view to publication. His approach 
even hints at the category into which the work might fall: ‘Do you dare take 
a French novel, set in Sweden, as indiscreet as [Hans Jæger’s Fra] Kristiania-
Bohêmen, but tremendously good, and which cannot or may not ever be 
published in a Scandinavian language’ (VII:33)?40 But the proviso already 
indicates a reservation. If, as Sven Rinman infers,41 a foreign language gave 
him an essential, uninhibiting distance to his material which enabled him to 
write the book in the first place, Strindberg also wrote in French because he 
knew that ‘when a work creates a scandal in its country of origin, it only has to 
cross the frontier where one no longer knows the “local circumstances” and it 
becomes literature’ (16:48).42 
But while a foreign language might suggest a wish to shield the feelings of 
those about whom he wrote, it also had practical advantages. As he explained 
to his cousin, the manuscript ‘consists of 350 quarto pages, in French, for the 
dual purpose of keeping completely unauthorized people out of the matter, 
and so that it may not come under the heading of a Swedish manuscript, 
which according to certain contracts would fall to my publisher’ (VII:43). And 
when he tried to interest the French publisher, Albert Savine, in the book, 
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it was certainly not least this Scandinavian public that he envisaged among 
its potential readership: ‘D’ailleurs et pour fixer le nombre des exemplaires à 
imprimer, il faut vous dire que vous pouvez compter sur mon public entier en 
Suède, Norvège, Danemark et Finland, en égard à ce qu’une édition en langue 
Scandinave ne sera jamais publiée’ (VIII:371). While he continued to describe 
A Madman’s Defence as a novel when expedient, however, the very fragility of 
its almost diaphanous fictional guise caused him to contemplate an alternative 
future for the text by playing down its literariness and stressing its documentary, 
even its testamentary, character as an ‘Ehrenrettung’ (VII:42), composed ‘in 
the face of death’ to claim his own redress, repudiate ‘the fable that I was 
mad’ (VII:48), and correct his strategy in texts such as The Father, in which he 
maintained he had ‘lead opinion astray on purpose in order to conceal the real 
situation’ (VII:47). ‘Ce n’est pas un roman,’ he told an unknown correspondent 
in 1893, ‘ni un livre dans le sens propre de ce mot, c’est plutôt un fragment 
d’une vie agitée, et ce volume, écrit devant la mort; déposé chez des parents sous 
le sçeau pendant deux ans il fut destiné à servir comme document de famille 
pour l’avenir, je n’avais jamais l’intention de le faire imprimer’ (IX:339), and 
in fact, three days after his letter to Österling of March 1888, he had already 
informed Edvard Brandes that he was working on ‘my history, which will 
never be published, but will be read in manuscript by my surviving [relatives]’ 
(VII:36). Moreover, when he took the extraordinary precaution of sending 
the book in manuscript to his cousin, Johan, and (thereby covering himself 
against misreport, and the text against misrepresentation) also to Heidenstam, 
the accompanying letters described it as ‘a document to be deposited in the 
family archives… to enlighten posterity about the situation, provided that 
violent measures do not compel me to disclose everything immediately to 
my contemporaries’ (VII:43). And such was the uncertainty surrounding the 
domain of this text in the minds of Strindberg’s contemporaries as well as in 
his own, that as a submission for the defence in the mysterious prosecution 
brought against the book in Germany, this family letter was indeed accepted 
as evidence that it was neither a novel nor intended for publication. 
Whatever the purpose he attributed to the book, however, the moral dilemma 
in writing and publishing A Madman’s Defence was certainly instrumental in 
provoking the revaluation of personal values during the Inferno period, when 
Strindberg largely abandoned literature for science and painting. In the former 
he escapes into a neutral language of chemical formulae and mathematical 
symbols that precludes identification save eventually of the’ calculating… 
measuring… master builder’ (27:494) whose signature he came to recognize in 
the recurring forms of nature; in the latter, he abandons himself to ‘the teleology 
of chance’ (X:215) and carries painting to the verge of non-representation, to 
the point at which the subject vanishes. Thus in both cases he avoids the type 
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of compromising identifications of the Naturalist period and also, as Göran 
Söderström has suggested, transforms the visible world into a skogssnufvistisk (or 
modernist) work of art, evolved by a creator whose artistic rationale resembles 
nothing so much as Strindberg’s own.43 From the too naked exposure of 
Naturalist writing a clef, with its merciless treatment of those surrounding his 
own central figure, he therefore works towards the rehabilitation of fantasy and 
an art that yields its innermost secrets only to those initiated into the mysticism 
of everyday life, where ‘banal facts’ (XI:263) and ‘strange chance occurences’ 
are transposed by analogy into meaningful events and a moral order wherein 
man is no longer, as in Naturalism, continuous with a determining nature 
that seems to preclude either a basis for personal responsibility or a rationale 
for pain and suffering, but part of a planned cosmology, in which the earth 
resembles a place of correction for crimes committed before birth, and men 
and women are merely one another’s tormentors: ‘If this existence is already 
purgatory or an inferno for crimes we have previously committed we are all 
demons, here to torment each other, and when we are driven against our will 
to do evil, we are only doing our duty, but suffer all the same from the fact 
that we have done wrong. This is the double curse of existence. No one has the 
opportunity of tormenting one another as thoroughly as a man and woman, 
who love each other (= hate each other)’.44
Thus his return to literature and to the continuing exposure of himself and 
others is again authorised, for he is now able to see his own life in its emblematic 
form as an exemplum or ‘warning to others’ (28:6) which he considers it his 
duty to make public, and in place of the no longer tenable role of vivisector he 
can, as the interpreter of this rediscovered moral order, recognize it as his duty 
to chastise others as they, indeed, seem so often to chastise him. And just as 
he had previously found solace in the idea that he had ‘sacrificed all the peace 
of my private life and offered up my whole person for the sheep’ (V:356) as 
‘the preacher, the prophet, the truth teller’ (18:313), so the later conception of 
the writer as a ‘scapegoat’ is already developed in the confession, ‘I struck my 
own wife, myself! It was a personal sacrifice, which I had to make. But that I 
struck those who were wretched! That is terrible, but it was perhaps the most 
essential point of all’. Ultimately, such statements, like the numerous Biblical 
texts from Ezekiel and Jonah, which come to hand whenever his writer’s role 
perturbs him, serve to ratify his conduct both retrospectively and in later works 
such as The Dance of Death and Black Banners, in which on one level of the 
text at least, his material is no less personal than in the Naturalist novels and 
plays. For in both public and private matters he continues to expose himself 
and those about him; it is simply that after the Inferno crisis he works within a 
framework that mitigates his guilt. As he explains, to the poet Gustaf Fröding, 
‘[I] must go forth and prophesy, in spite of the risk of being disavowed like 
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Jonah’ (XII:316); only now, in the economics of experience he has evolved for 
his craft, he expects to pay in terms of personal suffering for the use he makes 
of other lives besides his own. 
This, then, is the passion of the writer as it appears to Strindberg, and his 
suffering is without end because, his periodic schemes to combine literature 
with some other source of income notwithstanding, there is never any serious 
doubt that he will continue to appear before the public in words. However, as 
strategems ‘to save my talent from overproduction and my children’s future 
from misère’ (VIII:180), to provide the secure and regular income which 
writing did not yet afford, and to retain the freedom to write as he chose (and 
for this reason he also resisted the idea of a writer’s stipendium as a form of 
‘commitment which a writer ought not to take upon himself (54:235)), all 
the possibilities that he entertains as regards an alternative career, whether as 
banker’s clerk (VII:76), language teacher, tourist guide (VIII:180), gardener 
(V:121), lighthouse keeper (VIII:209), secretary and amanuensis to the theatre 
director August Lindberg (IX:8), or ‘secretary, majordomo, or head waiter in 
a large hotel’ (VII:79) where, like Jean in Miss Julie, he dreams of using his 
talent for foreign languages, deserve serious consideration both for what they 
reveal of his general predicament as a writer of exceptional range and ability 
who was yet unable to live by his pen, and because, as Bo Bennich-Björkman 
is almost alone in remarking, they ‘may well… be related to central conflicts 
rooted in his life and writing.’ ‘All Strindberg’s plans in this direction have still 
not been properly studied and seem to be regarded by a number of researchers 
as no more than passing fancies,’45 Björkman observes. Seen in the context of 
the pressures imposed on him by his chosen mode of writing, however, they are 
illuminating. When, for example, he informs Bonnier that ‘one fine day I will 
advertise for a position in a bookshop, as a correspondent, or for the tenancy of a 
market garden – I’m quite serious about this’, his threat occurs in a letter where 
he once again describes writing as ‘a raw and repulsive occupation’ (V:121), 
and the stability of these alternative ways of earning a living also reflects that 
underlying concern over the apparently immoral ease and lack of constraint 
with which art and the artistic life were customarily associated in his mind. 
‘Everyone worked apart from him,’ Johan reflects, in The Son of a Servant: 
‘When he now compared his dissolute, irregular life, without peace or quiet, to 
theirs, he considered them both happier and better. Their lives were serious and 
they carried out their tasks and fulfilled their duties without any hullabaloo or 
boasting’ (18:397), and from the early comedy, Anno’ 48, and The Red Room 
(in which Olle Montanus’s words from beyond the grave describe the artistic 
urge as ‘resting upon a broad basis of a desire for freedom, freedom from useful 
work’ (5:357)) to To Damascus III, where the choir of children intones ‘Thou 
shalt feed thyself with the work of thine hands’ (29:245), Strindberg is haunted 
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by a sense of guilt at the artist’s apparent immunity from ‘the curse [incurred] in 
the Fall of Man’ (5:357). And hence, against the remarkably constant anxiety 
which a ‘life of poetic idling’ (18:364) arouses in him throughout his career, 
Strindberg also evokes a life of order, of clear moral precepts, firm parameters 
in a world that is secure, clean, harmonious, and, ultimately, patriarchal. On 
the one hand, there is the ‘unnatural’ isolation of ‘the unclean bachelor life’ 
(28:252) to which the practice of art seems periodically to reduce him; on 
the other, a ‘natural’ world of work and of the home, which promises him 
membership in a community whose lack has otherwise pained him from his 
first days at university in Uppsala, when the glimpse through a half-open door 
of ‘a paterfamilias, a mother, and their children about a well-laid table’ (1:30)46, 
revealed a world from which he now felt excluded, and which continues to 
enchant him even as he attempts and fails to achieve it once again in his 
relationship with Harriet Bosse, to whom he writes: ‘And I only see things in 
a good light when we three are together. We three, man, woman, child were 
a world, legitimate, whole, sufficient unto ourselves, and therefore beautiful’ 
(XV:30).47
In one form or another, in Master Olof, Getting Married, By the Open 
Sea, Inferno or To Damascus, the conflict between isolation and community, 
the creative individual and the family, informs a large part of Strindberg’s 
production, and throughout his work references to matrimony and the family 
are of course legion. ‘The whole of my being rests upon my family’ (IV:45), 
he maintains in 1884, and when he loses the first edition he laments: ‘The 
worst of it is that work, life, business, cease to interest me when I do not 
have my family to struggle for, and in isolation I die’ (VII:49). And yet, as 
a practising writer, his hold on family life is so demonstrably fragile. ‘I was 
born for family life and a mate – and see what happened!’, he exclaims on 
6 September 1901 in The Occult Diary: the attempt to be both a writer and 
a family man repeatedly founders even as it becomes the object of insistent 
literary scrutiny, in the course of which he evolves the legend of himself as 
having been ‘born out of grace, brought up as life’s step child, harried, hunted, 
in a word, cursed’ (29:241) to account for the failure of his ‘youthful dream 
of a house, where peace and purity dwelt’ (29:240). Thus, although he would 
certainly have distinguished himself from the standpoint of those writers 
(particularly Flaubert, the Goncourts, and Huysmans) who demonstrate their 
opposition to bourgeois society by rejecting the nineteenth-century cult of the 
family as inimical to art, Strindberg’s predicament emerges, in practice if not 
in precept, as reminiscent of Flaubert, James, or Kierkegaard, for all of whom 
writing involves a sacrifice of life itself.48 
Like Strindberg, too, these writers frequently stressed the complex interplay 
of forces by which, if art preyed upon other lives, it also fed upon the artist, 
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however apparent his detachment from the text he produced. Flaubert, for 
example, often resorted to the same kind of violent physical image to describe 
his situation as Strindberg employed to encompass the enforced exposure of 
his inner life. Just as Strindberg was accustomed to see this as the painful and 
unsightly baring of his entrails (inälvor), so Flaubert protested: ‘Un livre est une 
chose essentiellement organique, cela fait partie de nous-mêmes. Nous nous 
sommes arraché du ventre un peu de tripes, que nous servons aux bourgeois’,49 
and wrote, once more to Feydeau, whose wife was dying: ‘Tu as et tu vas a voir 
de bons tableaux et tu pourras faire de bonnes etudes! C’est chérement les payer. 
Le bourgeois ne se doutent guère que nous leur servons notre cœur.’50 Moreover, 
the stress on method at the expense of experience in Flaubert’s correspondence, 
and the theory of impassibilité, are in part a response to this situation. For 
if, as Lukács points out, the division of labour now excludes the writer from 
living a multifaceted life and isolates him ‘as a subject, from all experiences not 
intended exclusively as the accomplishment of the work,’51 the consequences 
are twofold. Firstly, as the experiential capital to hand diminishes, the writer is 
reduced to the role of observer. Secondly, when he is thus thrown back upon 
his private life and condemned to observe himself and those close to him, a 
condition arises (and not only for Flaubert at Croisset) in which it is the work 
that possesses life while its author, plundered by his creation, is emptied of 
vitality. 
This situation has been conveyed in two striking images. In Illusions perdues, 
Claude Vigon observes:
Le génie est une horrible maladie. Tout écrivain porte en son cœur un 
monstre qui, semblable au tænia dans l’estomac, y dévore les sentiments 
à mesure qu’ils y éclosent. Qui triomphera? la maladie de l’homme, ou 
l’homme de la maladie? Certes, il faut être un grand homme pour tenir 
la balance entre son génie et son caractère. Le talent grandit, le cœur se 
dessèche.52
In The Will to Power, meanwhile, Nietzsche, like Strindberg, prefers the 
vampire to the tapeworm:
Artists are not men of great passion, whatever they may like to tell us 
and themselves. And this for two reasons: they lack any sense of shame 
before themselves (they observe themselves while they live; they spy on 
themselves, they are too inquisitive) and they also lack any sense of shame 
before great passion (they exploit it as artists). Secondly, however, their 
vampire, their talent, grudges them as a rule that squandering of force 
which one calls passion. – If one has a talent, one is also its victim: one 
lives under the vampirism of one’s talent.53
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But like Marx, who has his own vision of the vampire ‘in the shade of capital, of 
dead labour, that dominates and pumps dry, living labour-power’,54 what both 
these passages emphasize is that the victories of art seem to be bought by a loss 
of character, and that this loss may be interpreted in two ways. Most palpably, 
it has to do with the moral dubiousness of the procedure already examined, in 
which the writer is obliged to turn his private life to account and encouraged 
to publicize himself. Irrespective of any autobiographical pact, therefore, the 
text and its author come to be regarded as commensurate with each other. 
As Basil Hayward remarks, in The Portrait of Dorian Gray, ‘we live in an age 
when men treat art as if it were meant to be a form of autobiography’,55 and 
with the breakdown of that frank and familiar communication between writer 
and reader on which, for example, Dickens and Thackeray still congratulated 
themselves,56 it is as if the reader comes to regard the story as something 
other than fiction, as if he learns to read it symptomatically as the more or 
less masked avowal of the writer’s private life, a situation conceded even by 
many of Strindberg’s more circumspect contemporaries such as Conrad, who 
admits: ‘A writer of imaginative prose (even more than any other sort of artist) 
stands confessed in his works.’57 But there is also a sense in which the seeming 
shamelessness of the writer, his self-exposure and lack of that moral singleness 
of character upon which Strindberg so often reflected, is turned back upon 
itself and the vampire becomes the prey. It is this that Victoria Benedictsson 
hints at when she observes: ‘The people I invent batten upon me like vampires. 
They leave me hardly a drop of blood, for it is from me – from me they take 
their life.’58 
These themes, and the conflicts which underlie them, are all revived in 
Strindberg’s final major reckoning with the literary world, Black Banners, a book 
which is constructed to probe the permissible boundaries of his method and 
once again to attack the irresponsibility and immorality of his contemporaries 
in general, and of a way of life which permits a frivolous minority of artists ‘to 
sit here in freedom like this, idle in the morning, while the whole of mankind 
was working’ (41:78) in particular. 
The society portrayed in Black Banners is populated by the descendants of 
his ‘red’ book, The Red Room, the inhabitants of ‘humbug’s perverse epoch’ 
(41:32) in which, from values to reputations and from furnishings to opinions, 
everything is false, pilfered, and a lie: ‘Lies in life and ways of living, lies in 
society, in friendship and love, in legislation, administration, government, 
politics and religion’ (41:185). But what the book stresses is the economic basis 
by means of which (as he wrote to Schering, shortly after its completion), ‘False 
values are put in circulation, stolen and begged-together reputations circulate, 
and the entire values of the time become fraudulent’ (XV:44), and where it has 
become the norm ‘to write about nothing, to fabricate art without content’ 
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(41:33). As Martin Lamm remarked, in response to this novel, ‘exactly as in 
Balzac one observes in Strindberg how money is the mystical omnipotent 
power, which stands behind everything’,59 and the society depicted in the book 
is one of predatory animals in a vulgar Darwinist social jungle, creatures who 
evaluate every relationship in terms of profit and loss. The motif permeates the 
imagery. ‘People were living in a practical age of political economy and did 
not squander on conversation’, the Narrator explains, ‘everything is bought 
nowadays, and merchants appoint professors’ (41:5). Thus at the literary dinner 
with which the novel opens, Professor Stenkåhl’s precocious daughter, who 
is learning fast, inquires of one of the guests ‘Listen Kalkbrenner… have you 
bought pappa, or has he sold himself?’ (41:18), while in Stenkåhl’s ensuing 
embarrassment the listening Zachris ‘perceived all the economic possibilities 
inherent in the painful situation’ (41:25). Similarly, the Narrator remarks, of 
Zachris’s wife, Jenny: ‘Everyone who came to the house got to see her, but 
not for free. They had to pay with flowers, services, advertisements, feats of 
nature, and even with ready money’ (41:44), while in organizing her funeral it 
is pointed out that ‘Zachris, who for the moment was quoted at a low price on 
the [literary] market, did not want to risk a fiasco’ (41:275).
This economic imagery is associated almost exclusively with Zachris and 
his circle. It is they, whose dark designs and shady practices are carried through 
under the black banners of the novel’s title, who ‘steal each other’s thoughts, 
each other’s addresses, each other’s friends and one another’s identities’ (41:10). 
They live blindly behind their masks, ignorant of an alternative world which 
the novel also adumbrates, where values are solvent and true. In spite of the 
glasses which pointedly conceal his eyes rather than improve his sight, Zachris 
is unable to see this other order of existence which is visible to the group of 
intellectuals who have withdrawn to a spiritual retreat in the monastery on 
Siklaön, and which is eventually discerned, if dimly, even by Jenny. ‘Eaters of 
men’ and ‘executioners’ (41:17), these bohemians of the market place regard 
life ‘as a battlefield, and existence as a struggle for bread, position, and woman’ 
(41:288), a battlefield on which Zachris, the vampire, thrives as the most bitter 
and disturbing of Strindberg’s studies of the Alrik Lundstedt–Peer Gynt motif, 
a merciless analysis of the characterless self, of the writer as ‘a selfless jelly’ 
(41:211) who has lost himself by impersonating others and playing every role 
except his own. 
Because Zachris had ‘an enormous empty space to fill’ (41:48) within 
himself, he preys on others as ‘the racketeer of literature, forming companies 
for mutual admiration, speculating in reputations… He undertook business 
trips to publicise himself, had agencies in every corner of the country, formed 
a company to export himself to Germany… was obliging, in order both to tie 
the hands of other people and bury his pound, which could be dug up again 
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with interest when it suited him’ (41:38–9). He places others in his debt in 
order to exploit them for his private profit, both as material for literary works 
and as the tools which literature manipulates. He is unable to ‘live in and by 
himself, partly because his ‘I’ was weak from birth, partly because he had lost 
it in the course of life, or rather, sold it on fortune’s market’ (41:41) and hence 
‘he ate people, ate up their accomplishments, fed upon their private means, 
and possessed the ability to enter other lives, plough their furrow, so that 
he confused his person with other people’s’ (41:48).60 Exactly as Strindberg 
testified to the confusion between fiction and reality in his own experience as a 
writer, so Zachris loses that firm consciousness of selfhood which is associated 
with the idea of ‘character’ that had been scrutinized in The Son of a Servant. 
‘To have a conscience one must know oneself and be a self,’ the Narrator points 
out, and hence the immorality of the writer, Zachris, who ‘had always lived 
other people’s lives, never his own’ (41:211). And hence, too, the veiled self-
criticism in the novel, for if Zachris had ‘given out roles, made types of himself ’ 
(41:211) all his life, he had done no more than Strindberg, who noted, at about 
this time: ‘The poet sits and sees himself in certain scenes. Discovers he has 
distributed roles’.61 The irony is, of course, that it is by means of a fiction that 
Strindberg, unwittingly or not, suggests the truth about his own failure to tell 
the truth about himself. 
This lack of self is the basis of Zachris’s vampirism, his ability to eat his 
way into other lives and steal other people’s thoughts and emotions. But 
what commences as a long-meditated act of revenge directed by Strindberg 
against Gustaf af Geijerstam, the writer who he had long regarded as the 
pilferer of his [Strindberg’s] experience eventually develops more far-reaching 
similarities between the past and practice of its creator, and the methods 
attributed to his prey. There is of course the evident irony that in selecting 
a readily recognizable model for the character who is the main target of his 
satire, Strindberg has written a novel which solicits attention on precisely the 
interest-seeking grounds it criticizes in Zachris – as Erik Hedén remarked, 
it was such hardly concealed scandalous personal attacks which made the 
book ‘a unique means of speculation’.62 But what is more pertinent is that as 
always when he was committed to a subject, Strindberg’s characters partake 
of his own flesh and blood (and the tired metaphor is particularly appropriate 
here), as well as the body and form which others, sometimes unwillingly, lend 
him, and Zachris is no exception. Indeed, at times his ability to evoke his 
creator is striking, notably in his compulsion to transform his experiences 
into literature and write himself free of a troublesome marriage, as Strindberg 
had done in A Madman’s Defence, but also, as Hans Levander has pointed 
out,63 in the often anachronistic reactivation of mnemonic traces which occur 
in the course of Strindberg’s writing the novel, which endow Zachris with a 
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substantial layer of experience in common with his creator. The return of a 
son from a former marriage affords one such episode (it is also recorded in 
The Occult Diary and Alone)64 and material from the lonely winter Strindberg 
spent on Djursholm in 1891 after his parting from Siri von Essen, is woven 
into the melancholy Christmas Zachris spends when Jenny leaves him, as well 
as into the sufferings of the more apparent authorial surrogate, Falkenström. 
Although projected through the imagery of Strindberg’s later point of view, as 
a potential Swedenborgian vastation on the way to Damascus, this recovery of 
previous experience provides yet another instance of that jealous reluctance to 
leave anything he had lived through unutilized, which was so characteristic of 
Strindberg. 
Levander is no doubt correct in suggesting that such material recurs here 
because Strindberg’s animosity towards Geijerstam and Ellen Key (on whom 
Hanna Paj is modelled) was partly prompted by their failure to respond as 
he wished to the relationship between his wife and children and the Danish 
painter (and according to Strindberg, lesbian) Marie David, in 1891. But it is 
more constructive to see the presence of such material here as a consequence 
of the conscious parallel which the novel establishes between the destinies 
of Falkenström and Zachris. Faithful to his normal practice, Strindberg 
distributes his own experience between more than one character, or constructs 
characters from material provided by several models. As he remarked, in the 
suppressed preface to the novel: ‘That is what all of us do!… But we are not 
simply a camera show (biografteater)! We take a few features here and there, we 
work in mosaic; and when the hero (pardon the expression) is such a lump that 
he does not hold our interest, I have the right to knead in a little alien clay in 
order to pad out the match-stick man.’65 If in most respects it is Falkenström 
who represents Strindberg in the scheme of the novel, then Zachris is his 
shadow, and the parallels between them are as essential as their divergencies. 
As Bertil Romberg observes:
There are several parallel patterns in the novel. Thus Zachris’s marriage 
and its development is paralleled by what is related of Falkenström’s 
marriage. The parallel is underlined by the somewhat complicated 
position that Zachris has once acquired in Falkenström’s marriage, while 
Falkenström periodically lives as the third party in Zachris’s household.66 
More relevant than these facts, however, is the way in which the two writers 
react differently to two complementary experiences. This is stressed by the 
structural juxtaposition of Falkenström’s suffering or passion, in Chapter Nine, 
and the agony of Zachris’s Christmas, both of which represent a Swedenborgian 
vastation, wherein the individual is confronted by his past and provided with 
the evidence necessary for its correct interpretation, in much the same manner 
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as similar experiences form the substance of the key scenes in Strindberg’s post-
Inferno drama. Falkenström thereby learns to see matters in a different light. 
He takes the commonplace, that the earth is hell, literally, and makes his way 
through the inferno to Siklaön, where he hesitantly undergoes initiation into 
a new and purer world view similar to the one that Strindberg glosses in the 
speculations of A Blue Book. That is to say, in the course of Black Banners, 
Falkenström moves beyond a Naturalist standpoint to accept the existence 
of another level of reality as it is expressed in one of Strindberg’s favourite 
formulations – it is also inscribed near the head of The Occult Diary:’
‘If you want to learn to know the invisible, then observe the visible with 
the utmost care’, the Talmud states. Everyday life is full of mysticism, 
but you see so badly; and you have to be a Naturalist in order to become 
mystic. But it is not only a question of being able to spell; you have to join 
it all together, otherwise you cannot read. (41:200) 
Zachris, on the other hand, although offered one of the keys to correct 
interpretation in the work of Carl du Prel (41:172), from whose Philosophie der 
Mystik, Strindberg had drawn frequent enlightenment, remains an illiterate. 
Although it seems to him ‘as if the devil himself had written the text today’ 
(41:162) when he flees his isolation in a succession of unhappy encounters 
among those who might torment him into knowledge, he cannot decipher, in 
the minutiae of these experiences, a causal connection between events in which 
the meaning of his life would be spelled out. His life remains a textual enigma 
and he therefore persists in the blindness now associated with Naturalism, 
among those who live like the lascivious apes of Strindberg’s post Darwinist 
ancestral nightmare: ‘they walk in darkness and wound themselves, they root 
around in the earth like swine after truffles, they turn their backs upon the 
archetypes and see only the copies. Therefore they worship Maja, the earth 
spirit, woman, and when they do not wish to serve God in love they slave under 
Omphale in hate’ (41:185–6). 
However, it is their role as writers which forms the essential bond between 
Zachris and Falkenström. Both take their material directly from life, both 
are writing novels on living subjects (Zachris on Jenny and Falkenström on 
Zachris), and early on in the book Falkenström, too, is seen as a vampire 
‘gaping to swallow something as sweet as a woman’s secret’ (41:74) or literally 
biting Jenny’s arm (41:65). But if Falkenström’s literary exploitation of Zachris 
appears to be a replica of Zachris’s treatment of his wife (and certainly it 
suggests too self-consciously the way in which the text recording this event is 
produced), Strindberg is concerned to represent it as something else. Where 
Zachris remains a Naturalist, Falkenström’s entry into the retreat on Siklaön 
elevates his writing to another dimension. As a refuge from the economic forces 
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controlling the production of literature, the monastery represents an ideal 
that had long fascinated Strindberg, in his letters to Littmansson during the 
1890s, in The Cloister, and in To Damascus,67 and now that the conception is 
realised (if only in imagination, and significantly even there, only on the poorly 
motivated basis of an inheritance which conveniently exempts the members of 
this fraternity from the importunate demands of earning a living in the market 
place), it enshrines an approach to experience for which he had long striven: 
‘This was the place where a few people had saved themselves from despair, 
turned their back on the world, lowered their demands, and preferred to suffer 
instead of being revenged’ (41:256). 
A similar view is advanced in The Ghost Sonata where the old vampire, 
Hummel, asserts his congenital right to punish and revenge. ‘I was born like 
that – I can’t forgive until I have punished. I took it as an imperative duty… 
and do so still, to clear away the weeds, expose the crimes, balance the books’ 
(45:191). The terms he uses are those under which Strindberg has conducted 
many a literary campaign; they resemble those under which Zachris conceives 
the novel he is writing about his wife (41:213–4), and which might as well 
have been used by Strindberg to account for A Madman’s Defence or Black 
Banners. But when, in The Ghost Sonata the Mummy intervenes at the climax 
of the second episode and unmasks the formidable Strindbergian unmasker, it 
is again with an appeal to suffering and repentance that she opposes Hummel’s 
implacable desire for retribution: ‘But I can halt time in its course. I can wipe 
out the past, undo what has been done. Not with bribes, nor with threats, 
however – but through suffering and contrition’ (45:192). 
From Inferno onwards these are the qualities on which Strindberg has 
placed particular stress in order to exonerate himself from the guilt attached to 
writing books like A Madman’s Defence and Black Banners. As he maintains, 
via Falkenström: ‘In order to write my collected works I have sacrificed 
my biography, my person’ (41:196), and in an age when to write is to live 
precariously upon oneself and of others, suffering and sacrifice are the hostages 
to fortune by means of which the writer rejects his vampire’s role and performs 
his ‘duty as a citizen’.68 But as Black Banners demonstrates, the past is not 
extinguished nor time stopped in its course by suffering or regret, and while 
the text demonstrates the effectiveness of writing as a means of revenge, it also 
conveys that it is, for Strindberg at least, an imperfect means of witting self-
knowledge. Unwittingly, however, it provides the reader with a text in which 
to piece together the illusion of Strindberg’s hopes and the anxieties as well as 
the probity of his practice, a practice described in an earlier narrative as one in 
which, for better or for worse: 
the writer takes, takes egotistically, what he comes across; takes an 
anecdote, which someone tells in his cups, takes a trait from other people’s 
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lives, which others have lived, takes his thoughts from the philosophers, 
his comments from the papers, his feelings from imagination, and then 
he puts his little name to it all and becomes great, and – that’s all there 
is to it! The poet behaves like the boa constrictor: he draws his slime over 
his prey and then it is his. He spins beautiful nets out of himself so people 




Bless me… whose greatest suffering was the pain of not being able  
to be the one I wished to be.  
– The Great Highway 
With Strindberg the problem is always where and how to conclude. Protean 
not only in the multitude of characters he animates and the guises he assumes, 
but also in the variety of genres and fields of discourse in which he compiles the 
body of writing that now represents him, the difficulty is that in this written 
universe, as in the intractable world of fact and experience with which he, like 
Henry James, was confronted, ‘relations stop nowhere’.1 But then Strindberg 
was rarely able to reach a permanent conclusion himself. Having composed 
his own epigraph with great solemnity in The Great Highway, he confounded 
expectation and violated propriety yet again by instituting the political feud, 
known as ‘Strindbergsfejden’, which he left to reverberate in his wake, and 
the successive segments of his autobiographical project indicate not merely 
a voracious appetite for new experience, but the insufficiency of the several 
strategies whereby he sought to recapture his life and preserve the identity he 
valued so highly. 
In its sheer extent, this writing represents what Strindberg’s contemporary, 
Waiter Pater, described as ‘that continual vanishing away, that strange 
perpetual weaving and unweaving of ourselves,’2 a process to which the 
committed autobiographer is particularly condemned. For in contemplating 
the now distinct image he has just produced in order to endow himself with 
the definition for which he yearns, the baffling nature of this written other 
repeatedly prompts the query directed by The Unknown to the Beggar at the 
end of the second part of To Damascus: ‘Are you you or are you me?’ (29:225). 
‘I have seen a hundred portraits of myself and have always asked: is this me?’ 
(XI:152), Strindberg told Hedlund, at the height of his Inferno crisis, and 
when the splitting or multiplying of identity through which the self seeks to 
apprehend itself is compounded with the uncertainty which a multiplicity of 
assumed roles may foster in the mind of their nourishing author, recognition is 
placed in still further doubt. Either he feels himself slipping towards the domain 
of fable or the words to which he delegates himself render an incomplete, 
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distorted, or misleading account that compels him to embark upon another. 
And yet, although it is continually resumed and terminated only by the event 
which necessarily lies outside the text approaching it, in that death which 
Waiter Benjamin sees as ‘the sanction of everything the story-teller has to 
tell’,3 this inconclusive autobiographical pursuit of the self entails its constant 
displacement into the vehicles through which it is filtered, screened, interpreted, 
and designed: into language, where the autobiographer is present not in person 
but as a figure of the text in words in which he transcribes or invents the past 
in order to represent himself as he believes he is or wishes to be seen; into 
literary genres and the plurality of codes in which, to the extent that they 
are conventional, the individual experience they recuperate is depersonalized 
and stereotyped; into roles, which dramatize the tension between writing as 
a surrogate life and its tendency to come to life independently of its nominal 
creator by conferring on the discrete particles of experience in their narrative 
enchainment not the unity of a life through time but the unity of the text; and 
into a network of witting or unwitting literary and mythical identifications in 
which, as Job, Faust, or Oedipus, a unique story becomes a tale, and hence a 
destiny, which its teller shares with others, as indeed Northrop Frye’s plural 
reference to the pharmakos figures encountered ‘in stories of artists whose 
genius makes them Ishmaels of a bourgeois society’4 nicely implies. 
In retrospect, too, it is easy to discern how Strindberg’s autobiographical 
enterprise, which puts in doubt both the notion of autonomous identity and 
the ideology of a unique existence which autobiography is ordinarily assumed 
to predicate,5 is related to what is currently termed the ‘deconstruction’ of the 
idea of a fixed and substantial selfhood undertaken by Nietzsche and Freud, as 
well as to a modernism in which (for example, in Musil, Proust, or Joyce) the 
persona of the author outside the work carries almost as much dramatic weight 
as the supernumaries within it, and which explores other forms of plausibility 
and order beyond the principle of continuity applied almost universally in the 
nineteenth century, in the belief that in every sphere continuous sequence, 
inflexible order, and eternal law prevailed. And yet, unlike for example Yeats, 
with whom he had at one time much in common, Strindberg belittled neither 
Naturalism nor the nineteenth century even when he had moved beyond them. 
‘The nineteenth century is doubtless the greatest of all centuries. It is the age 
of great discoveries and inventions, constitutions, parliamentarism, and social 
revolution’ (54:378), he declared, in ‘The Mysticism of World History’, and it 
was by insisting upon the notions of growth and development which permeated 
organicist, determinist, and evolutionary thinking that he probed the limits of 
what could be said and thought within the discourse in which he first sought 
to inscribe himself, and so pressed Naturalism until it yielded the material 
of its own undoing. As he enquired: ‘Why scoff at Naturalism when it has 
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shown itself capable of inaugurating a new stage in art, and has been accorded 
the possibility of growing and developing?’ (28:59). For it was by applying 
the Naturalist model, with its emphasis on physiological and psychological 
cause and effect, on heredity, environmental forces, and the unconscious as 
well as conscious systems of meaning which the individual inherits as the 
field of his development, that Strindberg derived a conception of the self in 
which discontinuity, the unconscious, the irrational, and the indeterminate 
predominate, where discourse is lacunary and character the unstable mosaic 
of ‘conglomerations’, ‘fragments’, and ‘torn shreds of once fine clothing’ that 
he defines in the foreword to Miss Julie, where the individual is depicted as the 
product of impersonal forces and the discourses that flow through him. 
Thus, like J. P. Jacobsen, Strindberg discovers that in ‘The real history of a 
human being’s development… the characters will seem to lack coherence’, that 
‘in reality there are individual sides in people which do not hang together’,6 
and that even if the laws of nature should prove consequential and rational, 
they nevertheless manifest themselves in the individual by unconscious and 
irrational drives, as ‘an unconstrained break out of repressed instinct’ (23:105) 
which overwhelms both the individual and the social and moral categories 
designed to buttress his world. Like Dreiser’s Carrie Meeber, the Naturalist 
protagonist is very much ‘a waif amid forces’ and hence, as Richard Chase 
remarks, ‘at the mercy of circumstances rather than of himself, indeed he often 
seems to have no self,’7 for what he does is at once himself and yet, on the 
unconscious level at which his fate is already decided, not himself. Determined, 
his determinations are not necessarily his own, and Johan can never ‘be who 
I wanted to be’ because from the outset ‘his way was necessarily determined 
by his blood inheritance, temperament, [and] position in society’ (19:189), and 
as the choice less subject of ‘inherited instinct’ (19:41), he is always prevented 
by the encrustations of his family, period, religion, and culture from attaining 
what Strindberg sometimes refers to as ‘his right, his better self ’ (19:42) because 
what he regards as his genuine self is repressed, proliferates, and vanishes in the 
multiple forms he gives himself or has imposed on him. 
As time passes, moreover, his life mounts up not as a chain of events but a 
network of relationships, a densely textured web of meaning, and to interpret 
it he requires (but again, it is Naturalism, with its focus on the quotidian and 
superficial which opens a way to the mysterious in the mundane)8 a more refined 
instrument for the collection and analysis of the trivia of which it is composed, 
and he seeks by means of analogy and the collage-like appropriation of the real 
world in the fabric of The Occult Diary, to disengage the significance of events 
from the superficiality of their notation, to interrogate and decipher the often 
enigmatic graphism of the world in which the cryptic text of his life seems 
to him also to be written. This is of course the context in which Strindberg’s 
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kinship with Freud is most apparent, but it would be equally appropriate to 
quote Nietzsche’s contemporary comment, ‘Against positivism, which halts at 
phenomena – “There is only facts” – I would say, No, facts is precisely what 
there is not, only interpretations’,9 or to anticipate Proust who, in claiming that 
‘ce livre, le plus pénible de tous à déchiffrer, est aussi le seul que nous ait dicté la 
réalité’,10 stressed the task of the interpreter in penetrating the surface at which 
a literature content with merely describing the world is arrested. It is not the 
life as a succession of natural events that possesses meaning but the interpreted 
series into which it is transformed, and whether in fiction, autobiography, or 
science all perception is, Strindberg tirelessly maintains, a subjective projection. 
‘The only thing that exists is the self (le culte du moi), and of the world and 
‘the others’ I know nothing except through the self (X:150). Every organ or 
instrument of perception frames the world it perceives and dictates what and 
how it is apprehended. They extend the self into the world and reduce the 
world to an extension of the self. And if as Strindberg senses, with a customary 
nod in the direction of Schopenhauer, that ‘what we imagine possesses a higher 
reality’, it is because ‘Reality cannot penetrate within me and be expressed again 
without having taken form as idea or imagination. Thus we know reality only 
through our idea of it, and therefore our representations of an apprehended 
reality vary so enormously’ (40:288-9). But hence, too, Strindberg’s delighted 
recognition in a world so insistently shaped and designed by his own needs and 
desires, of plots and scenarios already imprinted upon the otherwise inchoate 
multiplicity of events in which he was both actor and spectator. 
But however they are apprehended, both the text of the self and the text 
of the world whose imprint it bears, are arranged, schematized, framed, and 
translated into a language which facilitates their temporary identification, and 
it is there, where he attempts to represent himself to himself in the essentially 
auto-generative act of self -interpretation, that Strindberg at once writes and 
then reads his life, before he again relinquishes his identity and the life he has 
lived to the reader or spectator who will, on occasion, attempt to reconstitute 
an image of this ‘rival to Orpheus’ (28:81) as it is dispersed throughout the 
series of texts in which, like Beckett’s Unnamable, he implicitly entreats this 
other to ‘equate me… with him whose story this story had the brief ambition 
to be.’11 Brief, however, it is not, and as the author of an unsigned review of 
Strindberg’s letters has so finely observed, when seeking to convert the raw 
material of his life into literature, Strindberg repeatedly comes upon his life 
already arranged and written by ‘Life’s designing purposes much as a fictive 
character is subject to the author’s will; and one realizes, with a sense of awe 
that of course this is what happens when Niels Lyhne’s prayer is answered’: 
Life, a poem! But not in the sense that one ‘wrote’ one’s life instead of 
living it. How meaningless that would be, empty, empty, empty. This 
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hunting for oneself, sharply observing one’s own trail – in a circle of 
course; this pretense of throwing oneself into the stream of life, while at 
the same time sitting down and angling for yourself, and fishing oneself 
out in some curious disguise or another! If only something would take 
one in its grip – life, love, passion – so that one no longer ‘wrote’ but ‘was 
written’.12 
In short, as Strindberg writes his life, Life writes Strindberg.
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Chapter Two: Writing Out and Repetition 
1. The Mirror and the Lamp (Oxford, 1953), pp. 48, 138. 
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concludes that ‘everything in my life has been somewhat awry (på sned).’ 
63. In The Roofing Feast, for example, he refers (44:14) to L. B. Hellenbach, 
who treats ‘Die Periodicität im menschlichen Lebenslaufe’ in Magie der 
Zahlen (Vienna, 1882), pp. 99–120. 
64. Standard Edition, XXII, 72. 
65. In indicating the universal nature of his guilt feelings to Lundstedt, the 
Pastor (like the Father in To Damascus I) performs something resembling 
a psychoanalysis: at least, Lundstedt is henceforth able to express himself 
in words as well as in music, even if the profit he draws from it is only to 
repeat his story to anyone who bought him ‘a couple of drinks’ (21 :258). 
66. Unto This Last (London, People’s Library, 1908), p. 181. 
67. Compare the exchange in The Pelican: ‘(The Son):… Let’s live to 
rehabilitate ourselves, and our father’s memory! (Gerda): And seek justice. 
(The Son): Say revenge!’ (45:254) with the note: ‘It is not revenge, it is 
justice, for people must see that such a thing exists’ (NMS 4 (13)). 
68. For the way in which the act of punishment was woven into his literary 
intentions, see Kari-Ivar Hildeman, ‘Strindberg, The Dance of Death, and 
Revenge’, Scandinavian Studies, 35:4 (1963), 267–294. Note, too, the 
sections ‘Paid Debts’, ‘Hard to Unravel’ and ‘The Art of Settling Scores’ 
in A Blue Book, 46:182, 124ff. 
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70. Standard Edition, XVIII, 36. 
71. Standard Edition, XVIII, 17. 
72. Standard Edition, XII, 150. 
73. Standard Edition, XII, 149. 
74. Problémes de la linguistique générale (Paris, 1966), p. 25.
Chapter Three: Writing, not Speaking 
1. Axel made the revelation in Dagens Nyheter (3 March 1924): ‘I have just 
been reminded of it [his shyness] because he has recently been portrayed 
naked [in a sculpture by Carl Eldh]. He was so shy even of us brothers 
that when he changed his underclothes, he got into a wardrobe!’ Cf 18: 
I 73: ‘But Johan was naturally shy. He did not want to show himself 
naked.’
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31, 74, and Maria Schildknecht, quoted in Sven Hedenberg, Strindberg i 
skärselden (Göteborg, 1961), p. 167. 
3. Tjänstekvinnans son, p. 94. 
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translated by R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth, 1973), p. 197. 
5. But see Göran Printz-Påhlson, ‘Strindbergs totemism’. Konstrevy, 45:4 
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remark in The Concept of Dread and again in Quidam’s Diary (19 May) 
in Stages on Life’s Way. 
8. The Philosophy of Karl Popper, edited P. A. Schilpp (Illinois. 1974). p. 
1113. See George Steiner. After Babel (Oxford, 1975) where the passage is 
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9. Oeuvres completes, IV, 285. 
10. Jean Starobinski, La transparence et l’obstacle (Paris, 1971), p. 365. 
11. ‘On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense’. The Portable Nietzsche, 
translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York, 1954). p. 45. Much of what 
Nietzsche writes in this fragment on how in man ‘deception, flattery, 
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splendour, being masked, the disguise of convention, acting a role before 
others and before oneself – in short, the constant fluttering around 
the single flame of vanity is so much the rule and the law that almost 
nothing is more incomprehensible than how an honest and pure urge 
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Strindberg’s diagnosis of ‘The public lie’ and the mendacity to which 
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for a comparison of the two authors than the superficial application 
by Strindberg of a borrowed Nietzschean rhetoric in, for example, the 
novella, Tschandala. 
12. See also A Blue Book (46:29. 47:552), Armageddon (54:155), and The 
Roofing Feast (44:56). 
13. Språk och lögn: En essä om språkfilosojisk extremism (Stockholm, 1978). pp. 
14, 147. 
14. London, 2nd edition, 1895, pp. 330–1. 
15. Samlade otryckta skrifter, II, 199. Compare NMS 3 (1): ‘Why does life 
make people false. Deference: politeness; conflicting interests’, and the 
account of a similar scene in The Pelican (45:358). 
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19. Oeuvres complètes, III, 193. 
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23. Besides Edqvist, Alfred Jollivet, ‘Le Rousseauisme d’August Strindberg’, 
Revue de littérature comparée, 13:4 (1933). 606–22, and Elie Poulenard. 
Strindberg et Rousseau (Paris, 1959) discuss the influence of his social and 
political thought. On the debt The Son of a Servant owes the Confessions. 
See Martin Lamm, ‘Quelques influences française sur l’autobiographie 
d’August Strindberg’, in Mélanges d’histoire littéraire générale et comparée 
offerts à F. Baldensperger, II, (Paris, 1930), pp. 22–27, and Elie Poulenard, 
‘Les lnfluences française dans l’autobiographie d’August Strindberg’, 
Scandinavica, 1:1 (1962). 29–50. For some general observations on the 
affinity between Rousseau and Strindberg, see Eklund, Tjänstekvinnans 
son. p. 26 and John Landquist, ‘Strindbergs filosofi’, Filosofiska essayer 
(Stockholm, 1906), pp. 292–3. Strindberg is sparing in his specitic 
allusions to the Confessions, but Rousseau’s ‘horrible confessions’ are given 
passing acknowledgement in the letter on writing (I:188) and in ‘Soul 
Murder’ he recalls that Rousseau ‘had stolen a bit of ribbon in his youth’ 
(22: 198). Note, too, the curious appropriation of the purloined ribbon 
episode that ends Book 2 of the Confessions to point the account of a 
stolen book in The Burned House (45: 114), and the remark: ‘Yes, if we 
were to express all our thoughts… Rousseau was unwise enough to do so’ 
(40:294). 
24. The most important contexts in which one or other of the several 
incidents of accusation, both just and unjust, of theft, or of wrongful 
punishment, to do with stolen wine, fruit, books or speaking out of 
turn, occur in The Red Room (5:320), ‘An Unwelcome Addition’ (11:73). 
‘A Child’s Story’ (37:47), To Damascus (29:347), The Nightingale of 
Wittenberg (39:30), ‘Hund’s foot’ (48:1024), The Burned House (45:99. 
114), The Pelican (45:265), and ‘August Strindberg About Himself ’ 
(54:465–6). The motif appears frequently in the surviving papers. A page 
headed ‘Mea Culpa’ (NMS 6 (16)) lists ‘Robinson. Injustices. The Screws 
(Muttrarna): ABC Book: school. The Plum Tree’, and the latter appears 
on several pages in NMS 9 (3) among lists of events and encounters via 
which Strindberg appears to be sketching possible literary projects and 
attempting to perceive the patterns of recurrence and meaning in the life 
that has witnessed these events. Perhaps the most pathetic of all these 
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to dispose of the piece of paraffin-scented bread and mustard he has 
taken to quell his hunger: ‘If I put it in the stove it might be found in 
the morning by the maid: she will take it straight to her mistress and of 
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64. See 3 December 1900 and 38:183. 
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